

THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN



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
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TORONTO



THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN

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INTRODUCTION

Of all the unexpected and startling developments of the remarkable century through which we have just passed none has been more notable than the transformation of Japan. A hundred years ago she was an obscure Asiatic kingdom, by her own volition tightly closed from the world. Then the West, spurred on by the new ambitions and equipped with the new commercial and military appliances of the industrial revolution, forced itself upon her. After a few years of hesitation she heartily accepted the new situation and by a series of rapid transformations adjusted herself to it and is now a factor to be reckoned with in the trade and politics of the world. She has become the dominant figure in the Far East and has established and maintained her hegemony by successful wars against China, Russia, and Germany. She is the formal ally of Great Britain and an important member of the entente group of nations. Her ships carry a large share of the freight and passengers of the North Pacific and are to be found in all the ports of the globe. She is feared and courted by most of the great powers of the earth.

From the beginning of her metamorphosis her relations with the United States have been intimate. For the first decades unquestioned friendliness marked the intercourse of the two peoples. During the past few years, however, there has been a growing mutual suspicion. America's advance across the Pacific to Hawaii and the Philippines, her interests in China, her unwillingness to admit Japanese to her shores on an equal footing with the nationals of other treaty powers, and her emphasis on the Monroe doctrine in

opposition to Japan's commercial ambitions in Latin America, have aroused in the Sunrise Kingdom questionings and resentments. Japan's policies in Asia, especially in China, her growing naval and commercial power on the Pacific, her insistence on the rights of her subjects in the United States, and Japanese migration to and business enterprises in Latin America have similarly awakened apprehensions in the great republic. Talk of war has been rife and many have feared that the two nations are sometime to come into armed conflict. Some have felt that a clash cannot long be delayed. War seems needless and stupid, but if it is to be avoided Japan must be better understood by Americans. Her people, her institutions, her needs, and her ambitions must be studied. The citizens of the United States must not be allowed to grow up with distorted impressions of their Pacific neighbor. If in our continually closer touch with her we are not to blunder, if we are to make our relations of the best advantage to both nations, we must have sufficient knowledge to form the basis of a sane public opinion.

Such knowledge can best be acquired by an historical survey, one which will trace the development of the Japanese people and civilization from their beginning, and in the light of this development endeavor to make clear the present ambitions and problems of the nation. The Japan of to-day is the product of centuries of growth. The advent of Western civilization sixty years ago did not cause a complete break with the past. It has modified profoundly the inheritance bequeathed by that past, but the old Japan must be studied if the new is to be understood.

It is encouraging that courses which deal with Japan are appearing in our college catalogues. In the congested state of our curricula she is usually covered only in a general, one

semester survey of the entire Far East. This is probably the most that can be expected in all but a few universities, and if rightly conducted such a course can furnish a very fair general knowledge of the great lands of eastern Asia. There is, however, a real dearth of texts suitable in length and scope for such a course. The author knows of no book which can be used with any degree of satisfaction and he has canvassed the field fairly thoroughly during the past few years in search of material for his own teaching. This little volume seeks to fill the gap until something better shall appear. No exhaustive study of Japan has been attempted, but the effort has been made to present a summary of the development of the nation, its people, its civilization, and its problems and policies, which will give the essential facts and at the same time be of sufficient brevity to be covered in the six weeks usually assigned to Japan in the average course on the Far East. It may be that the book will prove of value as well to informal study groups and correspondence courses, and to the general reader who wishes a brief survey for his own information.

The plan, as may be seen by a glance at the table of contents, has been to give an introductory chapter on the geographic setting, followed by a succinct narrative of the nation's history to the time of Commodore Perry and a summary of the chief characteristics of its civilization at the inception of intimate contact with the West. Then comes a somewhat more detailed account of the transformation wrought by that contact and of the progress and problems of the new Japan. A carefully selected bibliography has been added for the use of those who may wish to pursue the study in greater detail. If the volume helps at all to a better, more sympathetic understanding of the island empire its purpose will have been amply fulfilled.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN

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CHAPTER I

THE GEOGRAPHIC SETTING OF JAPAN

Japan occupies the greater part of the chain of islands which fringes the coast of Asia from Kamchatka to the southern extremity of the Malay Peninsula. Her possessions reach from the northernmost of the Kurile islands, just south of Kamchatka, to the southern cape of Formosa,¹ a distance of about twenty-five hundred miles and nearly thirty degrees of latitude. The islands held by her number over three thousand and have a total area of 173,786 square miles, or a little more than that of the state of California, and about fifty per cent more than that of the British Isles. Most of the islands are very small and only about six hundred are inhabited. The six principal ones, enumerating them in their order from north to south, are Sakhalin, Yezo, the Main Island, Shikoku, Kiushiu and Formosa. Sakhalin is called Karafuto by the Japanese. Only the southern half of the island belongs to them and it is important chiefly for its fisheries. Yezo, or Hokkaido, as it is commonly known in Japan, was until recently inhabited chiefly by the Ainu, an aboriginal people. It is to-day being rapidly developed and settled by the Japanese. The Main Island, called in the native tongue Hondo or Honshiu, alone comprises over half the entire area of the insular part of the empire. On it from the earliest historic times has been the center of government. Shikoku, "The Four Provinces,"

¹ Called Taiwan by the Japanese.

derives its name from an ancient administrative division of the island, and forms part of the southern border of the Inland Sea, famous for the beauties of its waters, islands, and shores. Kiushiu is literally "The Nine Provinces," a designation also derived from an earlier governmental organization. It is separated from the Main Island by the narrow straits of Shimonoseki, through which passes most of the shipping from the east coast of Asia to North America. It is but a comparatively short distance from Korea and since it is also nearer to China than any other of the principal islands of the older Japan, it was the gateway through which came most of the influences from the continent. It was, too, the first to be profoundly affected by European intercourse in the sixteenth century. Its chief port, picturesque Nagasaki, is still one of the most important harbors in the empire. Formosa was ceded to Japan by China in 1895 and racially is as yet unassimilated to the rest of the nation. To the north of Yezo lie the Kuriles,¹ a long line of thinly settled islands. Kiushiu and Formosa are connected by the Riu Kiu group, which has become definitely Japanese only within the past sixty years. In addition to its islands, Japan now holds the neighboring peninsula of Korea² which has about half the area of the insular part of the empire, and has come to dominate the adjoining territories of Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Of these continental possessions more will be said later.

THE EFFECTS OF GEOGRAPHY UPON THE JAPANESE PEOPLE AND THEIR HISTORY

But this enumeration of its main component parts and area reveals little of the many important effects that the

¹ Called Chishima by the Japanese.

² Called Chosen by the Japanese.

land has had upon its people. First of all, the fact that the historic Japan has been a closely coherent group of islands has promoted unity. As we shall see later, the Japanese, although of diverse origin, are a distinct type, and have, with the exception of a few sections in the north and in the newly acquired islands in the south, attained a remarkable homogeneity. They have as well a highly developed national consciousness. Their intense patriotism has undoubtedly been furthered by the fact that the sea has separated them from other peoples.

This insular position has, as well, encouraged individuality and continuity in national development. Never since the original, prehistoric migrations of the ancestors of the Japanese have the islands been successfully invaded. No foreigners have interrupted the sequence of events, as in China, by overthrowing the native dynasty and establishing on the throne an alien line of monarchs. Only during the great Mongol irruptions in the thirteenth century was the nation seriously threatened with foreign domination. The invasions that have succeeded have been those of ideas, not of peoples. The civilization that has been evolved, although deeply affected by influences from without, has been distinctive. The free and at times wholesale appropriation of alien cultures has always been marked by a certain vigorous originality that has put its stamp on all that has been acquired.

Then the fact that the Japanese are an island people has encouraged them to become a sea-faring folk. This tendency has been strengthened by the prevalence of protected bays and the absence of great gaps between islands. The harbors at Nagasaki and Yokohama, to mention only two, are among the best in the world. The Inland Sea, dotted with islands, free from storms, and near the home of early

Japanese civilization, invited to a life on the water. The Japanese have been famous fishermen. It is but natural that in this day of international commerce they should take kindly to the sea and that their flag should be seen in every port of the world.

The Japanese islands have, moreover, a peculiarly intimate relation to the eastern shore of Asia. Their nearness to the coast promotes intercourse. In at least three places they so nearly touch the continent that communication is comparatively easy—Sakhalin on the north, Kiushiu and Korea in the center, and Formosa on the south. Of greatest importance has been the second, for it was partly through Korea that the ancestors of the Japanese reached the islands. It was through Korea that the main stream of Chinese and Indian culture flowed to Japan. It is through Korea that to-day commercial intercourse with the continent most easily takes place. Through Sakhalin may have come some aboriginal tribes from the north, possibly the ancestors of the modern Ainu. Through Formosa by way of the Riu Kiu Islands, Malay elements entered, and possibly some strains of blood from the mainland.

This nearness to Asia means, too, that the Japanese are vitally interested in continental affairs. Here is their natural field for commercial and territorial expansion. Here is the natural outlet for their surplus population. They must see to it that no strong foreign power dominates the points where Japan most nearly touches Asia. Hence they fought both Russia and China for Korea, and later annexed it. Hence they demanded that China alienate to no European power the coast of Fuhkien province opposite Formosa. They must also insist that their voice be heard in settling the affairs of their unwieldy neighbor, China, and that her door be kept open to their commerce: they

have attempted during the War of Nations so to establish themselves in the great Asiatic republic that they cannot be easily dislodged when the struggle is over. Their policy on the continent has not without some appropriateness been styled their "Monroe Doctrine." It has been inspired largely by the same fear of foreign aggression that gave rise to our insistence on Latin-American independence. We feared lest Europe, by encroaching on the newly won freedom of our sister republics of the south, would threaten our own existence. Japan is apprehensive of a monopoly by Occidental nations of the vast resources of China and Korea that would stifle her legitimate commercial expansion. In the hearts of some of her leaders there has been a passion for expansion, but before we cast a stone we need to remember that it is not yet a hundred years since we talked glibly of our "manifest destiny" and seized vast regions from a defenseless neighbor.

The length of the chain of islands, combined with the proximity to the coast of Asia, is a factor of importance. In prehistoric days it meant that from many different points diverse racial elements could find their way into the islands. Thus through Sakhalin have come peoples akin to those of Siberia, through Korea various folk from Central Asia, China, and Korea, and from the south some of Malay blood. In more recent times this relationship to the continent has placed Japan in a position to dominate nearly all the east coast of Asia. Great Britain because of her location has long been able to command the ocean routes to north-western Europe and to be queen of the North Atlantic; even more does Japan's geographical position point to her as the logical mistress of the foreign commerce and shipping of far-eastern Asia.

Her location has made Japan the natural interpreter of

the culture of the Occident to the Far East. It is no mere accident that she should have been the first nation of that region unreservedly to unbar her doors to the West. Her great harbors, some facing Asia and some America, were an open challenge to the Occident when the age of steam began to dot the Pacific with ships. Nor is it an accident that Japan should have led in opening Korea, and that Chinese should have flocked in such numbers to her universities to acquire the new learning. She has geographical reasons for believing herself preordained to guide the Far East into the new age.

Not only have her insularity and her relation to the Asiatic mainland influenced Japan profoundly, but the characteristics of the land itself have been important. In the first place, the islands are very mountainous. They are badly broken by peaks and ranges. Some of these are of volcanic origin, others the result of folding, but they occupy the larger part of Japan's surface. As a result only a small proportion of the land is tillable. At present about seventeen per cent. of Japan's area (exclusive of Korea) is listed as arable. Probably another ten per cent. can be reclaimed, although the process will prove costly. This means that the limits of population supported by home-grown food are soon reached. Any excess beyond these limits must either emigrate or busy itself, as in Great Britain, with manufacturing and commerce. Fortunately there is near at hand a vast continent. In Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia are unoccupied lands for immigrants. In China there is a teeming, industrious population, the greatest potential market in the world, and unmeasured supplies of raw material. Nearly the entire eastern coast of Asia is a great granary and is to become a greater one. Moreover, the mountains of Japan invite to manufacturing. They are in

places well stocked with coal, and their streams can be harnessed to provide water power. They are, unfortunately, lacking in iron ore, but this is found in great abundance in China proper and Manchuria, not far from navigable streams which connect directly with the sea and with Japan. It is evident that Japan must insist that the door on the neighboring continent be kept open to her, and it is but natural that she should seek special privileges there. Here is a source of food; here is a possible outlet for surplus population; here is a market for her manufactures; here a store of raw materials.

The mountains cut the islands into small valleys and plains. There are few navigable streams, and in the old days before the advent of railways, telegraphs, and steam-boats, intercommunication was difficult. As in most mountain countries, a strong tendency to internal division followed. The nation separated naturally into small groups, each of which tended to become independent of the central power, and the feudal form of government and the emphasis on family which we are later to notice easily developed.

Japan is favored in climate. She lies largely in the temperate zone, the home of the great civilizations of the globe. By some observers she is said to have, more than any other country of Asia, that succession of cyclonic disturbances which helps to produce the marked changes in temperature from day to day that are believed by a school of modern geographers to promote human activity and civilization. She has an abundant rainfall. The Black Current,¹ a warm ocean stream from the tropics, washes a portion of her shores. Vegetation is luxuriant and as much of her land as is tillable responds splendidly to the efforts

¹ Kuro Shiwo.

of the husbandmen. Her large population could not have been self-supporting for so long had soil and climate not favored her efforts.

The natural surroundings may, moreover, partly account for the love of beauty which we so associate with the Japanese. The wooded hills, the infinite variety of mountain and valley, of lake and harbor and sea, could scarcely have failed to develop in the people any latent sense of the artistic. The land is one of the most beautiful in the world, and the inhabitants have responded to it with a love for flowers, for trees, for birds, for moonlit lakes, for streams and waterfalls. Their politeness and regard for ordered ceremonial may also be partially the result of long ages spent in an attractive environment.

The very situation and the natural resources and characteristics of the islands, then, have had and still have a profound influence upon the people, their civilization, their ambitions, and their policies.

Bibliography. (See end of the book for annotations and further details on these works.) Griffis, *The Mikado's Empire*; *Japan Year Book*, 1916; Hearn, *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan*; Mitford, *Japan's Inheritance*; Nitobe, *The Japanese Nation*; *Encyclopædia Britannica*, eleventh edition, article Japan.

CHAPTER II

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE INTRODUCTION OF BUDDHISM

Of the early history of the Japanese we know but imperfectly. Traditions, myths, and fragments of poetry and religious ritual have told us something. Ethnology and archeology are telling us a little more. The most ancient written records now in existence did not take their present form until the eighth century A. D. The oldest of these, the Kojiki ("Records of Ancient Doings") was finished in 712 and was a written transcript of the ancient traditions and records from the memory of one man who had made a business of collecting them. The next, the Nihongi, ("Chronicles of Japan"), was completed in 714¹ and was the work of a number of officially appointed scholars who carefully examined existing records and traditions. It was more profoundly influenced by Chinese thought and language than was the Kojiki, but in both works the original stories were made to conform to the ideas and surroundings of their compilers.²

THE TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT OF JAPANESE ORIGINS

The myths and traditions as they have come down to us give a most naïve account of the origin of the land, the

¹ An emended edition, called the Nihonshoji, was completed in 720.

² Another record, the Fudoki, made in 713, was a statement by the provinces of their natural features and traditions. Only fragments of it have survived.

people, and the state. Curious and numerous gods and goddesses are seen. After the birth of a series of divinities whom we need not notice, the islands themselves and various gods representing the forces of nature come into existence as offspring of a divine pair, Izanagi and his wife Izanami. Izanami dies and Izanagi goes to the underworld to seek her. He finds her, but angers her, and returns without her to the upper world. He finds himself contaminated by contact with the dead, and among other divinities there are born from the pollution which he washes off, the Goddess of the Sun (Amaterasu), the God of the Moon, and the God of Force.¹ The God of Force proved troublesome and so offended his sister, the Sun Goddess, that she retired into a cave and left the world in darkness. The divinities² in great distress attempted to induce her to return. At the suggestion of one of their number they performed before her refuge a sacred dance and liturgy, the traditional origin of some of the later religious ritual, and by sounds of merriment tempted her to peep out. She was informed that a greater than she had been found, and to convince her a mirror was shown her in which she saw her own face reflected. Surprised, she gradually came out, and the gods barred the cave behind her to prevent a recurrence of her flight. The God of Force eventually left heaven and from him sprang a race of men in Izumo, a province on the southwest coast of the main island. Ninigi, a grandson of the Sun Goddess, was commissioned by the gods to rule Japan and as a sign of sovereignty was given a chaplet of jewels, a sword, and the mirror that had helped entice his grandmother out of her cave. These three objects are still the

¹ Susanoo.

² Kami, the Japanese call them, a name not exactly represented by any single English word.

insignia of the imperial house of Japan. Ninigi settled in Kiushiu and a descendant of his, known to posterity as Jimmu, or Jimmu Tenno,¹ made his way to Yamato, on the peninsula that juts southward from the main island to the east of Shikoku, and there established himself as emperor. Then followed long centuries and many rulers. Kiushiu, Shikoku, and the southern part of the main island were brought under the sway of the royal house in Yamato, and the conquests were extended among the non-Japanese peoples of the north. One notable warrior, Yamato-dake, whose name is still dear to the nation, made his way as far north as the bay of Tokyo, fighting with the aborigines of the intervening districts. The accession of Jimmu is placed by Japanese annalists at 660 B. C.

The complete story of these early centuries is a long one,² but the many attempts that have been made to find in it traces of authentic history disclose only a minimum of fact. The story is, however, still taught in Japan and although no longer believed by men of education, it is seldom openly denied and it has had and still has a profound influence upon the nation. According to it the emperor is descended from the gods, and the imperial house has, to use the words of the constitution promulgated in 1890, "a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal."³ It helps to invest the ruling line with the dignity and sanction of the divine and to make disloyalty a sacrilege. Copies of the jewels, sword, and mirror which are said to have been given to Ninigi are still transmitted from emperor to emperor, and

¹ Tenno means "lord of heaven," or emperor.

² It may be found in some degree of detail in Brinkley, *A History of the Japanese People*.

³ The present emperor is by Japanese reckoning the 123rd of the line.

are emblems of the monarch's divine ancestry. In spite of modern science, the influence of these beliefs remains strong. However much the educated may have lost faith in them, openly to deny them might even now be construed as treason.

The nation at large was, moreover, at the time of Perry's coming, believed by the more radical patriots to be descended from the gods and so to be superior to all others, and the land was held to be *par excellence* the country of the gods; of all the earth it was the nearest to heaven when the connection between the two was broken. While never so generally nor so strongly held as the belief in the divine origin of the emperor, these convictions produced an attitude of mind that may still reënforce the intense, almost chauvinistic patriotism that exists in some quarters.

From these stories, reënforced by ethnology and archeology, it is possible to reconstruct with some degree of accuracy the main outlines of the beginnings of Japan. The earliest inhabitants of the islands seem to have been a race called "cave men." Their very existence is questioned. If they were a real people the only remaining traces of them are pit dwellings and shell mounds, and they must have been in the most primitive stages of culture. Entirely historical, however, are a strong race of aborigines,¹ probably the ancestors of those Ainu who are still to be found on the island of Yezo and the Kuriles, a hairy, flat-faced people, at present mild-tempered. Of their origin nothing certain is known; some have supposed that they came from northern Asia. When the first Japanese found their way to the islands these aborigines were in possession of most of the land. They were a fierce, rough lot, still in the stone age.

¹ Called Yemishi in the Japanese records.

They were cannibals, and apparently were without family life. They offered a sturdy resistance to the more nearly civilized invaders and were driven back and subdued only after long centuries of warfare, warfare which continued to within the past few hundred years. They left permanent marks on their conquerors, chiefly in an admixture of blood which is strongest in the north.

The Japanese of to-day are a mixed race, and are the result of the coalescence of several migrations. We cannot trace with certainty all the streams, but there must have been several of them from various sources, reaching the islands at different times. Not only do traditions and myths indicate a composite origin, but archeological remains, consisting principally of graves and their contents, unmistakably show it. The amalgamation, moreover, has never been entirely completed; from the earliest times there have been two pronounced types, the aristocratic, slender of limb and of light complexion, and the plebeian, stocky and dark. The migrations came from the continent for the most part, chiefly by the way of the Korean peninsula, but also from the south. There are strong strains of Malay blood which are apparently due to settlements partly from the continent and partly from the southern islands. Tradition, in fact, tells of a people¹ in Kiushiu which some have thought to be to-day represented by a race in Borneo and to have come northward along the chain of islands from the south. They were conquered by the Japanese from Yamato and very possibly amalgamated with them. Too little is as yet known of the ethnology of the Far East to enable us to determine accurately all the racial affiliations of the Japanese. Some of the groups that have entered into the formation of the Chinese are evidently represented, but

¹ Kumaso.

there are differences which must be accounted for on the basis of origin as well as of environment. The Manchu-Korean and the Malay stocks predominate, with the balance in favor of the latter, but there are as well traces of infusion of other blood, part of it Mongol, part of it still undetermined. Some enthusiasts have even seriously claimed to have found an Indo-European admixture. In language the Japanese more nearly resemble some of the groups of northern and central Asia, and especially Korea, but there are also likenesses to the Malay tongues.

When they arrived in the islands the ancestors of the Japanese were some of them in the bronze and some in the iron age and were evidently much superior to, although probably less numerous than the aborigines whom they found in possession. There were two main centers from which they spread, one in what is now Izumo, and one on the south coast of the island of Kiushiu. The latter was nearer to the southern islands and possibly also to Korea. There was also apparently a center of culture in Yamato. The peoples in all three of these places may have been closely related in blood. The settlers on Kiushiu first conquered Yamato and then Izumo. The first conquest of Yamato was traditionally made under Jimmu Tenno. At any event it was at Yamato that the Japanese state first had its seat and it was from there that it gradually expanded. The time of the foundation of the state was probably several hundred years later than the legendary 660 B. C. Extension was not an easy matter; it was achieved only by dint of constant warfare with other Japanese, against the ancestors of the Ainu, who stubbornly contested every foot of ground, and with other peoples, dimly discerned on the pages of the Kojiki and Nihongi.

THE YAMATO STATE

In the course of some centuries the Japanese hewed out for themselves a state which held in rather loose allegiance the southern part of the main island and Shikoku and Kiushiu. It reached northward toward the center of the main island and was strong enough to undertake a raid on the mainland. A persistent story has come down of an invasion of Korea under the leadership of a redoubtable woman, the empress Jingo. Her son, Ojin, is even more famous and is still revered as Hachiman, the God of War. From monuments and the Korean records we learn that there were several raids on the peninsula by the Japanese. The peninsula was nearer China, the great civilized state of the East Asia of those days, and hence probably had a higher culture than the Japanese, but it was divided into a number of principalities whose quarrels offered great temptations to the island warrior chiefs. For years the Japanese were in possession of a part of southern Korea, and there were frequent movements of Korean emigrants to Japan. The petty Korean states nearest Japan were considered as tributary to the court in Yamato.

The culture of the little kingdom that centered at Yamato was primitive enough. There were no cities and no carefully constructed houses. For several centuries writing was either unknown or used only by a very few. Family life was a patriarchy with lingering traces of matriarchy. The land was owned principally by the emperors and the noble families. There was some navigation in small craft, and fish formed a part of the national diet, although probably not so largely as now. Rice and other grains were cultivated. Many kinds of vegetables were known and used. The dense forests that originally covered the land were

gradually cleared away, and tilled fields took their places. Irrigation was practiced. Game was hunted in the forests and formed a part of the bill of fare. Cooking was in unglazed earthen vessels. For clothing, silk was used a little, but the principal fabrics were made from hemp and bark. Cotton was not introduced from China until later and wool was unknown. There was no money and such trade as existed was carried on by barter. Art was of the crudest, although, contrary to the custom of later ages, the Japanese elaborately decked themselves with personal ornaments. Some of the accouterments of war showed the beginnings of the æsthetic sense. There were a few simple trades, for implements were needed on the farm, in the home, and for battle. Artisans were organized by guilds. Life was largely agricultural and military. The population was divided into a number of different classes; serfs were to be found, and slavery existed, as might be expected from the nearly incessant warfare. There were apparently no codes of law, and justice was administered in a crude kind of way. The accused frequently swore to his innocence before the gods and as proof of guiltlessness thrust his arm in boiling water or carried a hot iron in his hand. Customs that seem to us cruel were in use. For example, the servitors, wives, and concubines of a chief were buried alive by the grave of their lord. Not until later, and then probably due to influence from the continent, were clay images substituted for the living sacrifices.

From the beginning the state was based on war, and the prolonged struggle with the Ainu and principalities in the south and west but tended to accentuate this characteristic. Unlike their continental neighbors, the Chinese, the Japanese as they expanded were compelled to fight for every inch of soil; as a result their culture had largely a military as well

as an agricultural cast. In China the soldier has usually been considered of secondary importance, an evil to be endured only because he is necessary for the defense of the scholars, farmers, and merchants. In Japan, with the exception of a few important centuries, he has dominated the state.

The imperial institution apparently dates from the earliest days of the nation. That does not mean that it was originally what we know it to be to-day. It was a gradual growth. At first the ruler was simply the leader who united the various tribes or families in war and formed a nucleus for a loose kind of coherence in the intervals of peace. Theoretically, possibly as a result of the unity made necessary by the long warfare with the aborigines and other enemies, he was absolute; practically he shared his power with local chieftains, and the state resembled a federation of tribes under his hereditary leadership. Not all the chieftains were loyal. Those in the far west and south were often virtually independent and yielded allegiance to the Yamato court only when a vigorous monarch sat on the throne. The emperor was high priest, declared war and peace, and the imperial institution became so firmly fixed in the consciousness of the nation that although much modified, it persisted through all the vicissitudes of later centuries. It was never abandoned, and when the great transformation of the nineteenth century came it formed the rallying point for the reorganized nation.

Religion was of the simplest. There was no formal theology and no elaborate system of ethics. Cosmogony was childlike. The people had not yet thought deeply on conduct, and on the mysteries of life and the origin of things. The great forces and objects of nature were deified and the spirits of ancestors were worshipped, especially

those of the imperial house: religion came to be, in fact, very largely the cult and bulwark of the royal power. Man was believed to be surrounded by a host of spirits who lived in trees, or rocks, or the air. Animals as well as men might be regarded as divinities. Shrines were few in number and crude in architecture. Ritual was not ornate or complicated, and consisted largely in the adoration and propitiation of spirits, gods, and ancestors, and in purification from ceremonial uncleanness. This purification was partly associated with a personal cleanliness which seems then as now to have been a national characteristic. In common with other primitive peoples various objects were held to be taboo, a corpse, for example, and a woman at childbirth. This primitive religion has persisted with amazingly few modifications. Originally it had no distinctive name, but after foreign cults entered, it became self-conscious and was dubbed Shinto, "the Way of the Gods." Present day Shinto is this primitive religion with the changes that it has undergone through the centuries.

The simple culture here described was the product of centuries through which progress was taking place and changes were always occurring. Only dimly can we picture these times, and even more inadequately can we treat them in a book of this length.

CHINESE CIVILIZATION: ITS CONTACT WITH JAPAN

While the Japanese state was growing up around Yamato, a mighty civilization was being formed on the neighboring continent. Beginning at least as early as the second millennium before the Christian era, in what is now the north-western section of China proper, the Chinese people had been increasing in numbers and territory, and in the latter

half of the first millennium before Christ they had produced a philosophy, a literature, an art, and an industrial and commercial organization that compare favorably with the best cultures of the ancient Occident. Confucius had meditated on the philosophy, ethics, and statecraft of his race, and, leaving on them the indelible stamp of a great personality, had transmitted them to posterity in a group of writings and sayings, the major part of the so-called Chinese classics. These have had an influence on a larger proportion of mankind than any other literary collection outside of the Christian and the Buddhist scriptures. Mencius and other philosophers had followed him. The Taoist faith had been developed. Writing had been brought to a high state of perfection in the form of characters, partly pictographs, partly ideographs, partly phonograms, and a literary form had been produced which with remarkably few alterations is the standard for the Chinese written language to-day. Agriculture, industry, and commerce flourished. Population had multiplied.

In the third century before Christ the separate Chinese principalities had been welded together into one empire. Under the Han dynasty (B. C. 206–A. D. 214), in the flush of newly found national unity, the boundaries had been extended to the north, east, and south, and for a time included much of the territory occupied by the Chinese empire of to-day. Trade had been opened across the caravan routes of Central Asia and communication established with the outposts of Indian and Greek civilization.

This expanding culture on the neighboring continent could not but affect Japan. Princes of the Han had set themselves over part of Korea and the civilization they brought with them made itself felt in the Yamato state. In the centuries that followed the Han Japanese embassies

were sent to the court of China; much that was Chinese was adopted by the semi-barbarous islanders; writing was introduced, although the knowledge of it made headway but slowly, and Confucian philosophy became known in court circles. Korean and Chinese artisans and merchants immigrated at times in large numbers, bent upon developing for their own profit the market afforded by the eager, virile, backward Japanese. With them, as with the Occidental merchants of later centuries, came a civilization which the Japanese appropriated and stamped with their own genius.

This intercourse had been in progress for several centuries and under its stimulus Japanese culture had been slowly developing, when a series of events took place which within a few years was to work a transformation in the island kingdom. The Chinese race was expanding. For centuries it was divided into petty states, but a renewed unity came and was followed by further expansion and a flowering of art and literature which profoundly affected all eastern Asia including Japan. The vehicle for this enlarged contribution of culture from China to Japan was Buddhism.

For further reading see: Griffis, *The Mikado's Empire*; Chamberlain's translation of the Kojiki; Aston's translation of the Nihongi; Aston, *Shinto*; Brinkley, *Japan, Its History, Arts, and Literature*; Brinkley, *A History of the Japanese People*; Asakawa, *The Early Institutional Life of Japan*; Longford, *The Story of Old Japan*; Longford, *The Story of Korea*.

of earnest, keen minds, who had found in it intellectual satisfaction and spiritual light. They had left on it the impress of their thought and had helped to make of it a faith that not only had a message for the simple but could command the respect and engage the life-long devotion of the most highly educated.

Shortly after the time of Christ the northern form of Buddhism was carried to China along the trade routes of Central Asia opened by the Han dynasty, and in the next few centuries, reënforced by the southern form, it achieved great popularity and took its place among the three chief faiths of the empire.

At the beginning of the third century after Christ the Han dynasty collapsed, and with it Chinese unity. In the earlier years of the intermittent civil war that followed, the Chinese were naturally not inclined to push out to neighboring nations with their culture. At the end of a century and a half or two centuries, however, some of the states into which the empire was divided became strong enough to exert an influence on their neighbors, and Buddhist missionaries found their way from China to Korea. By the middle of the sixth and the beginning of the seventh century reunion was in sight. Under a short-lived dynasty¹ followed by a much stronger one, the T'ang (620-907), China achieved union, her boundaries were extended beyond any previous limits, and a great development in commerce, art, literature, and religion followed. For a time she was the largest and most prosperous state in the world. To her capital at Si-an-fu came envoys from the peoples of Eastern and Central Asia. Merchants were to be met there from even the distant Roman empire, and Nestorian and Manichæan missionaries were to be found in competition, some-

¹ The Sui (589-619).

times not altogether unfriendly, with the followers of Gautama. In the centuries between the Han and the T'ang dynasties, Buddhism had become extremely popular and it was but to be expected that the Chinese should desire to propagate it. What more natural, then, than that Buddhism and Chinese culture should go hand in hand to outlying states? And what more natural than that Japan should be dazzled by the splendor of its great neighbor and under the impulse of contact with its new life should undergo a transformation? One is reminded of the changes wrought in Japan and China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by contact with Western peoples. The Christian missionary and the merchant and diplomat have gone hand in hand; the missionary, as a rule more altruistic and daring than the others, has been the most powerful agent of Occidental culture in the first stages of intercourse.

Buddhism reached Korea in the second half of the fourth century and was accepted by at least some of the kingdoms into which the peninsula was divided. Southern Korea was, as we have seen, in close touch with Japan, and it was only a question of time until the Indian faith would find its way across the intervening straits to the islands. In 522, indeed, a Buddhist monk came directly from China to Japan; he met with little response, but a few years later, in 545 and again in 552, the king of a Korean state¹ in close alliance with Japan sent Buddhist images and sacred books to the emperor in Yamato and advised the adoption of the new faith. Buddhism did not meet with immediate acceptance. There was, as might be expected, a party of conservatives who wished to reject it. The foreign religion, however, found an advocate in the powerful Soga family. In spite of pestilence and lightning that awakened the angry

¹ Kudara.

fear of the mob, the Soga persisted in erecting and maintaining a shrine for the new cult. Riots and even civil war followed, but in time the Soga prevailed, and completely dominated the throne. With their victory the success of Buddhism was assured. The Prince Imperial, Shotoku, one of the most brilliant leaders Japan has produced, was an ally of the Soga and an ardent disciple of the bonzes from the continent. The imperial court fell into line. Temples were built, monasteries were erected, and large numbers of men and women of noble birth renounced the world for the cloister. There were at various intervals during some centuries several women on the throne who aided the progress of the foreign cult by their fervor.

CHINESE AND OTHER CONTINENTAL INFLUENCES ON JAPAN

When once espoused by the upper classes the new faith and its attendant civilization achieved popularity with the masses. As in the nineteenth century, a feeling of national pride would not brook any charge of being backward in the race for progress, and when once thoroughly convinced that China's culture was superior, the Japanese set themselves to adopting it and adapting it to their needs. The process was hastened as the years went by and the brilliant T'ang dynasty was established and became the master of eastern Asia. The T'ang generals by the conquest of Korea in 667 brought the civilization of the continent to Japan's very doors. Missionaries, merchants, artisans, and scholars from Korea and China journeyed to the islands. Japanese visited Si-an-fu, some of them as students supported by the government, and were dazzled by its wealth and splendor. Embassies were sent to the Chinese capital and came back to spread its fame. Japan was being swept into the life of the Far East and sought to conform herself to it.

The transformation, as might be expected, was most marked at or near the capital, and as in the nineteenth century, the distant rural districts were the slowest to change. The entire nation was involved, however, and all phases of its life were affected. Naturally enough, Buddhism flourished. Many temples were erected. Rich and poor took the vows of celibate Buddhist monks and large monastic communities came into existence. Buddhist ethics were preached, and there followed a greater kindness in manners and a larger respect for animal life. The idea of reincarnation found acceptance, although never as fully as in India. Hinayana, the southern form of Buddhism, at first predominated, but in time it was chiefly the northern form, Mahayana, that prevailed and molded the forms of faith. The stately ritual of the temple services was introduced, and mightily impressed the Japanese, for until now they had been familiar with no other religious ceremonies than the simple ones connected with their native cult. The elaborate and matured philosophy of Buddhism had opposed to it no organized rival system. It raised and answered questions about existence and the divine which seem never seriously to have troubled the older Japanese, and hence drew attention to and met a genuine need.

The native cult was not abandoned. In later years, as we shall see, belief in it was reconciled with the acceptance of the new religion by the ingenious theory that its divinities were incarnations of the Buddha and of Buddhist saints. The two faiths continued to exist side by side with mutual tolerance. Shinto was reenforced and to a slight extent modified by Chinese contributions; its reverence for the dead, for instance, was strengthened by contact with Chinese ancestor worship.

Chinese writing and literature achieved popularity. The

Chinese written character had been known, as we have seen, for some time, but its use had been confined to a comparatively narrow circle. It was now studied more extensively, although for years the common people and even the higher classes away from the capital did not use it. The task of adapting it to Japanese needs was no light one. The two languages, Japanese and Chinese, were apparently entirely unrelated. One was polysyllabic, the other monosyllabic, and their grammatical constructions were very different. The Chinese characters, moreover, do not form an alphabet, but are pictographs, ideographs, and phonograms. Thus 人, in another form 丿, is man, and was originally meant to represent two human legs: 手 or 丿 is hand, and was in the beginning 丶, a crude attempt at a picture of the five digits; 人 and 二 (meaning two) combine to form 仁, meaning the duties between two men or man and man, and rather crudely translated "benevolence." Most of the characters are phonograms. Thus there is a character 孵 now pronounced *fu* and meaning primarily "to brood on eggs." Combined with 人 it forms 俘 and represents another word also pronounced *fu* and meaning a prisoner of war. Combined with 艹, meaning grass, it forms 荸 which represents a word which is also pronounced *fu* and means the inner skin of a kind of water plant. And these examples could be multiplied by the hundreds. In adapting these characters to Japanese use, two methods could be employed. They could be used phonetically; that is, a Japanese word could be reproduced by Chinese characters with regard not to their meaning, but merely to their sound in Chinese. Thus the Japanese word for mountain is *yama*. It could be written by two Chinese characters pronounced *ya* and *ma*, say for example 耶 (ya), a particle implying doubt, and 馬

(*ma*), meaning horse. This, however, is clumsy, as the Chinese characters do not suggest the idea, and there are syllables in Japanese for which there exist no corresponding Chinese sounds or characters. On the other hand, the Japanese word could be represented by the Chinese character having the same meaning. In this latter way the Chinese word itself might be taken over into the language. Thus *yama* was written by the Chinese character 山, meaning mountain, and given either its Japanese pronunciation, *yama*, or its Chinese pronunciation, *shan* or *san*. The famous volcano Fuji is either *Fujiyama* or *Fujisan*. Both methods of adapting the Chinese characters were used at first and great confusion resulted, but the established method gradually came to be the latter, i. e., employing the character which represented not the Japanese sound but the idea. This brought into the Japanese language many new words, since the character could be given either its Chinese or its Japanese pronunciation. There also came into the language many new ideas. Chinese came to bear much the same relation to Japanese that Latin does to English. The feat of adapting Chinese was no easy one. So unrelated were the two languages originally that it was probably as difficult to use Chinese characters to write Japanese as it would be to use them to write English.

With the written character came Chinese literature in all its wealth—philosophy, history, poetry, cosmogony, and science. It was the accumulation of centuries of development. There were the writings not only of Confucius, Mencius, and their contemporaries, of Laotze and the early Taoist worthies, but the rich store produced under the brilliant Han dynasty and the new flood that was issuing from the facile pens of the T'ang scholars. It

was on the whole a literature as able and as rich as that which came down to northern Europe from ancient Greece and Rome. Under its influence a Japanese literature began. The legends and stories of the earlier days were recorded, materials that later entered into the Kojiki and the Nihongi.

With the language and literature came art. Painting and sculpture had reached a high stage of perfection in China, first under the Han and than under the T'ang. Buddhism had brought with it to China a well developed iconography, combining Indian, Greek, and Central Asiatic elements. Under its stimulus the Chinese genius had produced works which in technique, feeling, and insight were of a very high order. The scanty remnants are still the delight of lovers of the beautiful in all nations. The latent Japanese genius was aroused by the examples presented and began to produce in great abundance pictures of Gautama and of various sacred episodes. Buddhist statues and carvings were imported; architecture became prominent for the first time; Buddhist temples were erected on the model of those on the continent, marked contrasts to the unpretentious buildings that had done for the Shinto worship and the flimsy structures in which even royalty had been wont to live. Inspired by the construction of temples, better and more permanent dwellings were erected for the emperor and the nobility.

Various handicrafts were introduced from Korea and China and the Japanese became familiar with new utensils and implements, with better textiles and industrial methods. Chinese medicine and military science were brought in. The Chinese calendar was formally adopted. Chinese costumes were introduced, and their use and form carefully regulated by law. Roads were built, probably for the first

time. Communication by land now supplemented that by boats, heretofore the chief means of transportation. Shipbuilding was improved and commerce grew. A system of weights and measures was adopted. The importation of the precious metals stimulated the Japanese to open mines of their own. Silver was discovered in the islands and shortly afterward, copper. With the working of native ores came the minting of money. In the early years of the eighth century the first true coins were struck; as in China they were mostly of copper.

There was an immigration of Koreans and Chinese. Some of course were Buddhist missionaries, drawn partly by zeal and partly by ambition. Some were handicraftsmen. Others were merchants who were interested in exploiting the resources of the newly opened islands. Still others were scholars, attracted by the rewards offered by the court and the nobility for men of learning. As a result, an infusion of Korean and Chinese blood found its way into Japanese veins, increasing the complexity of a stock that was already a composite of several races.

There were great social transformations. Wealth increased and with it the difference between rich and poor was accentuated. A greater emphasis was laid upon agriculture. The Japanese family was modified and strengthened by contact with Chinese ideals, which were, briefly, that orderly family life and its attendant veneration for ancestors are the basis of society. They found Japan not entirely unprepared to accept them, for the family systems of the two countries were fundamentally the same, but they greatly strengthened and modified existing tendencies. Chinese ethics, an outgrowth of the family system, effected a change in Japanese moral standards.

THE POLITICAL CHANGES DUE TO CONTACT WITH CHINA AND
THE CONTINENT

Especially noteworthy was the reorganization which took place in the state. Prince Shotoku, as we have seen, was an ardent advocate of the new religion. He was equally in favor of the new culture. He was a student not only of Buddhism, but of the great historic classics of China, the writings of Confucius and his school, and was an eager and intelligent admirer of the political machinery of the T'ang. It was due partly to his initiative that a complete reorganization of the government took place. In 604 he issued his "constitution" in seventeen articles, sometimes called Japan's first written code of laws. This was not an elaborate legal document, however, enumerating specific crimes and prescribing penalties, but an attempt to apply in a somewhat general way Buddhist and Confucian ethical principles to official life. It was a body of moral maxims sent out as instructions to the dignitaries of the state to guide them in the performance of their duties. Reverence for Buddhism and loyalty to the emperor were insisted upon, a high standard of personal rectitude was encouraged, and justice and integrity were commanded in the fulfillment of public duty. In 645,¹ after the death of Shotoku, a complete reorganization of the state took place, so thorough that this date may be regarded as the time when the real revolution in government occurred. Additional reforms followed under succeeding monarchs, usually along the lines marked out in 645, for over a period of nearly a century. In 701, for

¹ Under the emperor Kotoku, 645-654. They are known as the *Daika* reforms.

example,¹ a revised code of statutes was promulgated which dealt with practically all phases of official life.

The changes made during these years consisted mainly in an attempt to adapt to Japan the governmental system of China. The process was revolutionary and not altogether successful. China was a great agricultural, industrial, and commercial state whose organization headed up in an absolute monarch through a hierarchy of officials carefully chosen by competitive civil service examinations. The government existed in theory for the good of the people and was interested in everything pertaining to their welfare. Now, the Japanese were a military and an agricultural folk; their state was small and was made up of a cluster of principalities under local chieftains loosely acknowledging the headship of a hereditary ruler who was supposed to be descended from the gods. The attempt was made to reproduce in this very alien surrounding a political organization which had been developed to meet an entirely different set of needs. Temporarily, for many decades indeed, it seemed to succeed. The capital was located permanently at Nara in Yamato, and was not as formerly moved on the death of each sovereign. At Nara a city was laid out on the plan of the great Chinese capital, Si-an-fu. Here the emperors resided from 709 to 784, when the seat of government was transferred to a new site, the present Kyoto,² and a new and larger city was built, also on the lines of the Chinese prototype. This was the home of the emperors until the nineteenth century.

¹ Under the emperor Mommu (697-707). The codes are known as the *Daiho* laws.

² The period during which the capital was at Nara (708-784) is known as the Nara epoch, and the first few centuries at Kyoto are known from an older name for Kyoto as the Hei-an epoch (794-1159).

The permanent location of the capital, however, came almost at the culmination of a series of changes which entirely altered the administration of the kingdom. The outstanding feature of the "reforms" was the increase in the power of the Japanese monarch. His position already had much of sanctity attached to it. It was now made even more commanding, the source of all authority. The adoption of the Chinese system, in fact, seems to have been made under astute ministers and rulers who deliberately planned to use it to strengthen the power of the throne against that of the nobles, and to eliminate as far as possible the hereditary principle from every office but that of the monarch. It was in the main the constitution which had been evolved in China in the victorious struggle of the emperor against the hereditary local princes. One of the earliest evidences of the growing authority of the Japanese monarch is to be found in the "constitution" of Prince Shotoku. Still further proof was afforded by the fall of the powerful Soga family, an integral part of the program of the reforms of 645. For years the Soga had dominated successive monarchs, but they were now deposed, and less than seventy years later were exterminated.

It must be added that the Chinese theory of imperial succession was not accepted. In the continental empire the monarch was believed to hold his office by virtue of the "Mandate of Heaven," and if the ruling house proved unworthy that mandate might be withdrawn and given to another. Hence rebellion against a corrupt dynasty was justified, and family followed family on the throne. The position was sacred, but the occupant might be unworthy, and if so, he could be removed. The Japanese did not accept this theory. In fact, the reformers emphasized with renewed force the sanctity of the imperial family, and its

unbroken descent from the gods. Rebellion against the throne was held to be the height of impiety. A change of dynasty would have been utterly abhorrent.

A division between civil and military officials was made. No longer were the duties of the soldier and the administrator to be combined as in the earlier days, when the nation was, in many respects, a congeries of tribes and families rather loosely united by allegiance to the royal house, but a sharp division of functions was introduced on the model of the system in use in China. A hierarchy of civil officials was created and these were to be chosen partly on the basis of noble blood, and partly by means of civil service examinations based largely on the classics of the Confucian cult. Capacity for administration was thus measured, as on the continent, by the ability to produce an elegant and learned essay in Chinese. To prepare candidates schools were established in the capital and the provinces. A central ministry of eight departments was organized, after the system in use at Si-an-fu. Codes of laws were issued, inspired by Chinese models. The attempt was made to insure justice for every member of the body politic, even to the humblest. Although the old noble families were retained, many of the existing social gradations were abolished, and a new division of classes was introduced. All Japanese, irrespective of rank, were to be subject to the emperor and to his courts and his laws. Any might freely petition the monarch for the redress of grievances.

Military conscription was introduced, again under the influence of the continent. From a third to a fourth of the able-bodied citizens were to be in the service at one time.

All the soil was appropriated by the emperor. A few families had previously been monopolizing most of the land, reducing the mass of the rural population to a condition re-

sembling serfdom, and threatening the power of the crown. State ownership was now asserted, the land was redivided, and each man and woman was given a share. To prevent the soil from being engrossed again by a few landowners and to allow for the growth of population, a redistribution of the fields was to take place every six years. Tracts of land were allotted to officials, whose salaries were to be paid by the income from their estates and not by exactions from the peasants. Forced labor was reorganized and was to be partly commuted for taxes in farm produce. A premium was put on reclamation by granting a larger degree of private ownership in lands acquired through it; the Japanese still occupied only a part of the surface of the islands and expansion must be encouraged. The system of taxation was made over: officials were for the most part exempt, but an effort was made to effect an equitable levy upon the people at large.

The entire population was divided somewhat on Chinese lines into groups made up of five households each, and into larger units of fifty households. These groups were for purposes of police and mutual defense. In true Chinese style the collective responsibility of a group for the conduct of each of its members was insisted upon. The criminal code of the great continental empire was taken over, although in a modified form, and for more than a century was the standard by which Japanese cases were tried.

It must be remembered that these innovations in administration wrought by contact with the culture of the continent were not as sudden as this brief summary might lead one to believe. They were embodied in various codes which embrace a period covering most of the seventh and part of the eighth century. The modification of national life under the influence of intercourse with the mainland

was the predominant fact in Japan's history from the middle of the sixth to late in the eighth century. It recurred, although at long intervals and with less prominence, until the coming of the Europeans in the nineteenth century, every new burst of culture in China making itself felt in Japan. By the end of the eighth century, however, the T'ang dynasty had begun to weaken and the brilliancy of its culture had become dimmed. China for the time could not exert as strong an influence as she had under the earlier monarchs of that house.

JAPANESE MODIFICATIONS OF FOREIGN CULTURE

It is also to be noted that the Japanese were not blind imitators. As in the nineteenth century, they were eager to take from foreign civilizations what seemed suited to their needs. They were keenly sensitive and feared so greatly the epithet "barbarian" that they exerted every effort to equal in culture the most advanced peoples with whom they were acquainted. From the very first, however, they tried to adapt what they borrowed to the needs of their peculiar situation, and as time went on they more and more modified what they had received and were stimulated to make contributions of their own. They began thinking for themselves in matters of religion, and in the latter part of the eighth and the early part of the ninth centuries, the Tendai and the Shingon sects arose, each based on ideas introduced from China, but owing its introduction and much of its form to a Japanese. Tendai attempted to reform the current Buddhism chiefly by introducing a more nearly perfect philosophy and a greater asceticism. It made salvation possible, not after numbers of reincarnations through immeasurable periods of time, but here and now by

a knowledge of the Buddha nature that could be acquired through wisdom. It was also marked by an elaborate hierarchy. Its founder, one Saicho (known to posterity as Dengyo Daishi), lived from 767 to 822. He spent many years in China studying the parent sect, and on returning to Japan became very popular. Shingon introduced an esoteric system of faith and conduct, teaching three great secret laws regarding body, speech, and thought. These three secrets had to do with proper postures, magic formulæ, and prayers, and helped make possible a communion with the deities and union with the Infinite. It resembled the Gnosticism of the early Christian centuries of the West, with which, indeed, some have attempted to establish a historic connection. Its founder, Kukai, known to posterity as Kobo Daishi, was a contemporary of Saicho. Like the latter, he visited China and there learned the principles of the sect that he later propagated in his native land. He was famous in his generation as saint, artist, and calligrapher.

The use of the Chinese written character was made easier by introducing syllabic signs, the *Katagana* (square forms) and the *Hiragana* (script forms), which were simpler to learn and helped to make the written language conform more nearly to the vernacular than it had in its purely Chinese dress. They are in use to this day and are familiar to all who have ever glanced at Japanese papers or books. Native schools of art and literature were developed. Even the administrative machinery was not a blind copy but an attempt at intelligent eclecticism.

The new system of administration had no sooner been completed than it began to reveal a growing discrepancy with real conditions. This was partly because the adaptation of Chinese models to the local situation had not been

perfect: the attempt to transfer institutions which had been devised to meet entirely different conditions, unless most carefully done, could not fail to end in disaster. There were three outstanding results: the control of the monarchy by the Fujiwara family through a series of regencies, the rise of a kind of feudalism, and the growth of a military class in numbers and power, culminating in its control of the government.

SUPREMACY AND DECLINE OF FUJIWARA FAMILY

The Fujiwara family, next to that of the emperor the most illustrious in Japan, claims for itself divine origin. As early as the seventh century it had begun extensively to lay its hands on the government. Its founder, the high-minded and able Kamatari, had laid the foundation for its greatness by his part in the reforms of 645. As the strong emperors who helped in the great reorganization of the administration were succeeded by weak ones, the Fujiwara clan gradually tightened its hold in the government. It assumed but few military positions, for these by the borrowed Chinese standards were held to be socially inferior, but gradually obtained most of the important civil offices for the possession of its scions. These held the chief governorships of the provinces and the leading positions at court. The plan of choosing the members of the civil bureaucracy that was in use in China had never been applied in its entirety to Japan, and the reformers of 645 had filled the offices partly from the noble families. Even as much of the continental system as had been adopted was gradually allowed to fall into disuse. The theory of short tenure, which prevented an office from being monopolized by any one person or family, was little by little ignored. The terms of

office were first lengthened, then reappointments were allowed, and eventually the various positions were held for life and transmitted to the occupants' heirs. The Fujiwara filled the bureaucracy with its own members and made the offices hereditary, so that the institutions designed to weaken the power of the nobles and to strengthen the position of the monarch were used to defeat their own object. The Fujiwara, as imperial councilors, had the privilege of opening all petitions before they were handed to the throne. They saw to it that the emperors' consorts were chosen from their own women, and that heirs to the throne were selected only from among sons of Fujiwara mothers. Even to-day the empress is one of the family, as have been most of her predecessors for more than a thousand years. Members of the clan were finally appointed regent¹ and in all but name became the rulers of the kingdom. The family never, it is true, sought to usurp the throne; they rather sought to elevate its nominal dignity. But as the position became more sacred they saw to it that its occupant had less and less to say in matters of actual government. Finally, as soon as an emperor reached an age at which he might conceivably assert himself he was forced to take the vows of a Buddhist monk and retire to the cloister, to make way for a minor who could offer no opposition to Fujiwara ambitions. There frequently were several such ex-emperors living at one time.

This Fujiwara supremacy was not attained without a struggle, for from time to time the monarchs asserted themselves. Thus the emperor Kwammu (782-805), one of the most vigorous of the wearers of the imperial crown, removed the capital from Nara to the present Kyoto (794), apparently in an attempt to free the court from the traditions of

¹ The official title of this office was Kwambaku.

luxury and royal impotence that had begun to associate themselves with the older city, and also possibly in the hope that by placing the capital more nearly in the center of the Japanese state he might more effectively control its administration. Another¹ from the vantage of his retirement in a monastery sought to direct the affairs of the nation through the infant puppets that were set up in his stead. Occasionally other families sought to wrest from the Fujiwara their power.

The descendants of the great Kamatari were not to be deprived of their offices. The high posts at the court continued to be filled by them until the end of the old system in the nineteenth century. They were, however, rendered impotent by the introduction of a form of government by the military class. The Fujiwara were left in the possession of their titles but they were to become powerless in the provinces and in all but the immediate entourage of the imperial court. This change was brought about by a gradual evolution which was partly the result of the weakness of the system that the Fujiwara themselves had created, and partly of the growth in power of the military class. The period of Fujiwara supremacy was one of great luxury. The court at Nara and Kyoto was maintained on a most expensive scale. Elaborate palaces were built and a costly standard of living was maintained. The court nobility gave themselves over to writing poetic couplets, to flower festivals, love intrigues, gambling, and the refinements of a beauty-loving but sensual existence. Many arts and pastimes were developed, partly on Chinese models, and were the basis of much of that beauty and refinement that

¹ Shirakawa of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Two other emperors who became notably restive under Fujiwara dictation were Daigo (898-930) and Sanjo (1012-1017).

were to be so much admired by westerners who saw Japan in the early nineteenth century. Exquisite fabrics were produced, and fine paintings and carvings appeared. Architecture was improved: palaces and temples were built in profusion. Music was perfected. The position of dancing girls arose almost to the dignity of a profession. Festivals for viewing the flowers, for gazing at the newly fallen snow, for enjoying the moonlight, were introduced. Great sums of money were spent on Buddhist temples and monasteries and on elaborate religious exercises. Huge, costly metal images became the rage. At times half or more of the revenue of the state was spent for religious purposes. As the effeminacy and moral degeneracy of the court increased its devotion to religious exercises was intensified. Buddhism was never more popular. So powerful did the priesthood become that it is of record that one Buddhist monk¹ became the paramour of the empress² who at that time sat alone on the throne, and aspired to become monarch.

The court and its masters, the Fujiwara, were gradually losing control of the provinces and of all but the districts around the capital. Taxes to pay the expenses of the court and especially of the Buddhist church reached enormous proportions. The cost of government was increased by the necessity of administering the additional territories occupied by the expanding nation. The expenses of administration were augmented without a corresponding increment in the revenue, and the growing burden of taxation fell more and more upon a few of the peasantry. A system of estates immune from taxation and virtually free from the control of the machinery of the capital was slowly forming, resembling in time the feudalism of the European middle ages. By the reforms of 645 the arable land of the country

¹ Dokyo.

² Shotoku (765-770).

was to be redivided among the people at stated intervals. For a while this plan was fairly well carried out. As time passed, however, it fell into abeyance. The nation was expanding to the north and west, and most of the land that was reclaimed on the frontiers gradually, either by the direct grant or through the weakness of the central government, came to be held in perpetuity. As the nation grew, these reclaimed lands eventually formed the larger part of its area. Then for meritorious services or because of some special influence at court, individuals would be given estates to hand down to their descendants. Large tracts were similarly held by temples and monasteries as a permanent possession. Occasional edicts attempted to revive the periodical redistribution of lands, but failed to work a lasting cure. Owners of estates frequently extended their domains by forcibly annexing adjoining lands. The estates held in perpetuity were, too, as a rule partly or entirely exempt from taxation and the control of the representatives of the central government. This exemption was at first largely confined to temple lands and estates specifically granted by the government, and was recognized by formal charters, but in time it came to apply to all of the estates. For protection against disorder, or to escape taxation, many smaller landowners surrendered their holdings to the more powerful lords and monasteries and received them back as fiefs, a custom almost exactly corresponding to "commendation" in feudal Europe. Thus in time most of the area of the nation was comprised in great, immune estates and was practically lost to the jurisdiction of the Kyoto government. A governor often found that only one per cent. or less of the land of his provinces was subject to him, and so did not leave the capital to proceed to his post. Finally the vast majority of the landowners, great and small,

in all the provinces but those nearest to Kyoto were bound to the central power only by a formal allegiance to the emperor. They levied their own taxes, quarreled and fought with each other, and administered a rude justice without reference to the Fujiwara-controlled court. By the end of the eleventh century the central government was ready to collapse. Brigandage and military service became the only refuges from the intolerable taxation laid by the court on the lands that were not in the manors, and robbers openly infested even the streets of the capital.

FEUDAL STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE EMPIRE

During the centuries that the Fujiwara were making themselves supreme at court, warrior families were strengthening themselves in the outlying provinces, especially in the north, and a military class was appearing. In the reforms of the seventh and eighth centuries the attempt was made to establish universal responsibility for military service, but this proved a failure. With the decline of the power of the central government, and the growth of disorder, the proprietors of the great tax-free estates were forced to depend on their retainers for police purposes and for aid against their neighbors. On these estates, then, there were to be found professional warriors who were recruited partly from the police, partly from the lords' own retainers, partly from wanderers from sections where the conditions of life had become intolerable, and partly from adventurous fellows for whom no career was open at home. These professional warriors gradually came to be controlled by a new nobility, purely military and feudal, and quite distinct from the older civil nobility that had its center at Kyoto. This military nobility was founded by members of the imperial

family who, for reasons that need not here detain us, had assumed new family names and had become nobles of inferior rank. They had sought their fortunes away from the capital, in the provinces, as local officials and as managers of the estates that were held by the absentee civil nobility. As years passed they became the actual masters of the estates they managed, or of new estates, and the leaders of the warriors who formed the only source of protection in the midst of the general disorder. The strongest of these estates were in the west, where new lands were being reclaimed, and in the north, where a long war of expulsion was being waged with the aborigines. All these estates were far removed from the demoralizing luxury of the court, and by constant fighting among themselves and with the Ainu, a military class was developed, inured to hardship, loyal to its leaders, and paying but scanty respect to the fashionable fops who directed affairs at the capital. The warriors, or *bushi* as they were called, became in time a hereditary caste, closed to outsiders. They possessed an ethical code all their own, the basis of the later rather elaborate *bushido* ("way of the bushi") of which we are to hear more later.

With the decay of the administrative system controlled by the Fujiwara it was only a question of time until the military chiefs should struggle for the mastery of the empire. The two outstanding soldier families were the Taira and the Minamoto, both claiming descent from cadet members of the imperial family and both made strong by long residence on the frontier. Generally speaking, the Taira led in the south and west, the Minamoto in the north and east, near the present Tokyo.

About the middle of the twelfth century the disintegration at Kyoto could no longer be concealed. The Buddhist monasteries and Shinto fanes erected by the gifts of many

pious generations had some of them become the abode of armed monks and the refuge of desperadoes. They terrorized the weakened capital until the strong military chiefs of the provinces were called in by the distressed court to restore peace. Nothing loath, the Taira and Minamoto quickly responded. The warlike monks were put down, and then court intrigues and rivalries in the ranks of the Fujiwara led to civil strife which gave the two great soldier families further reason for interference. Finally the Taira and Minamoto fell to fighting for the control of the capital and the person of the emperor. So strong was the reverence for the past and for the imperial family that no one thought of usurping the throne or even the office of regent, for this last had been held traditionally by the Fujiwara. The military chiefs, however, did seek to place themselves so firmly in control that the emperor and court nobility, while retaining their ancient titles, could not hope to exert an appreciable influence on the administration.

In the long civil wars which followed,¹ the Taira were first victorious and established themselves in Kyoto. Their leader, Kiyomori, became prime minister and virtual ruler of Japan. He killed the leader of the Minamoto, Yoshitomo, and exterminated as far as possible all other members of that family who seemed to give promise of seriously contesting his power. A few escaped, principal among whom were Yoritomo and Yoshitsune, two sons of Yoshitomo by different mothers. Yoritomo was spared because of his beauty and extreme youth and lived an obscure life of exile until he reached maturity. Yoshitsune's mother bought the life of her three sons by becoming the mistress of

¹ They lasted for about fifty years and cover the period known as the Gempei era (1159-1199).

Kiyomori. All three boys were brought up in monasteries. The future of two of them does not concern us, but Yoshitsune is a name to be remembered, for he is regarded by Japanese as their greatest military captain. Kiyomori, after the defeat of his enemies, exercised an almost despotic power and became extremely arrogant. He was not a political genius of the first rank, however, and failed to organize the empire in a way that would prevent the recurrence of such disorders as had brought him into power. He died in 1180 and Yoritomo and Yoshitsune, now in the flush of vigorous manhood, raised the Minamoto banner. They were reënforced by an independent insurrection led by a cousin, Yoshinaka. Five years of war followed. The two brothers championed an ex-emperor who wished to be restored to the throne, while the Taira retained possession of the puppet child-monarch. Yoshitsune was the brilliant military leader and the idol of the Minamoto forces; Yoritomo was a crafty, able organizer, and was by force of character as well as birthright the head of the family. The Taira were driven out of Kyoto after a stubborn resistance, and were defeated in a memorable engagement near the present Kobe. They retired eastward and a final decisive battle was fought in the Straits of Shimonoseki. Here the Taira forces were overwhelmed: Kiyomori's widow, scorning capture, cast herself into the sea and carried to death in her arms the boy-emperor. Only a small remnant escaped, to live as outlaws in the fastnesses of Kiushiu. The exploits of the heroes of these memorable years have ever since been the delight of the story-tellers of the nation and are recounted to the admiring youth of each succeeding generation. After the final defeat of the Taira, the popularity of Yoshitsune aroused the apprehensions of Yoritomo. Yoshinaka had already been treacherously led into dis-

loyalty and had been disposed of. Yoritomo now trumped up a charge of treason and ordered Yoshitsune's execution. The latter fled, but was betrayed, and committed suicide rather than be killed by his heartless brother. Yoritomo was supreme.

For further reading see: Griffis, *The Mikado's Empire*; the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*; Lloyd, *The Creed of Half Japan*; Brinkley, *Japan, Its History, Arts and Literature*; Brinkley, *A History of the Japanese People*; Davis, *Japan from the Age of the Gods to the Fall of Tsingtao*; Asakawa, *The Early Institutional Life of Japan*; Longford, *The Story of Old Japan*.

CHAPTER IV

THE SHOGUNATE: FROM ITS FOUNDATION (1192) TO THE ACCESSION OF IYEYASU (1603)

ORGANIZATION OF THE BAKUFU

It now became the difficult task of Yoritomo to organize the power he had wrested from the Taira in such a way that it would remain in the hands of his family. He placated the powerful Buddhist monks and restored to the civil nobility lands which had been lost during the long wars. He did not attempt to usurp the imperial throne, nor even to remove the Fujiwara nobility from their offices. He preserved the court at Kyoto with its old offices and nominally with its authority. It was still in theory the source of all power in the state, and it was encouraged to maintain its ceremonies. Yoritomo made it innocuous, however, by establishing side by side with the older civil officialdom a military administration owing allegiance to himself. With imperial sanction, he appointed, in all the provinces, military constables¹ and in most districts and private estates military tax-collectors.² These constables and tax-collectors were Yoritomo's own vassals, owing allegiance to him. They did not displace the regular local officials appointed by the civil government at Kyoto, but shared and eclipsed their authority and transacted official business with greater promptness and efficiency. Taxes were levied on all lands but those of the religious orders: the great estates of secular princes were not, as during the later years of the Fujiwara, exempted

¹ Called *shugo*.

² Called *jito*.

from these burdens. This military organization was called the *Bakufu*, literally "camp office." Yoritomo was, of course, its head, and in 1192 was given the title of "sei-i-tai-shogun," or "great barbarian-subduing general," a title usually abbreviated into "shogun." Strictly speaking the word "shogun," meaning simply "general," was not new but had for some time been a common appellation for military officers of the highest rank. The center of the *bakufu* Yoritomo did not leave at Kyoto, but removed to the north to Kamakura, not far from the present Tokyo, where he established a separate capital. Kamakura was remote from the contaminating luxury of Kyoto, which had proved so disastrous to the Fujiwara and even to the Taira chief, and from the intrigues of the court nobility. It was also nearer the military principalities of the north on whose support the Minamoto primarily depended. Thus there came to be two administrative systems, the one civil, the other military, each with its own hierarchy of officials, and each with its capital. The military, of course, predominated, although theoretically it was subordinate to the civil, and the shogun acted only as the deputy of the emperor. Of the elaborate organization copied from China in the seventh and eighth centuries only the impotent forms remained. Yoritomo must be ranked as one of the greatest political geniuses of his nation, for with varying vicissitudes and with only a brief interruption the dual form of government that he inaugurated endured essentially unaltered until past the middle of the nineteenth century, a period of more than six and a half centuries. Had Japan been as seriously menaced by outside enemies as was China, however, it is quite possible that the divided authority of the system would have proved disastrous.

Yoritomo's descendants were unable long to retain the control of the machinery that he had so carefully put in operation. His house speedily suffered the fate that had befallen both the imperial and the Fujiwara families. His son proved incompetent and the real power fell into the hands of the Hojo family, from which had come the consort of the first shogun. The able head of that house¹ had helped in the establishment of the *bakufu*. He and his treacherous son² by subtle intrigues succeeded in killing the heirs of Yoritomo or reduced them to mere puppets. The Hojo themselves never usurped the shogunate, outwardly retaining for the position the same reverence that the Fujiwara had observed toward the institution of the emperor. The office was kept in the hands of minors, however, whose retirement was forced when they approached maturity. At first the office was reserved for the heirs of Yoritomo, but as his direct line died out, young scions of the Fujiwara or of the imperial family were appointed. The heads of the Hojo were content with the title of "regent"³ and with the substance of power. This latter they wielded with relentless energy and controlled emperors and shoguns with an iron hand. When, early in the history of their rule, an ex-emperor⁴ attempted to assert his authority and end the dual government, he was ruthlessly defeated, the ruling emperor was forced into a monastery, and the Hojo appointed one of their number as military governor of Kyoto, thereafter controlling the imperial succession at will. Never had the royal house been treated with such scant ceremony. The period of the Hojo domination is known by their name and lasted from 1199 to 1333.

¹ Hojo Tokimasa.

³ Shikken.

² Hojo Yoshitoki.

⁴ Go-Toba, in 1221.

THE HOJO ERA

The Hojo era, in spite of civil strife and military rule, was not without progress in culture and art. New sects of Buddhism arose, the expression of fresh needs and of originality in religious thinking. Like the earlier divisions of Buddhism that we have mentioned, all but one of these had their origin outside Japan and were brought in from China. They were modified, however, by their Japanese adherents. In the latter half of the twelfth century the Jodo ("Pure Land") sect had been added to the Tendai and the Shingon groups. It taught salvation by faith in Amida. This Amida or Amitabha, "the Buddha of Infinite Light," was without beginning or end and was the father of all beings. He had been incarnated at different times and in various forms to bring salvation to men and at his last appearance had vowed that he would not accept deliverance by entering Buddhahood unless by so doing he could make salvation possible for all men. He succeeded after much suffering and opened a Paradise for the redeemed. Jodo taught that Paradise was open to all who called on Amida with faith. One is forcibly reminded of Christian teaching, and some scholars have believed that they have established the existence of an historic connection.

In the thirteenth century three more sects appeared. The first, Shinshu, a form of Jodo, has sometimes been called Buddhist Protestantism. It dispensed with elaborate acts of devotion and ritual. Its priests married and it had no monasteries. It translated its scriptures into the vernacular and taught that salvation was achieved not through abstruse philosophy or penances, abstinence from meat, and elaborate ceremonies, but through simple faith in Amida and devout prayer, purity, and earnestness of life.

The second, or Zen group of sects, had a great influence over the military class. It owed its origin to an Indian priest who had come to China in the sixth century and had attempted to reform the Buddhism of that land. Enlightenment was to be obtained not primarily from books, but as Gautama had found it, through meditation. Zen found its way to Japan, and was greatly modified there. It demanded of its followers a mode of intense mental concentration; to know truth one must learn to look at the world from an entirely new angle, and become indifferent to the vicissitudes of life. Zen encouraged a studied and primitive simplicity and symbolized through it the deepest meanings. It valued reserve, a perfect self-control backed by concentrated energy. Its sternness and its austerity were in contrast to the softer teachings and ornate temples of the older sects, Tendai and Shingon, that had appealed to the luxurious court at Kyoto. It impressed mightily the warrior class and while only a few practiced fully its exacting, rigorous methods, it had a great effect upon feudal life. Painting, architecture, landscape gardening, social intercourse and etiquette, literature, and calligraphy all showed its influence, particularly in the later feudal ages.

The third, or Nichiren group, bears the name of its founder, an earnest, zealous preacher. He was distressed by the religious and political decay of his day and as a remedy taught a kind of monotheism, a belief in Gautama, not Amida, as the Eternal One. He laid especial emphasis on one book of the Buddhist scriptures. He bitterly denounced the other sects and the evils of his times, and was frequently in peril of his life at the hands of irate rulers. His followers have used spectacular methods of reaching the people. Far from restoring unity in Buddhism the sect has itself broken up into many subdivisions.

As time went on Kamakura began to take on an air of luxury and refinement. Magnificent temples were erected. Tea was introduced from China and with its use there began an elaborate ceremonial of tea-drinking closely associated with the Zen sect and meant to have moral as well as aesthetic significance. With tea came porcelain utensils from the continent, and in the attempt to copy them the Japanese for the first time began to produce superior pottery of their own. Sculpture flourished, especially in wood. Some specimens bear comparison with the best of the work of the Occident. Sword-makers raised their handicraft to the rank of a fine art. Two notable schools of painting developed. One of them, in Kyoto, while admiring the old Chinese masters, aspired to be distinctively Japanese. The other, in Kamakura, adhered closely to the form in use on the continent and remained decidedly Chinese.

Once during the period Japan was seriously threatened by foreign invasion. The Mongols, a Central Asiatic tribe, having achieved unity under some remarkably able leaders and generals, in the thirteenth century overran Central and Western Asia and Eastern Europe, and established themselves on the throne of China. In the latter part of the thirteenth century the Mongol emperor of China, Kublai Khan, decided to attempt the annexation of Japan. A first expedition was sent in 1274 but was beaten back, and a second more elaborate one was dispatched seven years later. Against the invasion the Japanese united as one people, forgetting for a time their divisions. It needed all their strength to repulse it, for Kublai had endeavored through years of preparation to concentrate on it the resources of all his vast domains. His Chinese dominions had been annoyed by Japanese pirates and his wrath had been aroused by the ignominious death that the Hojo had in-

flicted on his messengers. The Japanese bravely assaulted the armada which bore the invading army and held it at bay until one of the sudden storms of the region arose and destroyed it. It was probably the most notable deliverance in the nation's history. Japan remained the one civilized state in the Far East that had successfully resisted the Mongol arms.

THE ASHIKAGA PERIOD

In time the power of the Hojo was weakened. The defeat of the Mongol invasion strained their resources and for various reasons added little to their prestige. The luxury of the life at Kamakura did its baleful work. The regents became corrupt and followed the evil custom of retiring early in life, each in turn leaving his position to a child who was controlled either by his ministers or an ex-regent. The government presented the sorry spectacle of a puppet guardian of a puppet shogun who was in turn the agent of a puppet emperor. Dire mismanagement followed. When dissatisfaction was at its height there chanced to be on the imperial throne a monarch, Go-Daigo, who, unlike most of his immediate predecessors, was a mature man at the time of his accession. He made a desperate effort to regain the substance of the power whose shadow he enjoyed, and to end the dual government. Years of civil war followed. For a time the Hojo prevailed and Go-Daigo was driven into exile. The Hojo tyranny, however, had aroused such great opposition that many of the military class rallied to the support of the emperor. Aided by them, especially by a scion of the Minamoto, Ashikaga¹ Takuaji, and by two who are still greatly honored in Japan as noble patriots, Nitta Yoshisada and Kusonoki Masashige, the emperor

¹ His family name was Ashikaga.

finally prevailed. Kamakura was taken and sacked and the Hojo rule came to an end. Go-Daigo, while brilliant and capable, was lacking in political discretion. After the victory he divided the spoils among his followers with such injustice that dissatisfaction arose. A disproportionate amount of the lands of his enemies went to his favorites among the incompetent court nobility and to the scheming Ashikaga Takauji, to the discomfiture of many loyal soldiers who had helped him in the day of battle. The discontent found a leader in Takauji, who turned against his imperial master. Nitta Yoshisada and Kusonoki Masashige, although they had been shabbily treated by Go-Daigo, remained loyal to him. After a struggle of some months, in which the tide of battle flowed and ebbed, these two champions of the throne were killed and Go-Daigo was driven from Kyoto (1336). Takauji placed upon the throne his own candidate from the imperial line and had himself appointed shogun. This appointee of Takauji was declared by Go-Daigo to be a usurper and two rival royal lines came into existence. The Ashikaga and their candidate retained control of Kyoto and most of the nation, and Go-Daigo and his descendants, according to native historians the legitimate house, held sway in Yamato. For over half a century civil war between the two lines was kept up. Private feuds added to the disorder and for a time all centralized authority seemed to be doomed. A reconciliation was reached between the rival branches of the imperial house, by the southern court practically yielding its claim to the throne and uniting itself with the northern.

The two centuries (1392-1603) that followed the union of the two courts¹ were not destined to be peaceful. The

¹ Called the Muromachi period from the section of Kyoto where the Ashikaga shoguns built their palace.

habit of disorder had become too firmly fixed during the years of civil strife to be quickly overcome, and Takaauji had not proved himself the able organizer that Yoritomo had been. He had attempted too often to quiet opposition by kindness rather than vigorous cruelty and had helped to endow rival families with wide lands. After the union of the dynasties, civil war continued for several decades over the disputes that had arisen while the two were separate. To hold the southern court in check the Ashikaga shoguns had located their seat at Kyoto, and Kamakura, the former capital of the *bakufu*, became a center of sedition. Then there were conflicts over the succession to the shogunate, and candidates, often mere puppets, were championed by rival parties. The power of the individual military families grew, and away from the immediate vicinity of Kyoto each was erecting for itself what was virtually an autonomous domain. In their struggles for the shogunate and with the southern party the Ashikaga had been forced to grant, as the price of support, extensive estates to the military families, and rights of autonomy which Yoritomo would never have thought of conceding.

Disorder extended even beyond the bounds of the empire. Daring Japanese merchant pirates harrassed the shores of China, plundering and burning cities and towns, avenging the invasion of the Mongols and the failure of the Chinese to grant satisfactory trading privileges. They raided such centers as Ningpo, Shanghai, and Soochow and extended their operations to the Philippines, and to Siam, Burma, and India. For a time it seemed that the Japanese might become a seafaring people, and anticipate by three hundred and fifty years their commercial achievements of the twentieth century.

Internal disorder was augmented by Buddhist warrior-

monks. Monasteries had grown rich on the gifts of pious emperors, shoguns, and nobles, and sometimes housed groups of thousands of trained fighters. In the years of disorder many of the inmates of these religious houses had armed themselves. More than frequently men assumed the robes of the priest for other than religious reasons and in time the greater monasteries had become the abode of desperadoes who terrorized the surrounding country. One¹ even dominated Kyoto and for years kept it in constant dread.

The anarchy was still further increased by the extravagance of the Ashikaga shoguns. With their capital at Kyoto, they had fallen victims to the luxury and vices traditionally associated with the imperial court. Their excesses had weakened their moral fiber and had necessitated the levy of burdensome taxes. The military families, as their power grew, contributed less and less to the national treasury, and the burden of supporting the state fell on a narrowing region around Kyoto. The load finally became unbearable and the populace rose in riots, refusing to pay taxes and asking that all debts be cancelled. Under the later Ashikaga the capital was partly in ruins from the civil strife and the revenues had so fallen off that the nobles of the imperial court were forced to become pensioners of the feudal chiefs. The emperors were in dire distress. The coronation of one had to be deferred for lack of funds to defray the expenses; another is said to have been reduced to the straits of selling his autographs and becoming a copyist of poems and extracts from the classics to obtain the necessities of life. The body of still another is said to have remained unburied for many days for lack of funds to meet the funeral charges.

¹ Hiyeisan.

One Ashikaga shogun¹ brought down on his head the curses of all future Japanese patriots by acknowledging the overlordship of China and accepting from its emperor the title of "King of Japan." Under several of these shoguns trade with the Middle Kingdom was carried on as an official monopoly. The government's ships went to Ningpo and were treated by the Chinese as bearers of tribute. The Ashikaga calmly acquiesced, for the expeditions were lucrative and the proceeds were a welcome addition to the revenues of the state.

The anarchy was further increased by the arrival of Europeans. The explorations of the Portuguese in the age of discoveries, during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, so familiar to all students of Western history, had finally brought them to Japan. Europe had probably first heard of the country from the Venetian traveler, Marco Polo, who had spent some years at the court of Kublai Khan at the time the Mongol expedition against Japan was being organized. He brought back to the Occident marvelous tales of the riches of the islands, and it was partly the hope of rediscovering the country that led Columbus to undertake his famous search for a direct Western route to the East. It was in 1542, nearly fifty years after Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope, that the Portuguese reached Japan, the first Europeans to view its shores. They established commerce, chiefly with the ports of the southern island, Kiushiu. They brought with them two things which were to affect profoundly the future of the nation, firearms and Christianity.

Firearms were a new weapon to Japan and their use partly helped the feudal lords to achieve a larger independence of the central government. Their use also transformed

¹ Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358-1408), the third shogun of the line.

the strongholds of the military chiefs. No longer were wooden structures and simple earthen walls sufficient defense. There arose great castles with massive walls of stone which are still the wonder of the tourist.

Christianity was first brought by the zealous and heroic Jesuit, Francis Xavier, who arrived in Japan in 1549, with some Portuguese and Japanese companions. Xavier was in the islands about two years and penetrated as far as Kyoto. He was followed by other members of the Society of Jesus. The message of these earnest men found a quick and eager response. In ceremonial, doctrine, and organization Roman Catholic Christianity seemed to the Japanese but little different from the Buddhism to which they were already accustomed. Accepting Christianity meant a further share in the valuable trade with the merchants of the West, so they were predisposed in its favor. Buddhism had partly failed to meet the religious needs of the people and at this time was at a low ebb morally and spiritually. For reasons that we shall see later the new faith was favored at the capital. By 1581, or in less than a generation after Xavier's arrival, there were reported to be two hundred churches and one hundred and fifty thousand Christians. At the height of the mission the converts are said to have numbered six hundred thousand, although this figure may be an exaggeration. Two embassies from feudal lords were sent to Rome, and for a time it seemed as though Japan were about to become a Christian country. The new faith, however, added to the existing discord in the nation. Its missionaries were intolerant and insisted that the Christian lords use force to stamp out Buddhism and Shinto. This naturally led to opposition and disturbances. Moreover, following in the wake of the Portuguese Jesuits came Spanish Dominicans, Franciscans, and Augustinians from

the Philippine Islands. These friars fell to quarreling with the Jesuits and the confusion was accentuated.

What with the rivalries of the military chiefs, the Buddhist warrior-monks, the weakness of the central government, the anarchy at the capital, the introduction of firearms, and the divisions caused by Christianity, it seemed for a time that the nation might break up.

All was not dark, however. In the first place, the period was not one of utter depravity and barbarism. In spite of civil war, in spite of the robbers that infested the capital and the provinces, in spite of disunion, there was some progress in culture. Even at Kyoto there were occasional times of quiet when the arts of peace might flourish. At the courts of some of the great feudal barons, or *daimyo* ("great name"), as they came to be called, there was to be found a regard for the refinements of life, even though the luxury of the capital was despised. Here and there were towns, partly the result of the semi-piratical commerce with the continent. The Zen sect of Buddhism and its closely allied ceremony of tea-drinking grew in popularity. Artistic dancing had its votaries, as it had had from the dawn of the nation's history, and a severely classical style that was evolved then is still in vogue in aristocratic circles. Under the auspices of Buddhism the drama began its growth. The tasteful arrangement of flowers became popular as a special study. Landscape gardening, for which Japan is so justly famous, received much attention. It owed its inception, as does so much else that is good in Japan, to Chinese models, but these had been greatly improved upon. The studied simplicity and attempt to preserve nature, for instance, that are the ideals of one school of Japanese gardeners, are in sharp contrast to the elaborate formalism of the continental artists. The burning of incense took on

the proportions of an exacting, complicated avocation in polite society. Wrestling was evolved from its earlier and simpler forms to a specialized vocation. Sword-making, as might be expected in an age so largely military, attained the rank of a fine art. The secrets of manufacture were handed down from father to son and choice specimens were as famous as the greatest paintings and almost as costly. Painting was not entirely neglected, but was pursued by some whose names rank with the greatest that Japan has produced.¹ *Bushido*, "the way of the warrior," the ethical code of the military class, was elaborated.

JAPAN UNDER CONTROL OF MILITARY LEADERS

In the second place, out of the anarchy of these years arose the men who were to reëstablish order, vigorous leaders without whom the Japan of to-day would have been impossible. It was natural that the shifting fortunes and the struggles of such troublous times should enable the strongest men to come to the front. Birth counted for less than it had in some previous centuries, and the man of merit and ability had a much better chance of recognition than he would have had in peaceful times when society was more stereotyped. Members of the lower orders of the military class arose and struggled to establish their supremacy. Three of these stand out preëminently, as successive masters of the nation, Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Iyeyasu, more commonly referred to simply by their personal names Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Iyeyasu. The last was to organize a form of government that was to endure until past the middle of the nineteenth century.

¹ Two of the greatest painters of the time were Sesshu and Motonobu. They followed the models of the Sung dynasty artists of China.

The first of these, Nobunaga, rose through a series of successful wars with his neighbors and in 1568, at the invitation of the emperor, came to Kyoto to restore order. Partly through the favor of the imperial house he made himself master of Kyoto and reduced the shogun to the position of a mere puppet. From that time his life was largely a series of wars waged to maintain his position. He fought other feudal lords who desired to emulate his success. He fought the warrior-monks and subdued them, destroying one great monastery at Osaka and another¹ that dominated the capital. In his hatred of these monks and Buddhism in general he viewed with favor the coming of the Jesuits and furthered their propaganda, quite possibly in the hope that this new sect might help him in his fight with the older. He did not formally assume a high office but was content to rule the empire simply as the most powerful of the feudal princes. In one of his wars (1582) he was trapped unexpectedly by a vassal and, in accordance with the traditions of his class, committed suicide rather than allow himself to be captured in disgrace. Nobunaga had had two able lieutenants, Hideyoshi and Ieyasu, who were now in turn to dominate the nation.

Hideyoshi is one of the most remarkable men that Japan has produced, and has at times been called its Napoleon. He was of humble birth, not being even of warrior (*samurai*) rank. His youth was spent in the most desperate poverty. As a lad of six he lost his father. At sixteen he was able to attach himself to a small daimyo with whom he became popular. He later joined Nobunaga, by sheer ability arose to high command, and eventually became one of the two chief lieutenants of his master.

Ieyasu was of Minamoto blood and so was eligible for

¹ Hiyeisan.

the position of shogun. He owed his position, however, not so much to family connections as to genius, and was to emerge as the final organizer of the feudal system and one of the ablest statesman that his nation has produced. He was frugal and hardworking, and could bide his time with infinite patience. While he was utterly unscrupulous in the use of means for attaining his own ends and never allowed his heart to interfere with his designs, he won men by his affability and was not without feelings of generosity and justice. His resourcefulness seemed inexhaustible and his judgment almost infallible.

The sons of Nobunaga proved incapable of maintaining their leadership of the nation after their father's death. Civil strife followed and out of it Hideyoshi emerged as master. Iyeyasu, for a time his enemy, soon allied himself with him, and became his chief lieutenant. By a combination of tact and force Hideyoshi put down opposition and united all Japan under his sway. He crushed his opponents, even in remote districts like Kiushiu, by masterful campaigns, and then often won the support of the vanquished by generous terms. He was a remarkably accurate judge of men, a skillful strategist, and an extremely able administrator. While he never overcame some of the defects of his plebeian birth and early training, these did not seriously handicap his success. Not being of Minamoto blood he could not become shogun, but he had himself adopted by one of the Fujiwara and was appointed to the post of regent, an office heretofore reserved to members of that aristocratic family, and later was given the title of Taiko, "great merit," by which he is usually known to Japanese readers. He is the one instance in the nation's history of the rise of a commoner to the highest position open to a subject.

After subjugating the nation, Hideyoshi gave himself to

the task of unifying and increasing his power. At first he favored Christianity, but he soon came to oppose it, for he felt it to be a source of dissension, and feared that it might pave the way for an invasion by the Spanish or Portuguese. Because of greater interests elsewhere, however, he did not strictly enforce against it his edicts of proscription. He built extensively in Osaka, the port of Kyoto, and laid the foundations of the prosperity of that city. Not content with controlling Japan, he dreamed of foreign commercial and political expansion. He encouraged daring Japanese mariners to sail to Macao, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Annam.

Near by was Korea, and Hideyoshi planned to reduce it and use it as a gateway for the conquest of China. He probably felt, too, that a foreign expedition would be a convenient channel into which to divert the martial spirit of the feudal lords, and prevent their plotting against him. War was forced and in 1592 Hideyoshi's armies crossed to the mainland and began their attack. This was carried on with great cruelty and won for the Japanese the abiding hatred of the Koreans. The invasion also involved the islanders with China, for the Celestial Empire claimed the peninsula as a vassal state and felt that its possession by an alien power would be a menace to the imperial borders. Korea had been united some centuries before, but was then in decay and found it difficult to offer an effective resistance. The prolonged attack was only partially successful; it drained Japan of men and money and caused endless anxiety to its author. Peace negotiations were begun with China but were angrily broken off by Hideyoshi when he learned that he was to be invested by the emperor of China with the title of a tributary king. Finally after the Taiko's death in 1598 the troops were recalled. The Japanese

power in the peninsula soon dwindled to a shadowy claim of suzerainty which was not vigorously enforced. Occasional embassies were sent from Korea to acknowledge the overlordship of the island empire, but there was no attempt at interference in the internal affairs of the vassal state.

Hideyoshi had spent much time in attempting to make the succession secure for his only son, Hideyori, and had perfected an elaborate council of regency made up of the strong men of the realm with Ieyasu as president. These all solemnly promised to be true to their trust and to their lord's heir. The great warrior was scarcely in his grave, however, before dissensions broke out. Hideyori was a mere lad and of course could not keep the turbulent feudal chiefs under control. Within two years Japan was in two armed camps, one made up chiefly of southern daimyo and in possession of Hideyori, the other led by Ieyasu, who had thus proved untrue to his trust as president of the regency. The two armies met at Sekigahara not far from Kyoto, and there followed one of the decisive battles of the nation's history. Aided by treason in the enemy's ranks, Ieyasu won, and was henceforth master of the country. Hideyori, his mother, and his immediate followers retired to the strong castle at Osaka which his father had built. Outwardly he submitted to the Tokugawa and for some years was not molested. He was not constrained to join the feudal system that Ieyasu was organizing and was even married to that astute person's granddaughter. As Hideyori approached maturity, however, he gave promise of real vigor and ability. There began to gather around him at Osaka all those who were discontented with the Tokugawa's rule. Ieyasu's apprehensions were aroused and in 1615 he trumped up a cause for a quarrel. The castle was attacked but proved so impregnable that Ieyasu withdrew,

feigning a desire for peace. An agreement was entered into by which Hideyori, in exchange for quiet, trustingly but unwisely allowed the outer defenses of his fortress to be razed and the moat to be filled. Ieyasu then returned to the attack, the castle was fired by traitors and Hideyori and his mother perished. All opposition of the Taiko's followers now ceased.

For further reading see: Griffis, *The Mikado's Empire*; Lloyd, *The Creed of Half Japan*; Brinkley, *Japan, Its History, Arts and Literature*; Brinkley, *A History of the Japanese People*; Longford, *The Story of Old Japan*; Longford, *The Story of Korea*.

CHAPTER V

THE SHOGUNATE: FROM THE ACCESSION OF IYEYASU (1603) TO THE COMING OF PERRY (1853)

IYEYASU REORGANIZES THE SHOGUNATE

After disposing of the heir of Hideyoshi, Ieyasu faced the great task of consolidating his conquests and insuring their permanence in the hands of his family. It is here that his distinctive genius shines out. He was fortunately succeeded by an able son and grandson, Hidetada (1579-1632), and Iyemitsu (1603-1651), who walked in his steps. So well did these three do their work that the empire was dominated by their house for two and a half centuries and for over two centuries the country was undisturbed by war. The means that they used to achieve these ends were various. In the first place, Ieyasu had himself appointed shogun (1603) and thus placed himself at the head of the feudalized military system that had first been organized by Yoritomo, over four hundred years before. He located the military capital at Yedo, the present Tokyo, away from the imperial court, nearer the geographical center of the main island and in the North, from which most of his support came. The city became in time the largest in the land. Its castle, the residence of the shoguns, was a massive and extensive piece of masonry and in an altered form is to-day the imperial palace. Ieyasu surrounded Yedo with fiefs held by members of his own family, the Tokugawa. All strategic points were placed in the hands of chiefs whom he could trust. Officials responsible to the shogun were put over the prin-

cipal cities, and the main highway between Tokyo and Yedo was carefully guarded. Iyeyasu skillfully distributed fiefs among members of his family and loyal barons wherever there seemed likely to be disaffection. Thus two great families, possible aspirants for the shogunate, were certain to find a strong fief organized near them or between them and given to a Tokugawa. The funds of those barons of whose loyalty there was any doubt were depleted by the enforced construction of great works, especially castles.

All daimyo were commanded to maintain houses in Yedo. Each was to keep some of his family or retainers there throughout half of the year as hostages for his good behavior, and each was himself to spend the other half of the year there, where he could be watched. The rules regarding hostages, it may be added, were cancelled by the fourth of the Tokugawa shoguns. Deputy governors under the direct control of Yedo were scattered through the country, and were still another check on the daimyo. The feudal barons were allowed a great deal of liberty within their own fiefs, and the commoners—merchants, farmers, and townspeople—were encouraged to govern their local affairs through guilds, city elders, and village chiefs. All officers were held strictly accountable for the maintainance of order, however, and a habit of discipline and obedience was acquired which was in sharp contrast to the anarchy and excessive individualism of the last years of the Ashikaga. This habit of discipline was to be of service to the nation in the great changes of the nineteenth century.

The imperial institution was not destroyed, but the emperor was effectively barred from any active interference in national affairs by the clever expedient of increasing his sanctity. His divine origin was emphasized and was held to remove him from the sordid duties of ruling and of con-

cerning himself with the material affairs of his realm. None but his most intimate ministers and the members of his family were to come into intimate contact with him. No others might see his sacred face. He was to devote himself to honoring his imperial ancestors and obtaining their blessings for the realm. He was still held, however, to be the source of all authority and the shoguns were in theory merely his servants. He was provided with a modest but sufficient revenue and was allowed to confer empty titles of honor. The old civil or court nobility was preserved and the sanctity in which it was held was increased, but it was provided with only meager stipends, and was given no part in the active administration. The appointment and tenure of the emperor's chief officials were virtually under the control of the *bakufu*. From this same source, and not from independent estates, were derived the incomes of the monarch and the court aristocracy. To make the imperial impotence doubly certain, Kyoto was surrounded by a cordon of fiefs held by military lords on whose loyalty the Tokugawa could depend, and Osaka, the port to Kyoto, was governed directly by the shogun.

All classes of society were carefully controlled by minute and exact regulations. The imperial court, feudal lords, warriors, and commoners had their actions, their dress, and their food strictly standardized. Confusion and turmoil were reduced to a minimum by a most elaborate system of governmental supervision. Education, the printing of books, and especially the study and teaching of the works of the Chinese Confucian scholars were fostered, possibly in the belief that by these means public and private morality would be made stable and order become secure. The successive shoguns helped the merchant and farming classes by favorable rules and public works. This may have been

done with the conviction that if the country were prosperous there would be no unrest.

Iyeyasu initiated and his successors completed the consolidation of the nation by stamping out Christianity and cutting off all but the scantiest intercourse with the outside world. We have already seen how the foreign faith was introduced by the Jesuits, and how its rapid growth and the discord created by it led to its proscription by Hideyoshi. That proscription was not fully carried out and in the years that followed Christianity continued to spread. Foreign priests kept up their propaganda and many of the inhabitants, possibly 600,000 in all, principally in Kiushiu and other southern portions of the empire, became Christians. During the earlier years of his rule Iyeyasu was apparently not averse to Christianity and distinctly favored the missionaries on several occasions. He seems to have had no religious motive in this, but did it as a commercial measure. He was exerting himself to open up and maintain trade with Europe and the lands of Eastern Asia. For a number of years commercial relations were kept up with Spain through Mexico, and the Dutch and the English were both permitted to establish trading factories in the South. Japanese merchants made their way unopposed by the shogun to the Philippines, Annam, Siam, China, and India. Iyeyasu was eager to see a mercantile marine developed and Japan's mines opened. Gradually, however, his attitude underwent a change and toward the latter part of his life he became hostile to Christianity. Hidetada and Iyemitsu, especially the latter, were even more bitter and ended not only by stamping out Christianity but by closing the country against all but the slightest contact with the outside world. It is difficult to ascertain all the reasons for this policy, but a few are apparent. An envoy sent to Europe

reported unfavorably on what he had seen of the foreign religion in its own home. A shipwrecked Englishman, Will Adams, won the regard of Iyeyasu and painted in an unfavorable light the history of the Catholic Church, encouraging the suspicion that the propaganda of Spanish and Portuguese missionaries was but the preliminary to political aggression. A Christian conspiracy was discovered against the shogun and his authority was defied by a Franciscan father. There were unseemly dissensions and rivalries between the different missionary orders. The missionaries, especially the Jesuits, obeyed their religious superiors rather than the temporal authorities, an attitude that was intolerable to shoguns who were trying to insure peace by centralizing all power in their own hands. The Spaniards tried to shut out the Dutch, and the Dutch in turn tried to shut out the English from the Japanese trade. In 1614 Iyeyasu ordered that all foreign priests be expelled, that all churches be destroyed, and that all Japanese Christians be compelled to renounce their faith. His determination to enforce the edict was strengthened by the evident sympathy of the Christian communities with Hideyori in his last stand. It was also reinforced by the persistent refusal of the missionaries to leave Japan. They hid themselves, or were deported only to return. Such contumacy boded ill for the peace and unity that it was Iyeyasu's chief ambition to establish. Iyeyasu died (1616) before he could fully carry out his policy of repression. Hidetada and Iyemitsu, however, continued and made more stringent his anti-Christian policy. Missionaries persisted in coming to Japan and many of the native Christians refused to renounce their faith. Their stubborn disobedience strengthened the fears of the shoguns. It seemed evident that the prestige and possibly the supremacy of the Tokugawa was at stake. To the

alarmed Yedo chiefs it was even conceivable that Japanese independence might be threatened. The foreign faith was proscribed primarily on political, not on religious grounds. As in the early Roman empire, Christianity seemed to mean treason. The most stringent measures were adopted to stamp out the church. Missionaries and converts were apprehended by the thousand and on refusing to renounce their faith were killed, many of them by the most cruel methods. The fine heroism of the martyrs but heightened the apprehensions and determination of the Tokugawa officials. The persecution culminated in a rebellion in 1638¹ when most of the remaining Christians rose as a unit and made a last stand in an old castle not far from Nagasaki. They were annihilated by the government troops and the church practically ceased to exist. The edicts against it were strictly enforced until well into the nineteenth century. Registration in the Buddhist temples of all persons was made compulsory. All Japanese were forced to profess allegiance to some branch of Buddhism, and all suspected of being recalcitrant were required on pain of death to tread on the emblems of the Christian faith. Only in one or two remote localities, and under disguised forms, did the foreign religion persist.

The stubborn resistance of the Christians could not but arouse in the shoguns a suspicion of all foreign trade. For a time the effort was made to keep up the much desired commerce with the Spanish and Portuguese, but as the persecution of the Christians became more severe and missionaries continued to come on the vessels of their nationals, the Yedo officials decided that all intercourse with Spain and Portugal must be stopped. Trade with the former was interdicted in 1624 and with the latter in 1638. When, in

¹ The Shimabara revolt.

1640, the Portuguese tried to resume intercourse, their messengers were decapitated. To make certain that no disturbing influences would invade the empire, all Japanese were forbidden to leave the country and any one who succeeded in doing so was to be executed on his return. The building of any vessels large enough for over-seas traffic was interdicted. The English had for a few years maintained their trading factory but found it unprofitable and closed it. They later desired to reopen commerce but were not permitted to do so. Of all European nations only the Dutch were allowed to continue to send ships. They were by their past history bitterly opposed to the Catholic church and were not at all eager to propagate their Protestant faith. They had even helped the Tokugawa officials to exterminate the Japanese Christians. Less fear therefore was felt of them. Still, they were Christians, and to the timorous officials at Yedo were not entirely above suspicion. Their trade drained the country of specie and restriction was gradually increased until they were eventually allowed to come only to one port, Nagasaki. There their merchants were carefully confined to a small island¹ and were forbidden to hold any religious service. Only a few ships a year could come and the number was eventually reduced to one. Only once a year could any of the Dutch come ashore, and then merely to make a strictly guarded journey to Yedo to do homage to the shogun. The most minute regulations were adopted for all intercourse with them. In spite of the humiliations it entailed the Dutch continued their trade because for many years it was highly lucrative. Their imports were largely silk and piece goods and these they exchanged for gold and copper which sold in Europe at a large profit.

¹ Deshima.

With this slight exception, Japan was now hermetically sealed against contamination from the Occident. The land entered on more than two centuries of hermit life. A few ideas filtered in through the Dutch, and a carefully regulated one-sided commerce was carried on by the Chinese who were themselves almost equally well sealed against contact with Europe. That this voluntary isolation was a disadvantage is open to question. It is true that it deprived Japan of the stimulus that comes from international competition, but disintegration might have resulted. In the ensuing centuries she was being prepared for the great awakening that took place with the renewal of intercourse with the West by Commodore Perry.

The Tokugawa organization had at last insured internal and external peace. The centuries of disorder and civil strife had come to an end. The system, however, carried within it the seeds of its own destruction. It became an anomaly. Warlike in its origin and purpose, an organized military feudalism, all its strength was now directed to the repression of strife. Its decay was inevitable. It was like the shell of a chrysalis. Within it the nation could rest and become prepared for the transformation of the nineteenth century, but in the shock of that transformation the shell was to be destroyed. The years of peace led to great changes within the nation. For the first time since the seventh century it began to be a unit. The Tokugawa system forced it to cease to be a group of warring clans, and to act as a whole. True, the forms of feudalism were preserved and the fiefs still existed. National unity was not complete, but the barriers that had helped to divide the nation were being weakened. Although the *bakufu* issued no extensive codes, it published a system of rules by which

the actions of every subject were carefully ordered. Obedience to laws issued by a central authority was becoming a habit.

Moreover, the nation was becoming more prosperous. With order insured, the farmer and the artisan could pursue their occupations unmolested. The state encouraged agriculture and undertook irrigation and riparian works. Peasant proprietorship of land increased, and village self-government was strengthened. Roads were improved. Internal commerce grew in volume. The attention of the military chiefs was turned from fighting to the pastimes of peace. Luxury sprang up, and extravagant amusements, methods of dress, eating, and living became common. The wishes of the mighty were catered to by a merchant class which itself became wealthy. Commercial capital was accumulated and the currency was improved. Although there were occasional famines and epidemics of disease, population increased. There was but little abject poverty, and the cities had no slums to compare with those of modern London or New York.

Education became fairly widespread and literature and art flourished. In the capital and the homes of the daimyo, schools were established and the sons of the rude soldiers became polished men of the world. Lecture halls were maintained for the common people. There was much study of the Chinese classical writers. This had been encouraged, it will be remembered, by Iyeyasu and his successors, and it was given additional impetus by the influx of Chinese scholars after the downfall of the Ming dynasty in the middle of the seventeenth century before the Manchu invasion. For the first time in the nation's history the avowed followers of Confucius became numerous. There had been for many centuries a few in nearly every genera-

tion who called themselves such, but the teachings of the Chinese sage had never previously been accorded so wide a hearing. There were many lecturers on Confucianism, and different sects arose, the two principal groups of which followed the Chinese philosophers Chu Hsi and Wang Yang Ming. The first, called Sho Shi in Japanese, had long been known. He had taught that the world and its laws must be studied before the moral code could be determined; knowledge must come first and right conduct would follow. Wang Yang Ming (1472-1529), on the other hand, held that a man's knowledge of the moral law is intuitive, derived from looking within his own heart. Chu Hsi held that all nature is the result of the working of two forces: Wang Yang Ming held that these two forces are one. Chu Hsi ruled out of the classics much of the supernatural. He belittled religious observances and emphasized the orderly processes of nature. His commentaries on the writings of Confucius were received in China as official until the twentieth century. In Japan, as in China, Chu Hsi was given the support of the state, but Wang Yang Ming had many devoted followers. He appealed strongly to the samurai who adhered to the Zen sect of Buddhism. Most of the upper classes became Confucianists, and while still nominally adherents of Buddhism, rather openly regarded the Indian faith as a mass of superstitions and fit only for the unlettered masses.

The state encouraged the collection of books. Historians basked in the light of official favor and made extensive studies of the nation's past. Painting and ceramics reached new heights of achievement. Colored *genre* prints and a popular literature were developed to please those of the lower ranks. Famous works of architecture were being produced, such, for example, as the beautiful temples that

still adorn the tomb of Iyeyasu at Nikko. The old Japan was perfecting its culture.

The old warrior or samurai class was decaying. It is true that its ethical code, *bushido*, was being elaborated more than ever before into a formal system and that martial exercises and ideals were encouraged. The spectacle of a military caste being served by the entire nation, however, and yet having not fought for decades, was an anomaly. Luxury was sapping the strength of the feudal soldiers. The heirs of the great daimyo were falling under the control of their retainers, much as the emperors in the old days had fallen under the control of the Fujiwara and then of the shoguns. Even the shoguns were at times dominated by their ministers. The pernicious habit of abdication that had been inaugurated for the emperors centuries before was still popular; Iyeyasu himself had retired some years before his death, although he persisted in controlling the administration from his seclusion. His successors frequently followed his example. As a result the nominal shogun was often a child and before he had reached middle life abdicated in favor of a youthful heir.

Moreover, the increased leisure for study and its encouragement by the *bakufu* had turned men's thoughts to the past. Japan's history was delved into and compiled and with the work came a renewed love of things Japanese. The language was studied and organized. A vernacular literature, as opposed to one in the classical Chinese, was developed. Shinto, the old native cult, was revived, and with its revival came an increased reverence for the emperor, its head. Buddhism, although it had been made a state religion by the Tokugawa in their efforts to stamp out Christianity, was looked at askance by these patriots, for it too was a foreign faith. But more important politically

was the discovery by the historians that the emperor was the rightful ruler of the nation and that the shogunate was a comparatively recent innovation. Among a group of scholars the conviction gained ground that the shogun must resign and that the emperor must be restored to his rightful place as the actual as well as the nominal head of the nation. By a strange irony of fate this school of historians had its birth in the home of one of the branches of the Tokugawa family.

Reënforcing the renewed emphasis upon the institution of the emperor, was the interest in Chinese classical literature. The Tokugawa officials, when they promoted its study and welcomed the fugitive scholars of the Ming, could not have appreciated how subversive the writings of the Confucian school could prove to the *bakufu*. The Chinese classics emphasized the position of the monarch and knew nothing of the dual system that existed in Japan. Loyalty to such ideals could not but weaken the position of the shogun, for according to them he was but a minister of the emperor and had usurped the power of his master.

The great feudatories of the South, former rivals of the Tokugawa, and never completely contented with their rule, could be counted on to aid in any attempted restoration of the emperor, if for no other reason than that it might give them an opportunity to place a new family on the seat of the shogun.

IMPENDING CHANGE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY

By the middle of the nineteenth century the nation was ripe for change. The old order was decaying. The vigor of the Tokugawa shoguns had so declined that they were more and more controlled by their ministers. Rumors of dis-

satisfaction and unrest were beginning to be heard. Some revolution was seemingly about to take place. What form it would have taken had there been no interruptions from without, it is hard to say. By one of the strange coincidences of history, however, just as the old Japan was ripe for change it came into contact with the expanding Occident and out of the shock a new nation emerged.

For further reading see: Griffis, *The Mikado's Empire*; Lloyd, *The Creed of Half Japan*; Brinkley, *Japan, Its History, Arts, and Literature*; Brinkley, *A History of the Japanese People*; Longford, *The Story of Old Japan*; Davis, *Japan, from the Age of the Gods to the Fall of Tsingtao*; Cary, *A History of Christianity in Japan*.

CHAPTER VI

THE CIVILIZATION OF THE OLD JAPAN

One cannot well begin the story of the transition from the old to the new Japan without interrupting to describe the main characteristics of the nation's culture just before the beginning of the change. The Japan of 1917 is so decidedly the child of the Japan of 1850 that to know the first one must be acquainted with the second.

THE MILITARY CLASS

One of the prominent features of the culture of Japan in the eighteenth century was the dominant position of the military class. This military class, usually headed by the shogun or his ministers, had from the time of Yoritomo controlled the state. The few emperors who attempted to assert themselves were forced to rely as firmly upon an army as did the shoguns. There had been gradually perfected a system closely resembling the feudalism of medieval Europe and like it primarily military in its forms and ideals. Its name, *bakufu*, "camp office," and the title of its head, *sei-i-tai-shogun*, "great barbarian-subduing general," were martial. The shogun based his authority on force, and while in theory he was the servant of the emperor, in practice he was the chief power in the state. Underneath the shogun were the great military lords, the *daimyo*. In Tokugawa times some of these were cadet branches or direct vassals of the ruling family. Some were descendants

of former rivals of Ieyasu, and gave to him and his successors a more or less grudging allegiance. Associated with the daimyo were minor chiefs and especially the samurai, the ordinary knights or soldiers. Their position was hereditary and as a sign of their rank they proudly wore two swords. Most of the sumurai owed allegiance to some baron or to the shogun. From their lords they received a stated allowance. Only a few, called *ronin*, "wave men," were unattached. Their freedom was not normal and was due either to an unusually adventurous spirit, or to some calamity, such as poverty, disgrace, sorrow, or the extinction of their liege's house. The warrior classes had developed their own code of ethics, *bushido*, of which more will be said later. The lower social orders seemed to exist for the support of this fighting caste. A wide gulf divided the samurai from the commercial and agricultural classes, and the young bloods of the lower orders paid the warriors the sincere flattery of an imitation in dress and manners carried as far as the laws would allow. The ideals of the nation, as is usually the case, were molded by the standards and the exploits of the *élite*. It is true that in spite of warlike exercises and education the samurai had lost some of their vigor during the centuries of Tokugawa peace, and that many daimyo had impoverished themselves by luxury and had fallen under the control of their subordinates. The Tokugawa, too, had favored the commoners, possibly in an attempt to offset the power of the daimyo. But the barons and the samurai were still the masters of the nation.

The presence of this military class was in many respects to be a distinct advantage to Japan in the new age brought by contact with the West. It provided a group of disciplined men accustomed to leadership, and whom the nation had been trained to follow. With a few exceptions the

leaders in the transition from the old to the new Japan were of the military class. The government is still largely dominated by their descendants. In the possession of this special type of military heritage the island empire has had a distinct advantage over China, for there no hereditary nobility with traditions of loyalty and sacrifice is present to lead the nation through the perils which beset the period of change, and the nation itself does not seem to have developed a capacity for discipline and unity as fully as in Japan. Moreover, the military tradition was a partial preparation for competition with the Occident. Europe, it is true, has long since passed from the feudal stage to that of industry and commerce, but the habit of war is still strong upon it, and the mailed fist is depended upon to further the economic interests of the West. Japan, under the leadership of her samurai, and especially under the influence of her martial tradition, found it comparatively easy to adjust herself to European navalism and militarism. She proved an apt pupil in learning the methods of Occidental warfare. The obedience, physical courage, and willingness to fight bred by the ages of her military past have had no small part in enabling her to make herself feared by Western powers and to assume a place among them. The victories of the Russo-Japanese war were made possible partly, although not by any means entirely, by the long centuries of the *bakufu*.

In one respect this emphasis upon the military has placed Japan at a disadvantage in the modern age. She was not primarily commercial or industrial. Trade was left to the lower classes. She was lacking in accumulated commercial capital. She had no fleet, either of merchant or of war craft. For the most part her roads were poor. She was almost entirely self-sufficient and her foreign commerce was

of the slightest. What industry and trade existed were organized into guilds, a system admirable in its time, but unfitted to cope with the great joint-stock concerns of the Occident. In 1853 Japan entered a world dominated by the ideals of the industrial revolution, bending all its energies to the production and accumulation of wealth. It took her some time to adjust herself to the situation. That she has done so in a little over half a century is marked evidence of adaptability. Moreover, her ethics were military, not commercial. Business integrity had not achieved the place of honor that it occupies in the codes of the commercial West. The trade of feudal days was not characterized by excessive dishonesty, to be sure, but in the early days of Japan's intercourse with the Occident much of her business was carried on by men who were not of the military class, and who were unrestrained by strong traditional standards of probity and became all too apt pupils of the scheming adventurers who were present in the vanguard of the European commercial invasion.

In the possession of the military ideal the Japanese are in striking contrast to their great continental neighbor. China has been primarily commercial and industrial and only secondarily martial. She has often been devastated by war, but her government has traditionally been in the hands of a civil bureaucracy that is recruited from the ranks of the agricultural, mercantile, and scholarly classes and exercises its power in their behalf. She has found it difficult to organize herself to meet the armies and navies of the West. Japan has, as we shall see, felt compelled to assume the defense of the entire Far East against the aggressive Occident, and to that end has annexed Korea and has taken steps toward a protectorate of China. For her ability to do this and for her victories over the Russians and Ger-

mans, Japan must partly thank the training given by the years of military feudalism.

The warrior class was organized by fiefs. The feudal system produced loyalty to the local lord rather than to the state or the emperor or even to the shogun. The shogun as head of the Tokugawa family had his personal retainers and his vassals who were true to him, but the land had many daimyo who were jealous of his power, and the samurai who owed them allegiance could be counted on to obey their lord first, and the shogun second or not at all. Although much weakened, and thoroughly subordinated to loyalty to the emperor, this feudal spirit has persisted in the new Japan. The army is dominated by Choshu, and the navy by Satsuma, both of which we are to hear of later, and at times the rivalries of the two have been important factors in national politics.

THE IMPERIAL INSTITUTION

Another powerful survival from Japan's earlier days is the institution of the emperor. The ruling house is devoutly believed to have reigned from ages eternal and to be the direct offspring of the gods. It has formed the rallying point for the ardent spirit of patriotism that has been so marked a characteristic of the new Japan. Here again the island empire has had the advantage of its continental neighbor, for the latter has no native imperial line around which the awakening nation can unite. Dynasty has followed dynasty, and at the time when the Occident burst in on China, her throne was occupied by a race of alien conquerors whose hold in their position was already weakening. The traditional attitude toward Japan's imperial house was a remarkable preparation for the duties of the new age. By the shoguns, especially the Tokugawa shoguns, the

emperor's sanctity had been emphasized, thus strengthening his hold on the imagination of his people and heightening the new-born patriotism of the nineteenth century. Moreover, the precedent had been maintained that he should reign but not govern, and the transition to a constitutional monarchy of the European type was an easy one. The shoguns, Hideyoshi, and the Fujiwara premiers had ruled in the emperor's name for well over a thousand years. Fujiwara, shoguns, and even daimyo had in turn been dominated by ministers who were likewise content with the substance of power while preserving the nominal dignity of the princes in whose name they held it. From the shogun who exercised absolute authority in the name of a sacrosanct sovereign who but seldom interfered in the administration, to a ministry, likewise acting for the monarch, was no difficult step. Under both, the emperor has been the source of all authority but has exercised little of it himself. This does not mean that in the new age there has been a ministry responsible to a parliament, although toward this goal there seems to have been progress. It does mean that a group of the ablest in the land won the ear of the emperor and governed in his name, assuming all responsibility for his acts. Just how much personal influence he has exerted has never fully been made public. In the mature years of Meiji, the great monarch of the transition period, it seems at times to have been large: under the present ruler it is probably not so great. Both have scrupulously observed at least an outward loyalty to the ministry.

MODERN OUTGROWTHS OF OLD IDEALS

The patriotism of the new Japan, the self-conscious nationalism which so centers in the institution of the em-

peror, has grown up largely in the past seventy years. Strange as it may seem to those who know only the Japan of the twentieth century, there was but little of what we think of as patriotism until nearly the close of feudal days. The intense national spirit of to-day is, however, partially an outgrowth of features of the older Japan, the loyalty of the samurai to his lord, a keen sensitiveness to ridicule and insult, the solidarity produced by the Tokugawa shoguns, and the atmosphere of sanctity that surrounded the emperor. The individual samurai, as we have seen, had originally little if any feeling of attachment to the emperor at Kyoto or to the nation. He would probably not have tolerated the usurpation of the throne by one not of the lineage of Jimmu Tenno, and he certainly resented the invasion of the land by the Mongols, but it was not until well along in the Tokugawa régime that even some of his class began to be passionately conscious that the country was the "land of the gods" and to be sensitive to the impotence of the rightful sovereign. The samurai did, however, have a real sense of loyalty to his lord. Part of his code of ethics was to be willing to sacrifice all that he held dear, wife, children, life itself, in the service of his master. At the latter's death he might even commit suicide. So extensive indeed did self-destruction become on such occasions that it was necessary for the early Tokugawa shoguns to seek to restrain it by law. The spirit of personal loyalty was during the old régime directed toward the lord, but with the passing of feudalism it centered itself on the person and institution of the emperor with an intensity which it is hard for the Occidental to appreciate, and contact with the nations of the West wakened into life a latent but earnest love of country.

Another characteristic of the code of the samurai was

extreme sensitiveness on points of honor. Personal affronts were often avenged by death. Emphasis was laid on the Confucian precept that a son must not live under the same heaven with the murderer of his father and the stories of the vengeance of sons upon the assassins of their sires are numerous. The retainer pursued unto death the slayer of his lord, even at the cost of his own life and that of his wife and children. The sword of the samurai was ever ready to be drawn to maintain what he deemed his honor. He was intensely proud of his rank, at times arrogantly so. This pride seems almost to be a racial characteristic, for it is older than feudalism. It has survived the latter, and it is national as well as personal. It helps to explain the resentment of the Japanese at the discrimination against their fellow-countrymen in the Occident. They are indignant at the land legislation of California and the attempts at exclusion by law from the United States and Canada, partly, it is true, because of the economic disadvantage at which they are thus placed, but primarily because these measures, which are applied to no Europeans, seem to brand them as inferior and so to be a slur on their national honor.

Patriotism is partly the result of the solidarity forced upon the nation by the Tokugawa. Before and even during most of their time the national spirit was low. Feudalism tended to break up the country into loosely connected units. The great daimyo of the South at times tended to act as independent monarchs, as, for example, when they entered into commercial agreements with the European traders of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Tokugawa sought to promote peace by insuring unity and their authority was successfully asserted over the entire land. All the nation was controlled by careful regulations from Yedo.

Commerce, travel, and even dress and food were subject to state supervision. The feeling of nationalism did not prevail, it is true, until after the end of the shogunate, but it was the natural outgrowth of the Tokugawa régime.

The organization of the Tokugawa prepared the way as well for another characteristic of both the old and the new Japan, the predominance of state supervision and social, as contrasted with individual, initiative and activity. As we have seen, all phases of life were subject to regulation and supervision by the shogun's representatives. Foreign commerce was under official control. Order and peace were maintained by the most rigid conformity to law. Collective responsibility was enforced; the family was held accountable for the deeds of its members, and the village for those of its inhabitants. Partly as a result, in the new Japan social action has been emphasized to a high degree. The state has taken the lead in encouraging railways, telegraphs, banking, and foreign commerce. The Japanese merchant marine, for example, whose growth has been so noteworthy, has been heavily subsidized. This emphasis upon collective action has many advantages in the twentieth century, when the nations of the West are being forced by economic competition and war to an ever-increasing state direction of industry, transportation, and commerce. Apparently it is the nation which can be best organized in all phases of its life, intellectual, economic, and military, under the unified control of the central government, that has the best chance of winning in the intensified competition of the twentieth century. For this form of state collectivism Japan is by her past training eminently fitted, and when the situation in which she found herself in the nineteenth century made it necessary to develop it, she did so to a high degree. In the struggle for the maritime hegemony of the Pacific and com-

mmercial leadership in China, she can act as a unit, without the waste that comes from haphazard direction and imperfect coördination of the efforts of the citizens in many nations of the Occident.

The agency by which state direction has been exercised under the new régime has been the bureaucracy. This has been one of the outstanding features of the administrative system of the new Japan. Its higher positions have been filled largely from the ranks of the samurai and their descendants. It has formed a hierarchy that has on the whole dominated the nation. It is a continuation in another form of the spirit of the Tokugawa, a careful and minute control by the government of all phases of human activity.

Another characteristic of the old Japan was its experience in assimilating foreign culture. The civilization of the pre-feudal ages, as we have seen, was developed largely under the stimulus of contact with China. Even during the feudal ages, so distinctively Japanese, the country was at times and in some phases of its life much affected by the continent. Japanese standards of action, while largely the outgrowth of the people's social needs, were partly molded by Confucian and Buddhist ideals. Bushido, while unmistakably indigenous, showed the effect of both Confucianism and Buddhism. Family life and solidarity bore the imprint of continental influence. Feudalism grew up partly as the result of the failure of the attempt to adapt the administrative system of the T'ang to Japanese conditions. The written characters of China were taken over bodily and its literature was read as eagerly in Japan as on the continent. Buddhism, so influential in the old Japan, was Indian in origin and reached the islands in Chinese garb. Chinese philosophy profoundly influenced Japanese thinkers. And yet the people of Nippon were not blind imitators. As much as

they admired the civilization of the continent, they were not content to be slavish copyists. Bushido is very different from Confucianism and Buddhism. The Chinese written language was partly adjusted to Japanese needs by the invention of syllabic marks. A true Japanese literature and art were produced, as different from continental models as was any national art or literature in medieval Europe from those of the Roman world. The Japanese were not overwhelmed by the flood of culture from the continent as was the American Indian by that of Europe; they built on it, as did the peoples of Northern Europe on that of the Mediterranean basin, a civilization of their own.

This experience in assimilating alien ideas and institutions was an admirable preparation for the coming of the European. Japan had for centuries been accustomed to embrace and adapt new ideas from abroad. Her national pride caused her to be fearful of any charge of barbarism, and her past made it natural for this pride to lead her, not to reject the culture of the Occident, but to hasten to adopt as much of it as she needed. She had assimilated the civilization of the Chinese, the highest that she had known. Once she was convinced that that of the West was more powerful she was quick to seize upon it for herself. In this again she had the advantage of China. That country had never known intimately a culture equal to its own. It had for centuries posed as a teacher, not a learner. A much more severe shock than that which aroused Japan was needed to convince the Middle Kingdom that it must adapt itself to the ways of the Occident, and the process of adjustment was accordingly more delayed in beginning and has been more painful.

Nor is it strange that Japan, having been so apt a pupil, should deem herself a competent teacher. Now that she

has so successfully learned of the Occident, she poses as the instructor of the other and less facile peoples of the Far East. To her schools come students from all the Far East. The new terms that she has coined from the Chinese ideographs for objects and ideas of the West are being taken over bodily by her great continental neighbor. She aspires to help organize on the modern lines that she has learned from the Occident the industry and commerce, the armies and the diplomacy of the huge Oriental republic.

THE CULTURE OF OLD JAPAN

Still another characteristic of the old Japan was its love of the beautiful. This aesthetic sense has shown itself in painting, sculpture, ceramics, lacquer, and architecture, in landscape-gardening, in an elaborate code of politeness, in flower festivals, the tea ceremony, in the manufacture and decoration of swords, in dancing, and a score of other ways. It would be out of place in a book of this size and scope to go into any but the briefest of discussions of these, interesting as they are. Art was largely influenced by Chinese models. The great masters of the T'ang, the Sung, the Yüan, and the Ming dynasties, all had their followers in Japan. Each art revival on the continent was felt in Japan. There were developed, however, vigorous native schools, and even in following the foreign schools the islanders showed originality. Like their Chinese prototypes, Japanese works of art show the strong influence of Buddhism. Like them, too, the ideal is not so much a photographic reproduction of nature, as an attempt to catch its spirit. To Buddhism the visible world is transient, and it is natural that art produced in its atmosphere should seek to depict the soul that is back of the visible, to portray emotions as

much as matter. Users of the Chinese character hold calligraphy to be a fine art, and their emphasis upon line is naturally carried over into painting. If allowance is made for these differences in ideals, however, the best work of Japan will bear comparison with much of the best of the Occident.

Painting has a long and brilliant history. The collections to be found in America and Europe and the enthusiasm of its Western students bear witness to its appeal to a more than national artistic sense. The enumeration of its distinct schools and great masters would alone require several pages, and there is room here for only a few. There was the Tosa school, largely Japanese in its subjects and methods. There was the priest Meicho (1351–1427), or Cho Densu, who gave himself to portraying the divinities and themes of the Buddhism faith. There was Sesshu (1420–1506), also a priest, who after a close study of the great Chinese masters in their home land branched out on lines of his own and left behind him figures and especially landscapes that live to-day. A younger contemporary of Sesshu, Kano Motonobu (1476–1559), the son of a painter, showed a wide variety of subjects and styles and founded a school, the Kano, which still has adherents. All of these had catered to the aristocracy. Hishigawa Moronobu (1646–1713), an embroiderer's draughtsman and so of the lower orders, showed the growing importance of the common people under the Tokugawa in his portrayals, in the splendid technique of the old schools, of the life that he saw around him. He gave an impulse too, to illustrations for books and wood-engravings, a means of education and amusement for his own class. Okyo also illustrated the tendencies of the Tokugawa era. He was the son of a farmer, and attempted to break away from the canons of the Chinese schools and to paint nature exactly as he saw it.

Then there is color printing of broadsides and illustrated books, also a development of the Tokugawa age, and primarily for the masses. It seems to have been distinctively a Japanese idea and not to have been introduced from the continent.

There were noted sculptors in wood, and workers in metal, including those who erected the great bronze statues of Buddha that still charm the traveller. Lacquer and inlay work were known and remarkably well executed. Porcelain had long been imported from China before it was produced in Japan, but the Japanese later spent much labor and skill in its production. A complete history of pottery would fill several large volumes. There were many different schools, often named from a locality, or from a feudal fief whose chief was a patron of the arts. The best examples of the architecture of the past are to be found in Buddhist temples and in the few remaining feudal castles. The well known buildings that adorn the mausoleum of Iyeyasu at Nikko, for example, are the delight of all who see them. Part of the landscape gardening is too grotesque to appeal to an Occidental, but most of it, of a naturalistic school, has a real charm for him. Some of it is in miniature, and stunted trees are trained with infinite care to reproduce the forms of those of normal size. The flower festivals at the cherry blossom season are national holidays.

The leisure of the imperial court circles and later of the daimyo under the Tokugawa gave opportunity for the beauty-loving soul of the people to express itself in elaborate and exquisitely perfect etiquette. The courtesy of the period has come down to the present, although at times rudely shaken by the bustle of the industrial twentieth century. Japanese politeness has become proverbial, and the disregard for it that Western nations have at times

shown in their dealings with Tokyo has frequently helped to produce friction. The ceremony of tea drinking with its different schools and minute regulations, the development of the burning and judging of incense into an elaborately ordered pastime of the leisured, the skill that went into the manufacture and decoration of the sword of the samurai, all seem to be outgrowths of a spirit that sets great store upon the beautiful. Dancing, much of it ceremonial, goes back to the earliest historic times and is said to have taken its rise in the days of the Sun Goddess. The æsthetic spirit has of recent years been at times prostituted for commercial purposes, but it still survives and is one of the characteristics of the Japan of to-day.

Of the literature of the old Japan but little need be said. Here, although rather less than in the fine arts, she was strongly influenced by China. Only in poetry did she refuse to conform to foreign models and fully show her originality. This poetry, because of its peculiar canons, defies adequate translation into Western tongues. Japan has had the drama, said in its beginning to have been associated with Shinto, but later deeply colored by Buddhist ideas. Still later it became completely secular and popular in form and content.

Japan has not shown a creative spirit in philosophy, ethics, or religion equal to that which molded the life of China, India, or the Semitic races. Her sons have rather been content to adapt divergent alien systems to their own necessities, and to build on contributions from abroad. The philosophers of China were studied and at times criticized. Buddhist priests arose who thought with a sufficiently vigorous independence to be founders of new sects, but no Japanese has appeared who ranks in originality with Gautama, Confucius, Chu Hsi, Socrates, or Kant.

Family solidarity is one of the characteristics of the old Japan that has persisted in spite of the altered conditions of a new age. It has been one of the ever present factors in Japanese life. Each man must be loyal to his parents, serving them while they are living, honoring them after their death. The family must be continued by male heirs that the forefathers may not lack descendants to pay them honor. Marriage was universal, and failing offspring, adoption could be resorted to to continue the ancestral line. Obedience to parents has been one of the cardinal virtues. The family was more important by far than the individual and each must subordinate his wishes to it. The individualism of the Occident would have been the rankest of heresies. Here the influence of Chinese teachings and models has been very great. In China even more than in Japan, the family is the unit, and there are those who believe that before the advent of Chinese culture the family was of but small importance in Japan. Here also is again the Japanese electicism. Filial piety was not as important as loyalty, and filial duties are perhaps less institutional and more sentimental than in China.

The wife was more abjectly subordinated to the husband than in the great continental empire. Absolute obedience, self-effacement, and fidelity were required of her, and yet her husband might be unfaithful or divorce her almost at will. Within her sphere she might be greatly honored, but she was always the subject of her lord. It must be added, however, that the Japanese wives were not without their charm, and a very real one. Those of the higher classes were models of unobtrusive courtesy; they had a decided influence over the younger years of the children, and left an indelible stamp, chiefly for good, upon the morals of each new generation. The work of the women of the feudal

classes, while unspectacular, was noble and far-reaching in its effects. The wife by her intense loyalty and self-effacement inspired her husband to maintain his ideals and to preserve toward his lord something of the same attitude. The wives of the humbler strata of society were real help-meets for their husbands and frequently shared in the bread-winning. There have been empresses on the imperial throne, although only two of these have sat there in recent centuries. The difference in the status of women in China and Japan is possibly one that is natural between a civilization that is essentially agricultural and commercial and one that was primarily military.

RELIGION AND ETHICS OF OLD JAPAN

In the sphere of religion the Japanese have not been creators of the first rank. They have been religious, and deeply so. Their fine loyalty has made them willing to die for a faith once adopted, as was seen in the persecutions of Christianity. But their religious sentiments seem to be influenced largely by their appreciation of the beautiful and by a matter-of-fact attitude toward life. They have not been given to original philosophical or theological speculation, nor even to daring innovations in the field of ethics. They have largely been eclectic; all of their religious beliefs are either foreign in their origin or have been profoundly influenced by foreign ideas. Their primitive faith, it will be remembered, seems to have been a very simple affair. They honored various spirits, the many divinities that had been created by the naïve attempts of the race to account for the beginnings of the world, of life, and the nation. There were the Sun Goddess and hosts of other deities. The spirits of great warriors were reverenced. A few

scholars have even suggested, although on very doubtful evidence, that the gods of the aborigines whom the Japanese drove out may have been adopted, on the ground that they were potent in the conquered land and must be propitiated. There were the beginnings of what resembles taboo, and a method of ceremonial purification by water and wind. There were no images, no ornate temples, and no priestly caste. Such ethical standards as existed had little connection with religious belief.

Under the influence of continental thought and institutions, this primitive religion became much changed. The stories of the gods and goddesses were recorded by those who were more or less familiar with the Chinese cosmogony and other foreign myths, and in the process were altered past hope of accurate restoration. The primitive faith seems to have been modified to exalt the power of the monarch and to emphasize his divine origin. For centuries the native cult was, as it still is, primarily associated with the ruling house. The Chinese reverence for ancestors was introduced, and that phase of the indigenous faith that had to do with the names of the departed was accentuated. Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess, the ancestress of the emperor, was honored, as were the spirits of the rulers of the past.

Buddhism came in, and for the first time the native faith achieved self-consciousness and was given a name, *Shinto*, Chinese in origin, meaning "the way of the Gods," as distinguished from *Buppo* "the law of the Buddha." For a time Shinto seemed about to be absorbed by Buddhism, for clever monks identified the Japanese divinities as incarnations of Buddhist saints and deities.

The indigenous faith persisted, however, in the imperial household and in shrines through the country. During Tokugawa times it was revived by the group of scholars

who were seeking to emphasize the native as contrasted with the foreign, and the attempt was made to purify it of many of its alien elements. It passed over from the Tokugawa to the new age and with the restoration of the emperor achieved a marked official extension in a more purely native form. Its temples are now, as they have traditionally been, simple buildings, reproducing more nearly than any other structures the form of the primitive Japanese house. They have caretakers, who form a sort of hierarchy of priests but are not powerful as a class. There is no image within them, but there are emblems of the deity, usually a sword, mirror, or jewel, the insignia said to have been given by the Sun Goddess to the imperial ancestors. Before the shrines are the *torii*, resembling ornamental gateways. There was and is no ethical system enforced by Shinto, and it induces but little sense of moral or spiritual guilt. Its ceremonies are confined to formal lustrations, to honoring the spirits of emperors, of national heroes and ancestors, to entreating blessings on the nation, and asking for protection from evil.

In Buddhism, on the other hand, the old Japan had a most highly developed religion. The faith had come to the nation with all the wealth of the philosophy, art, and organization that it had acquired in the course of its growth in India, Central Asia, and China. Its philosophy was elaborate, teaching that this world is but a passing show, a delusion; that man is chained to it and to suffering in an endless series of rebirths, his lot in each new one being determined by his *karma*, a term that is rather lamely but succinctly defined as meaning the sum of his actions good and bad in preceding existences. Man is to seek and to find salvation by escaping from the transient world and the chain of existence through the means provided by the faith. These means, it may be recalled, were various, differing

somewhat with each sect. Buddhism had a voluminous literature. It erected magnificent temples, adorned with all the beauty and skill known to the art of the lands through which it had passed, and with the gifts of generations of pious believers. Its celibate priesthood formed a powerful hierarchy, often noted for learning, devotion, and ability. It had a large pantheon, a complete calendar of holidays and feasts, and encouraged pilgrimages to shrines of noted sanctity. It had been the principal vehicle by which civilization had been brought to Japan, and it had received the support of generations of emperors, nobles, and feudal chiefs. Buddhism, indeed, occupied in Japan much the position that the Catholic Church held in the Europe of the middle ages. Both were the means of bringing to a semi-barbarous people a superior and older civilization. Both dominated society by their philosophy, learning, and priesthood, and their elaborate rituals, their art and architecture. There were six principal sects, it will be recalled, most of them of foreign origin. Each of these developed sub-sects, and there were several minor sects. But while there have been jealousies and quarrels between these divisions there has never been an Inquisition and never mutual persecutions comparable to those that have marred the relations of Christian bodies. In the later years of the Tokugawa, it will be remembered, Buddhism began to lose its hold on the thinking men of the nation. The masses still believed in it, but the educated were inclined to follow the teachings of the great philosophers of the Confucian school. It must not be thought, however, that there was the sharp division between religions that one finds in the Occident. The Japanese for some purposes would frequent the Shinto shrines, for others the Buddhist temples, and could still pay reverence at his ancestral graves and follow the moral pre-

cepts of the Chinese sages without any feeling of inconsistency. Even if he had largely lost his faith in Buddhism, he would still resort to its burial rites for his kinsmen, much as an agnostic in Christian lands is apt to desire the services of the church at funerals and weddings.

Confucianism has been a determining factor in the life and thought of Japan. From the time that continental culture had first reached the islands the Chinese classical writings had been studied, although by only a few until the Tokugawa régime. After the time of Iyeyasu Confucius and Mencius were honored and had fully as profound an influence upon the feudal classes as had Aristotle upon medieval Europe. Under the early Tokugawa, especially, Chinese literature and the Chinese sages were extremely popular with the military class. Even after the Japanese revival of the middle and later years of the Tokugawa, when the native religion, language, literature, and institutions were given renewed attention by many scholars, Chinese ethics remained popular with most of the samurai.

The effects of Confucianism on Japan were many. Ancestor worship, so essential a part of the Chinese system, flourished. The five relationships of the classics, between prince and minister, father and son, husband and wife, younger brother and older brother, and friend and friend, became cardinal points in the Japanese moral code, although with modifications due to local conditions and habits of mind. Loyalty of the vassal to his lord, complete subservience of the children to the paternal will, subordination of the wife to the husband even to the point of self-effacement, were encouraged. The moral precepts taught in the schools to-day are largely Confucian in their form.

Bushido, the ethical code of the military classes, reminds one of the chivalry of feudal Europe. As it existed under

the later Tokugawa, it was the result of years of development. It seems to go back at least to the time when the military class was forming. Under the successors of Iyeyasu it was elaborated and largely made over until it lost some rather unlovely features of its earlier years. It was essentially Japanese, but in its later and elaborated form it showed the influence of Confucianism and Buddhism, especially the former. Confucius and Mencius, to whom the Chinese system named from the first owed its classical form, it may be added, lived and worked under a feudal organization which in some respects resembled that of Japan. The adaptation of Chinese ethics to bushido was thus facilitated. Perhaps one may say, although the parallelism must not be pushed too far, that somewhat as chivalry showed the influence of the teachings of the Christian church, so bushido gave evidences of having grown up in an environment in which Buddhism and Confucianism were present.

Loyalty was the cardinal virtue of bushido. The samurai must sacrifice life, truth, and even his family if the service of his lord required it. With the passing of feudalism, one may say in parenthesis, the nation, personified in the emperor, has absorbed the loyalty previously paid to the daimyo. Filial piety, the devotion to one's parents and ancestors, although subordinate to loyalty, was prominent. Family unity, promoted by filial piety and by the duties of brothers to one another, was marked. Frugality, simplicity of life, and indifference to wealth were exalted. For recreation military amusements were encouraged. Bread-winning pursuits and regard for money affairs were held in contempt. The warrior above all valued self-control in the presence of pain, and steeled himself to endure the most intense agony without flinching.

Personal honor was highly esteemed and the sword of the samurai, the sign of his rank, although it must not be drawn but for the gravest reasons, was ever held ready to avenge a slight to its owner or to its owner's lord. Honor was dearer than life and in many exigencies self-destruction was regarded not simply as right, but as the only right course. Disgrace and defeat were atoned for by suicide, and on the death of a daimyo loyal followers might show their grief and affection by it. The knight might protest against grave injustice by suicide, and might by the same means try to dissuade his lord from unwise or unworthy action. Part of the training of every samurai was the ritual for disemboweling,¹ the approved means of self-destruction, and one of the highest tests of his character was to be able, if the occasion demanded, to perform it calmly and without flinching. If condemned to death, it was held to be a privilege to execute the sentence on one's own body and to be a disgrace to die at the hands of the public headsman. This stoicism and disregard for the material accessories of life were especially encouraged by the Zen sect. This, it will be remembered, had been marked by a stern discipline and fostered self-reliance, and had been modified by Confucianism.

The wife of the samurai was also influenced by bushido. She was to be self-effacing, and was to hide all traces of suffering or grief. She was taught how to end her life with decorum in case the occasion seemed to demand it. By her example she exercised a profound influence over her husband.

Magnanimity to a defeated enemy was encouraged. Fidelity to one's plighted word was part of the code, as was faithfulness to principle and to friends. These considera-

¹ Called *seppuku* or, more vulgarly, *hara kiri*.

tions took precedent over an exact regard for objective facts.

It must not be thought that bushido, any more than chivalry, was lived up to by all those who professed to be guided by it. The samurai seldom attained to even his own standards.

As in the case of chivalry, bushido profoundly influenced not only the upper classes, for whom it was primarily intended, but the civil population as well. The lower orders of society copied as far as possible the ethics as well as the manners of the warrior. Bushido, like chivalry, was to remain an active force long after the social order that had produced it had disappeared.

Such were the more prominent features of the organization and life of the old Japan. They were to be profoundly modified and some of them later disappeared, but they have left an indelible stamp upon the ideals and the culture of the nation.

For further reading see: Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*; Griffis, *The Mikado's Empire*; Binyon, *Painting in the Far East*; Fenollosa, *Epochs of Chinese and Japanese Art*; Morrison, *The Painters of Japan*; Aston, *A History of Japanese Literature*; Chamberlain, *Japanese Poetry*; Mitford, *Tales of Old Japan*; Aston, *Shinto, The Way of the Gods*; Gulick, *The Evolution of the Japanese*; Hearn, *Japan, An Attempt at Interpretation*; Knox, *The Development of Religion in Japan*; Lloyd, *The Creed of Half Japan*; Nitobe, *Bushido, The Soul of Japan*; Brinkley, *Japan, Its History, Arts and Literature*.

CHAPTER VII

THE PERIOD OF INTERNAL TRANSFORMATION (1853-1894)

I. FROM THE COMING OF THE FOREIGNER TO THE RESTORATION OF THE EMPEROR (1853-1867)

In a preceding chapter we have seen how the Tokugawa régime gradually prepared the way for its own destruction and the end of feudalism. By the middle of the nineteenth century the time was ripe for a change. The successors of Ieyasu had become feeble and were largely controlled by their ministers. The more influential rivals of the Tokugawa were disaffected. The great fiefs of the southwest, especially Satsuma and Choshu, far removed from Yedo, were practically autonomous in all local affairs and would not brook the interference of the shogun's officials. As a result of the long peace, luxury and idleness were working havoc with the warrior class; military feudalism was fast becoming an anachronism. A Japanese revival, which so far was largely confined to a relatively limited circle of scholars, was emphasizing the historic position of the emperor and was fostering the conviction that the shogun was a usurper. The court nobles at Kyoto were beginning to be restless under the arbitrary control of the *bakufu*. The middle classes, increasingly prosperous, could no longer be regarded as existing merely to support an idle, obsolete warrior caste. Some sort of change was inevitable. Whether if there had been no external factors the nation would simply have been plunged into long civil strife from which one of the feudal families would have emerged in

possession of the shogunate, or whether the constitution of the state would have been entirely altered, it is hard to say.³ As it was, the revolution was precipitated and its course determined by the coming of the foreigners.

THE OCCIDENTAL ADVANCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The seclusion to which the Tokugawa had confined Japan was remarkably effective, but its success was not due entirely to their efforts. During the latter part of the seventeenth and all of the eighteenth century Occidental nations did not try with any persistence to force their way into either China or Japan. In China only one port, Canton, was open to foreign trade. The Portuguese had ceased to be an important factor in the Far East. The Spaniards were content to occupy the Philippines and did not reach out for more commerce. Great Britain was busy extending her possessions in India and in making them secure against the natives and the French. All European nations were occupied at home in the great wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries. By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, a change was taking place. In the latter part of the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth century, Russians, English, and Americans had explored the North Pacific. The peace that followed the Napoleonic Wars was making possible a more nearly undivided attention to commerce and manufactures. The industrial revolution was stimulating trade. Markets were being sought for the enormous quantities of goods produced by the new machinery. Fresh sources of raw material were necessary to supply the demands of the enlarging factories. Steam navigation and the railway were making it possible to reach the ends of the earth in an un-

precedently short time and to transport goods in quantities hitherto undreamed of. In North America the expansion of the United States had brought European peoples to the east coast of the Pacific; Oregon and California were settled in the eighteen forties and fifties. The Russians had reached the west coast after a mighty advance across the vast reaches of Siberia, and had formed settlements in the Amur country and Alaska. Before long the Pacific would teem with a new commerce and the nations of eastern Asia would be compelled to open their doors. By 1850 nearly all India had been brought under either the direct or the indirect control of Great Britain. The English, having found China's restrictions on trade intolerable, had fought a war with her which was ended in 1842 by a treaty¹ opening five ports to trade and making provision for commerce and official intercourse between the two nations. This treaty was quickly followed by others between China and the leading powers of the Occident. It was inevitable that pressure would soon be put on Japan to end her hermit existence.

During the first half of the nineteenth century there were repeated indications of an approaching attempt of Western powers to open Japan. The Dutch, through their closely regulated intercourse at Nagasaki, brought news of impending changes. Here and there Japanese were learning Dutch and through the medium of that language were getting an inkling of the importance of the civilization of Europe. A few European works on history, geography, literature, and science were read. From the time when some native surgeons dissected a human body and found that it was more accurately described by the Dutch anatomical works than by the Chinese, there were those who saw that the culture of the West was in some respects supe-

¹ The treaty of Nanking.

rior to that of the East, and wished to know more of it. Russian ships appeared on the northern coasts as early as the eighteenth century, and envoys from the Czar asked (1804) that regular intercourse be established, only to be met with a peremptory refusal. Russians and Japanese came into conflict in the Kuriles and Sakhalin, and the Japanese were worsted. The Russians might have forced themselves on Japan proper had the Napoleonic wars not intervened to engross their attention elsewhere. In 1846 a French ship touched at the Riu Kiu archipelago and advised the islanders to place themselves under French protection as a guard against the British. In 1847 the king of Holland advised the Japanese to abandon their policy of exclusion, and in 1849 warned them that an American fleet might soon be expected. Ships of other European nations touched at Japan from time to time.

THE PERRY EXPEDITION AND RESULTS

Fortunately the move that finally opened the country was made by the United States, a power that had no territorial ambitions in the Far East. The American merchant marine was at that time relatively much more important than it became after the losses of the Civil War. American ships had gone to all corners of the earth and in the Far East were second in numbers only to those of England. Japanese fishermen were occasionally driven across the Pacific to the Aleutians or to the coast of North America. In 1837 one ship¹ made its way nearly to Yedo in the effort to return a few such castaways, and, if possible, to open commerce. She was fired upon, and returned to Canton without having landed her charges. American whalers

¹ The "Morrison."

gradually became numerous in the North Pacific and in several instances were wrecked on the Japanese islands. The surviving sailors were confined, often handled roughly, and as a rule were returned to the outside world only through the kindness of the Dutch. Some arrangements were necessary with the shogun's government to insure good treatment and rescue for the crews. In 1846 an American commodore ¹ asked in the name of the president that intercourse be opened, only to be refused. In 1848 the American brig *Preble* threatened to bombard Nagasaki unless fifteen foreign seamen held there were immediately handed over. California was acquired in the forties, and ships were soon sailing from San Francisco to the new treaty ports of China. Since Japan lay in the direct path of such vessels, its ports, if opened, would offer convenient places for restocking with water and provisions, and for refitting. The shipping, especially the whaling interests in the United States, asked the administration to insist that the country unlock its doors. Finally the American government responded and sent a squadron under Commodore Perry to obtain a treaty. In 1853 Perry arrived in Araga bay near Yedo with a fine display of force, transmitted the president's letter to the Japanese authorities, and since there seemed to be no immediate prospects of successful negotiations, sailed away, announcing that it was his intention to return the following spring. His coming created an unprecedented commotion in the island kingdom. The shogun's ministers were sorely perplexed. Even the imperial court was stirred and ordered prayers said at the great national shrines. Perry returned, according to promise, the following spring. Before his steam warships the Yedo authorities felt themselves powerless, and after some negotiations concluded a treaty.

¹ Commodore Biddle.

Japan's isolation was not yet entirely at an end. The Perry treaty did not provide for the complete opening of the country. Its emphasis was not upon commerce, but upon the care and safe delivery of shipwrecked sailors, and the provisioning and refitting of passing vessels. Two ports were opened, one (Shimoda) near Yedo and one (Hakodate) on the northern island. An American consulate was to be permitted at Shimoda; trade was to be carried on only in accordance with local regulations, which might be stringent; supplies for vessels were to be purchased only through Japanese officials. The most-favored-nation clause, customary in the West, guaranteed to Americans any concessions that might be made to other powers. In the two years following the Perry treaty similar covenants were obtained by England, Russia, and Holland, but in none of them was residence or extensive commerce and intercourse provided for. In 1857 Townsend Harris, the United States consul-general, obtained for American citizens the privilege of residing in the open ports, to which was now added Nagasaki. The foreigners were to be under the jurisdiction of their consuls and not of Japanese officials and laws. Commerce was provided for in 1858 by a further treaty with the United States, also negotiated by Harris, which remained for many years a model document of its kind and was in force until 1899. By this last treaty customs duties were provided for, and a fixed scale was agreed upon which was not to be changed without the consent of both nations. The reception of diplomatic representatives at the court and the opening of an additional port were also granted. It ought to be added that Townsend Harris obtained these treaties from the shogun, not by any display of force, but mainly by his sympathy, tact, and persistence. The provisions for extritoriality and the treaty-established tariff were a partial

sacrifice by Japan of her sovereign rights, the struggle to regain which was to be a prominent feature in the nation's history for the next thirty-five or forty years. By the first, foreigners were removed from the control of Japanese courts:¹ by the second, the nation surrendered the right to establish its own tariff dues. Both were very galling to the sensitive, patriotic spirit of the people after their significance was recognized. Almost simultaneously with the American treaty of 1858 similar ones were signed with Great Britain, France, and Russia, and others soon followed with twelve more Western powers. Just at this time France and England were engaged in a war with China, in an attempt to force her doors still further open. As an added effort at European expansion in the Far East this war probably had some influence in hastening the negotiations of the new Japanese treaties. To exchange the ratifications of the American document Japanese envoys were sent to the United States, the first diplomatic mission to visit foreign lands.

DIVERGENT VIEWS ON ADMISSION OF FOREIGNERS

The negotiation of these treaties was not at all supported by a unanimous national sentiment. In fact, the coming of the foreigner divided the nation into three camps. The strife between these was, within a few years, to bring to an end the dual form of government, and to pave the way for the transformation of the political structure of Japan. One camp was made up of those who recognized the superiority of Western culture, and the impossibility of ignoring it. They were in favor of receiving the foreigner, and learning from him as quickly as possible in the endeavor to match him with his own weapons and at his own game. As Japan

¹ For a longer explanation of extritoriality see below, page 154.

had in years past adopted Chinese civilization, the highest that she then knew, so these reformers would have the nation now accept that of the Occident, for it was proving itself to be more powerful and efficient than that of the neighboring continent. This group, at first very small, was to predominate within a decade and a half. As time went on it saw that the dual form of government was an anachronism and a handicap in dealing with the centralized powers of the Occident. Some of its members began to work for the restoration to the emperor of the powers exercised by the *bakufu*. In this respect they found themselves in accord with the native school of historians who had come to regard the shogun as a usurper. A second group saw the impossibility of remaining a hermit nation, but believed in opening the door only as far as was insisted on by the powers. That was the prevailing sentiment at the court of the shogun. The third believed in keeping the door tightly shut, in abrogating all agreements with the Westerner, and in ousting him and all his ways. This opinion was for much of the time the prevailing one at Kyoto. The imperial court was not in contact with the foreigner and the incumbent of the throne was presumed to be reactionary. The court was, moreover, from time to time under the control of the Western fiefs. Of these the most prominent were Satsuma and Choshu. From the time of Iyeyasu, it will be remembered, they had paid the shogun only a grudging submission; they were hence not inclined to yield him unquestioning obedience in his decision to admit the foreigners. At first they had no fixed ideas on the question and were divided both between and among themselves. In time, however, they arrived at the conviction that to admit the Westerner was treason and that they should oppose it with all their might. They sought to win the ear of the

emperor and induce him to assert his authority and compel the shogun to cancel the treaties.

THE SHOGUN'S DIFFICULT POSITION

The struggle increasingly centered around Kyoto. Each faction hoped that the emperor would side with them. Part of the time the Western fiefs had his ear, and inspired by them he ordered the shogun to expel the barbarians. The shogun could not comply, for he knew himself to be powerless before the cannon of the foreign gunboats. Nor did he dare to refuse point-blank, for that would be acclaimed by his opponents as disobedience to his master, and the rising tide of national sentiment would not brook such an insult to the legal head of the state. The shogun therefore temporized. On the one hand he promised Kyoto to carry out its wishes but asked for leeway. On the other he continued his intercourse with the powers but delayed as much as possible the granting of concessions, so much so, in fact, that foreigners, not understanding his dilemma, accused him of insincerity. Had the shogun's ministers at the beginning expressed their determination not to refer foreign affairs to Kyoto they might with firmness have carried their point, but they compromised and were undone. Not willing to ignore Kyoto, the Yedo court sought to control it. The youthful shogun was married to an imperial princess, and later journeyed to Kyoto to pay homage to the emperor and receive his orders.

THE END OF THE SHOGUNATE

The situation was fast becoming an impossible one for the shogun. The numbers of Westerners in the treaty ports were increasing. Commerce was growing. Even Christian

missionaries were entering and, sheltered by the foreign settlements, were propagating their faith in spite of the anti-Christian sentiment bred by two hundred and fifty years of prohibitory edicts. Serious clashes occurred between the reactionary feudatories and the Occidentals. Foreigners were frequently attacked and occasionally killed by samurai who thought thus to show their anger against the barbarian who had violated the sacred soil of Japan, and to aid in his expulsion. In 1862 some Englishmen chanced to meet the retinue of the daimyo of Satsuma on a public road and violated, ignorantly but rather insolently, the Japanese etiquette for such occasions. They were attacked by the lord's followers and one of them was killed. The Yedo government made ample apology and paid an indemnity, but the Satsuma baron refused to surrender the guilty samurai as the English demanded and the shogun was not strong enough to compel him to do so. The British therefore in 1863 sent a naval force to the Satsuma dominions in Kiushiu and bombarded the capital (Kagoshima). The other leading Western fief, Choshu, determined in the same year to take action against the hated barbarians. It commanded the straits of Shimonoseki, the narrow passage through which passed foreign ships on their way between Shanghai and the east coast of Japan and North America. An edict from the emperor had been issued without the knowledge of the shogun, ordering that the foreigners be expelled. Choshu gladly obeyed, and the forts at the straits fired at several vessels, American, Dutch, and French. The powers concerned, together with Great Britain, joined in demanding of the shogun that the truculent daimyo be punished, but this the bakufu was quite unable to do. In fact, the Choshu lord killed the ambassador sent to him from Yedo. The four powers now sent a

squadron to Shimonoseki, bombarded and demolished the forts, and destroyed the daimyo's ships. That feudatory thereupon promised the powers that he would not rebuild his forts nor molest foreign ships and also agreed to pay the sum of three million dollars. The shogun sent an expedition against Choshu to punish the fief for its insubordination, but could accomplish nothing. He even assumed the indemnity when Choshu failed to pay it. The last installment of the indemnity, it may be added, was not paid until 1875. The Americans' share proved much larger than was necessary to cover the costs and damages sustained, and later they returned the entire amount to the Japanese.

The foreign ministers had at first been ignorant of the true nature of the relation of the shogun to the emperor. They had regarded the former as the supreme ruler of the land and the latter as a kind of high priest. In the course of time they discovered their mistake and after the Shimonoseki affair the able British Minister, Sir Harry Parkes, led in a demand, which had been planned before his arrival, for the ratification of the treaties by the emperor. Backed by an allied fleet, the request was presented not at Yedo, but at Hiogo, a port near Kyoto. The immediate opening to foreign residence of that city and Osaka, the port of the capital, and a reduction of the customs duties were requested. Terrified by the show of force, the emperor issued an edict sanctioning the treaties, and the promised reduction of the tariff was agreed to. This incident finally made apparent the failure of the shogun. He had not closed the land against the foreigner as he had promised: he had not even been able to prevent the barbarian from threatening with his fleet the entrance to the imperial city. He had been treated by the foreigners as a minister who was fast becoming discredited with his master. The emperor, under the

guidance of the Western fiefs, vigorously asserted his authority and disgraced the *bakufu* for the bungling way in which its representatives had handled the negotiations at Hiogo. The shogun resigned, but the emperor was not yet ready to assume the responsibility of accepting his resignation.

The young shogun soon died and was succeeded by a mature man who attempted to restore the waning fortunes of the Tokugawa by a cordial acceptance of Western methods. He began the reform of his army and navy and of the Yedo court, and continued to try to coerce the Choshu fief into obedience. He was too late, however, to save his office. An increasingly strong national sentiment demanded that the incompetent Tokugawa restore its delegated power, and in 1867 the shogun recognized that to attempt longer to keep up the dual government would be to court disaster for himself and the nation. Accordingly he resigned (October 14, 1867), and an imperial decree followed declaring his office abolished and the duarchy at an end. Some of the followers of the Tokugawa resented the manner in which Kyoto, under the control of the Western fiefs, was accomplishing the transfer of the government from the *bakufu* to the emperor, and raised the standard of revolt. The insurrection was quickly put down by the loyal daimyo, however, and the prestige of the imperial power was only enhanced. The system first founded by Yoritomo, seven centuries before, had been brought to an end, and the emperor once more exercised direct control over his domains. The ex-shogun retired to private life. He lived to see all the changes of the next generation and did not die until the second decade of the nineteenth century.

For further reading see: Griffis, *The Mikado's Empire*; Brinkley, *A History of the Japanese People*; Brinkley, *Japan, Its History, Arts, and Literature*.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PERIOD OF INTERNAL TRANSFORMATION (1853-1894)

2. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE RESTORATION OF THE EMPEROR TO THE WAR WITH CHINA (1868-1894)

The end of the shogunate marks the beginning of a new age. Henceforth the official policy of the nation was reform on Western lines. The leaders who engineered the emperor's restoration had come to recognize that the foreigner must be accepted. At their advice the monarch announced his intention to abide by the treaties made by the shogun and to supervise directly the relations with the powers. Only eight months before the resignation of the last shogun had come the death of the emperor Komei. Although only a young man, he had been loyal to the old order, and in so far as his own personal opinions went was rabidly anti-foreign. His successor, Meiji,¹ was a lad of only fourteen when he ascended the throne, and was naturally under the influence of his advisers. As he came to manhood's estate he heartily accepted the ideals of the new age. Although the progress of his reign was due primarily to his councillors, he did not hinder them by reactionary tendencies. He was hard-working, tactful, and sanely progressive. He had the good judgment so to accept advice and so to act in conjunction with his ministers that it is hard at times to determine just

¹ Meiji is his regnal name. His personal name, by which he is frequently referred to in foreign books, was Mutsuhito. He was born November 3, 1852.

how much positive influence he had on the policies of his reign. Had he been more self-assertive and less tactful and well poised, he might have been a serious hindrance instead of a help, and his reign would have had a different history. By injudicious acts he might have come to grief as had Go-Daigo in an earlier attempt at the restoration of imperial power.

The Western fiefs that had been so instrumental in bringing about the downfall of the shogun had at first been actuated by hatred of the foreigner. As time passed, however, they became convinced that the Westerner could not be expelled. Satsuma and Choshu, two of the leading forces in the coalition, had experienced a change of heart after their rough handling by the foreign fleets. They realized that the "barbarian" was in Japan to stay, however much they might dislike him, and that he could be met only with his own weapons. They became hearty champions of Western methods and provided modern equipment for their troops. Each may possibly have hoped to substitute itself for the Tokugawa in a kind of revised shogunate, but as time passed they saw that the old order could not be revived and that the control of the government must be exercised through other channels. Their adherents, together with those of two other Southern fiefs, Hizen (in Kiushiu) and Tosa (in Shikoku), dominated the new government, to be sure, although not quite so completely as the Tokugawa had the old, and were to maintain that mastery for many years. The army and navy are still under their control and their voice is strong in national councils. But the shogunate was dead and national affairs were henceforth to be conducted through the instruments of the new age, a bureaucracy, the cabinet, and the Elder Statesmen.

THE CENTRALIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION

To the support of the young emperor came all the radicals, a growing number, who desired a complete reorganization of the nation, and who saw in the restored imperial authority the opportunity to develop a monarchy and a government of the European type. The revolution of 1867 had been the work of these men, most of them samurai of the lower ranks, not nobles, and they were to be the real architects of the new Japan. The old order was not to die without a struggle; all the nation had not yet heartily accepted the foreigner. From now on, however, the history of the country was to be one of steady development and transformation. The "year period" that nearly spanned the emperor's reign was rightly and prophetically called Meiji, "enlightened government."¹

From 1868 to 1894, when foreign affairs began to be dominant in the national mind, the chief interest of the nation was to be in domestic reorganization. The main features of this period of internal transformation may be conveniently classified under political and constitutional development, foreign relations, economic progress, intellectual, educational, and literary innovations, and religious and ethical changes. The constitutional and political changes can best be treated first.

The end of the shogunate was of course only the first

¹ The Japanese have the custom, derived from China, of dating events not by centuries or by reigns, but by reign names. These are not necessarily coextensive with reign of the sovereign, for the name may be changed several times during the life of one monarch. The Meiji era began January 25, 1868. The emperor Meiji had ascended the throne January 13, 1867. The Meiji era ended with his death, July 30, 1912.

step toward the reorganization of the government. The first need of the state was centralization. The nation must act as a unit if it was to succeed in competing with Occidental powers. It must have nicely articulated political machinery that would operate on every individual in the land, and that could be directed by a united executive. The first step toward centralization had been taken when the shogunate was abolished, but it was only the first step. There was no adequate machinery for carrying on the government under the new régime. For nearly eight hundred years the emperor had delegated his authority to the *bakufu* and precedents for the organization of the state under his direct supervision had to be sought for in the reforms of the seventh and eighth centuries. At first (1868) a kind of ministry or council was formed, intended to be somewhat like the one copied from the China of the T'ang dynasty. It was made up of members of the Western fiefs and of the court nobility. It could be but little more than a makeshift, pending the time when something better could be found. It was not, however, an exact copy of its ancient prototype, since provision was made for a deliberative gathering of the *samurai* and court nobility. This assembly, which actually met in 1869, was an abortive attempt to adapt to Japanese use the representative institutions of the Occident.

In 1868 the capital was moved from Kyoto to Yedo, which was now renamed Tokyo, "Eastern Capital," and the emperor took up his residence in the castle-palace of the shogun. The change emphasized the break with the seclusion and impotence of the past and the assumption by the emperor of the functions formerly intrusted to the shogun. No longer was the monarch kept in veiled seclusion, but rode out openly to show his face to his subjects and to

receive their homage. The transfer of the capital also brought the emperor nearer to the geographic center of his domains, and by establishing the seat of his government on the coast it gave an unmistakable demonstration of his frank and cordial acceptance of intercourse with foreigners and facilitated his relations with them. This attitude toward the Westerners was reënforced by an edict denouncing all violence against them, and by an imperial audience to the representatives of the treaty powers.

Shortly after the restoration the emperor's advisers put in his mouth a "charter oath" to indicate the lines on which future changes were to be made. This remarkable document has been somewhat freely translated as follows:

"The practice of argument and debate shall be universally adopted and all measures shall be decided by impartial discussion.

"High and low shall be of one mind, and social order shall thereby be perfectly maintained. It is necessary that the civil and military powers be concentrated in a single whole, that the rights of all classes be assured and the national mind be completely satisfied.

"The uncivilized customs of former times shall be broken through, and the impartiality and justice displayed in the working of nature shall be adopted as a basis of action.

"Intellect and learning shall be sought for throughout the world, in order to establish the foundations of the Empire."

Here was a combination of the old and the new, a mixture of Chinese and Japanese philosophy and phraseology with Western ideas. The Confucian cosmogony, the foreshadowing of parliamentary government, the centralization of the state, the determination to learn from the entire world, were all in it.

With the oath came another adjustment of the machinery of government, including principally a council of state¹ which was to have the control of the government for some years.

With the passing of the shogunate and the coming of the new age, feudalism was evidently an anachronism. Already under the peace imposed by the Tokugawa it had begun to lose its strength. Its armies, in which the individual prowess of the warrior and the glory of each fief were valued more than discipline and group strategy, would be of but little use in defense against a European power. Its decentralization was a handicap in the struggle for national solidity and reorganization. With the loss of its head, the shogun, and the reassertion of the authority of the civil arm, represented by the emperor, its continuation would be an anomaly. The reform leaders, as a rule drawn from the ranks of the samurai of the more progressive fiefs, were the first to recognize the wisdom of abandoning the old system, and a public agitation for abolishing feudalism began. Civil officials were appointed to represent the central government in each of the fiefs, and a bureaucracy controlled by Tokyo was thus begun. In 1869 the four great daimyo of the southwest offered to the emperor the registers of their lands and people as a symbol of the transfer to him of the local administration. Then followed a remarkable spectacle, a splendid example of the old loyalty and the newly aroused patriotism of the empire; the vast majority of the nearly three hundred remaining feudal lords voluntarily surrendered their fiefs. No longer was the allegiance of the samurai to be first of all for the daimyo; no longer was Japan to be a loose collection of fiefs. The love of country for which the centuries of union under the

¹ Daijokwan.

Tokugawa and the loyalty inculcated by bushido were a preparation had, within a few years, been aroused by contact with Western peoples and had made possible a unified administration under the emperor. The daimyo must not, however, be regarded as moved purely by an impulse to voluntary, heroic self-abnegation. Strong pressure was brought to bear on them by the reformers. Numbers of them had long exercised only a nominal authority: in the decay of feudalism the real power in many fiefs had fallen into the hands of ministers and retainers, and the daimyo were not averse to giving up a power of which they had only the shadow. Moreover, the central government guaranteed the feudatories incomes of one-tenth of their former revenues, and the expenses of local administration need no longer be met by them. The surrender of the fiefs was followed (1871) by an imperial edict which finally abolished feudalism.

The pensions which were promised the ex-daimyo and samurai proved to be so heavy a drain on the national exchequer that before many months the emperor's advisers were endeavoring to find some means of reducing them. In 1873 a plan was announced for commuting the pensions for cash and government bonds. Although the established proportion for commutation provided the samurai with sums the return from which would be much less than their pensions, many of them willingly acceded, partly out of patriotism, partly out of ignorance of business methods, and partly because the code of the samurai had insisted that it was beneath his dignity to be seriously concerned about money. Before long (1876) commutation was made compulsory and the special support by the state of an hereditary warrior caste came to an end.

The end of feudalism was followed in the course of the

next few years by acts which perfected as thoroughly a centralized government as the most highly organized states of the Occident. In the first place, for the old feudal army made up of contingents furnished by individual fiefs and recruited exclusively from the samurai, there was substituted a national army, drawn from all ranks of society. To no class was there now reserved the privilege of defending the state; the opportunity for doing so was not only offered, but forced upon all by a system of compulsory military training and service which applied to men of suitable age regardless of station or birth. The new army was first patterned after French models, and then, subsequent to the Franco-Prussian war, after the German system.

An act essentially related to this nationalizing of military service was the removal of many of the old social distinctions. The difference between the civil or court nobility and the military class was abolished. The new aristocracy that was later created was neither civil nor military, but national. The former distinctions between the warriors and the commoners were cancelled. Within the commoner class itself the ancient gradations which had condemned certain groups to hereditary dishonor and had imposed on one of them the opprobrious title of "not human" (*hi-nin*) were annulled. Many of the samurai voluntarily laid aside their swords, the badge of their rank: in 1876 the rest were compelled to do so. All subjects of the emperor were now on an equal footing in the eyes of the law. From the ranks of the ex-samurai, however, came most of the leaders of the new Japan, and while the class ceased to have a legal existence, individual members of it, by force of character and tradition, were to dominate and guide the nation for years to come.

In place of the local administration by feudal lords, an

elaborate bureaucracy was organized. Its members were appointed by and were responsible to the authorities in Tokyo, and to it was intrusted the entire administration of the country, local as well as national. Through it the humblest subject of the emperor was protected and supervised by the direct representatives of the monarch himself. At its inception the bureaucracy was naturally recruited largely from members of the samurai class, for these were the only ones who were trained in governmental administration. No one was allowed to hold office in the fief of which he had been a member, however, and as time went on the ranks of the civil service were recruited from the successful candidates at competitive examinations. These last were open to all classes, regardless of birth, and have helped to bring into official life large numbers of men who are not of the military class. The model and precedent for this bureaucracy were found partly in the reforms of the seventh and eighth centuries. The Japanese of the Meiji era, however, were influenced as well by Occidental models, the example of Germany being especially potent later.

The leaders in the reform movement early planned a national code of laws. The feudal customs of the old days, varying from fief to fief, could not meet the conditions of the new age. Moreover, extritoriality, which seemed to reflect on the character of existing courts and laws by exempting foreigners from their jurisdiction, was gall and wormwood to the sensitive Japanese. Impelled by the hope of ending it by removing the cause for its existence, the new government pushed as rapidly as possible the formation of codes along Occidental lines. By 1871 two volumes of the criminal code were ready and some offenses against foreigners were tried by it. The use of torture and of punishments which, judged by Western standards, are

excessive or barbarous, was abolished. Trial by jury was not adopted, but a collegiate judiciary was instituted and every effort was made to render it efficient and above reproach.

The currency system was thoroughly reorganized and nationalized. Under the old régime many kinds of money had been in circulation, both coin and paper. Paper money, suggested by Chinese precedent, had been in use, and each fief had felt itself free to issue it. The result was confusion and instability. The newly centralized government was under the necessity of instituting a uniform national currency. The support of the mercantile classes would thus be assured, and every new coin and bill would be evidence to the public of the power of the emperor and the Tokyo administration. National prosperity would also be promoted. A commissioner (Ito) was sent to the United States to study its finances. On his return the decimal system was introduced, a new coinage was issued, and a plan of national banks and paper currency was adopted which resembled the one in use in America. At the advent of Perry the ratio of gold to silver in Japan had been about four to one. Foreigners had quickly taken advantage of the situation and had bought up all of the more precious metal that they could lay hands on, exporting it under the protection of the treaties. As a result the distressed officials altered the ratio to the fifteen and then the sixteen to one current in the West. But in the meantime gold had disappeared and the cheaper silver had taken its place. The process was helped by an unfavorable balance of trade. The nominal bimetallism of the nation was destroyed by these agencies and the currency was reduced practically to a silver basis; the nation was not to go on a gold basis until after the Chino-Japanese war. Before many years a finan-

cial crisis made necessary a reorganization of the banking system and the American plan was modified by the foundation of a central national bank along the lines so common in Europe.¹ This strengthened the control exercised by the central government over the banking organization of the nation, and aided as well in the marketing of the government bonds and in the financing of its other undertakings.

An official revival of Shinto was encouraged to increase the respect paid to the emperor. Under the early Tokugawa Buddhism had had more official favor shown it than had Shinto, possibly because of the aid it afforded in exterminating and guarding against Roman Catholic Christianity. During the last years of the Tokugawa a Shinto revival, it will be remembered, had helped to pave the way for the restoration of the emperor's power. After 1869 Buddhism, while still recognized, was virtually disestablished and in places discouraged, and Shinto became the official cult of the nation. Shinto was made to emphasize more than ever the memory and achievements of the emperor's ancestors, and became closely identified with the growing spirit of patriotism. Through Shinto a religious tinge was given to the love of country. Patriotic and religious enthusiasm combined to emphasize national consciousness and unity.

A national postal service was begun even before the end of feudalism, and, supplemented by a telegraph system introduced and managed by the government, it became an efficient instrument for promoting national consciousness. The new national school system, of which more will be said later, was directed from Tokyo and also helped to strengthen the unity of the country.

The agents of this transformation and centralization

¹The Bank of Japan was modeled after the Bank of Belgium.

were a group of young, able men, drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of the samurai. For the most part they were those who had early seen the necessity of admitting the foreigner and adjusting the nation to his ways, and who had made themselves familiar, often at grave personal risk, with Western civilization either by residence abroad or by diligent study and travel. Prominent among them were Iwakura and Sanjo, court nobles, Kido, Yamagata, Ito, and Inouye, all four of them samurai of Choshu, Okubo and Saigo, both samurai of Satsuma, and two other samurai, Itagaki and Okuma, the one of Tosa the other of Hizen. Others equally famous in their time might be mentioned, but these names at least should be remembered by all who seek to be familiar with the new Japan. Most of them were from the South and Southwest, from those fiefs which had been prominent in bringing about the restoration. Under them the control exercised by the southern feudatories over the government was to be maintained for many years. These ex-feudatories had the ear of the emperor and dominated the civil bureaucracy and the army and navy. Okuma and Itagaki were later to break with the others and to head liberal movements.

OPPOSITION TO THE NEW ORDER

This centralization of the government, although relatively and strikingly rapid, was not the work of one year or of two, and was not finished until the middle of the eighteen eighties. But it was not completed without a struggle with the forces of the old régime. The mass of the nation, it is true, was increasingly in sympathy with the reform leaders, but nearly every step in advance met with violent opposition. It was some years before West-

erners were entirely safe from the swords of anti-foreign rowdies and fanatics, even though the emperor had placed the strangers under his special protection. Irreconcilables haunted the unlighted streets and alleys of Tokyo at night and assailed unwary foreigners. Two samurai attacked the foreign escort of the British minister when the latter was on his way to his first audience with the emperor. The emperor's ministers were often in personal peril of violence from conservative agitators, and at least one, Okubo, actually lost his life at their hands. Not all the nation could see that the changes were wise. Many bitterly resented the abandonment of time-honored Japanese customs and methods for the foreign ways. Incipient insurrections broke out from time to time, only to be put down. Finally, in 1877, the opposition culminated in a well organized rebellion in the South, the suppression of which taxed the powers of the new government. The leader of the rebellion was Saigo, a samurai of Satsuma. He had been among the reformers in the earlier stages of the reorganization movement. However, he had broken with the majority of the group who were at the head in Tokyo. He had wished to preserve military service as the exclusive privilege of the samurai, and had opposed the creation of the national army recruited by conscription from all ranks. He had, moreover, favored a war with Korea. That country had haughtily broken off relations with Japan when the latter admitted the foreigner, and Saigo would have avenged the insult with an armed expedition. Since war would check internal reorganization, the more radical reformers opposed him and Saigo retired from the cabinet. Leaving Tokyo, he went south to Satsuma and here there began gathering around him all the forces of discontent. Imposing in person, able, apparently the embodiment of

all the virtues of the samurai of the old school, he soon found himself surrounded by a formidable army. All those opposed to the iconoclasm of the ministry to the seeming abandonment of the nation's individuality, flocked to him. He was cordially supported by the ex-daimyo of Satsuma, who was himself of the moderate conservatives. In 1877, the Satsuma discontents raised the standard of revolt against the government. Saigo, probably reluctantly, allowed himself to be dragged into the rebellion as its head.¹ Against these recalcitrant samurai were brought the forces of the new national army in which commoners and ex-sumurai fought side by side. The Tokyo government called out more troops than were actually needed, partly to demonstrate to the nation the efficiency of the new system and partly to insure victory. The fighting was fierce, but the outcome was not long, if ever, in doubt. The Satsuma rebels were defeated and those of their leaders who escaped death in battle committed suicide. The new order had met the old on the field of battle and had conclusively demonstrated its superiority. The new national army, drawn from all classes, had overwhelmed the forces of unreconciled feudalism and serious armed opposition to the new age was at an end.

THE MOVEMENT TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

The triumph of centralization was but one phase of the political transformation of Japan. A little later in its inception, but of no less importance and absorbing interest, was a movement toward constitutional government, the

¹ It ought to be added that Saigo's motives and the exact process by which he became the leader of the revolt have been a mooted question.

result of contact with the democracy of the Occident. All thoroughgoing reformers were united in demanding the end of feudalism and the restoration of the emperor. One group of them, however, was in favor of an autocracy supported by a bureaucracy, and another believed that the elected representatives of the nation should have an important share in the government. The one found in Germany and the Prussian system a model which more nearly than any other in the Occident represented its ideal. It was supported by the conservative ex-samurai, a majority of that body, and retained control of the government. The other represented different shades of opinion, but in the main saw its ideal in England and the limited monarchies of the West. It advocated placing the administration in the hands of a ministry responsible to a parliament elected by the nation.

Constitutional government was seemingly foreshadowed in the imperial oath of 1869 when the advisers of the young monarch put into his mouth the promise that "argument and debate shall be adopted and all measures shall be decided by impartial discussion." The exact meaning of this promise was and is a matter of some dispute. Its language was ambiguous and it might be also translated, "An assembly widely convoked shall be established, and all affairs of state decided by impartial discussion." Its import was even more a matter of dispute. Some held it to be a definite promise of parliamentary government; others maintained that it did not have any Occidental institution in mind. The latter position is probably more nearly correct. The framers of the oath seem to have intended nothing more than an assembly of the feudatories and the court nobility, for with the exception of the loss of the shogun, its head, feudalism was still largely intact.

at the time the oath was taken. The samurai and nobles would meet by virtue of their hereditary positions, not as elected spokesmen of the nation. Such an assembly did convene in 1869.¹ Its functions were purely consultative. It was to be a means of ascertaining the opinion of the warrior and noble classes, the only groups which had in the past been concerned with the active government. The gathering proved a fiasco. Membership in it was not highly esteemed, and it accomplished nothing of note. The government was carried on through other agencies. In 1870 the gathering was prorogued and in 1873 dissolved.

Although the institution which seems to have been contemplated by the charter oath had failed, the oath itself was to be taken up by the liberals and to be interpreted as a promise of a truly national assembly with extensive powers. By 1873 the statesmen of the nation knew more of Western institutions than they had in 1869. An official mission had visited America and Europe and had been much impressed by what it had seen. On its return to Japan one of its leaders² presented to his colleagues in the government a memorandum advocating a constitutional monarchy, but did not suggest any very definite institutions through which this should be carried on. This was the true beginning of the struggle for representative government. The history of subsequent developments is an interesting one, but only its main features can here be presented. The movement drew its support principally from two groups of people. The first was made up of the radical wing of those who favored the adoption of Occidental ways. They advocated an enthusiastic and wholesale Westernization of Japan and were in favor of discarding all the customs and institutions which from the for-

¹ It was called the Kogisho.

² Kido.

eigners' standpoint marked the nation as peculiar and barbarous. They wished Japan to take its place at once with Western powers by copying all the trappings of Occidental civilization. The younger students, both those who were returning from America and Europe and those who were the product of the new schools in Japan, some of the editors of recently established newspapers, and some of those who were in intimate contact with foreign books or foreigners in the treaty ports, formed the bulk of this group. The more extreme among them had imbibed or were to imbibe many of the most radical political theories of the West. They were to read the books that had preceded the French Revolution, such as Rousseau's *Social Contract*. No one ever talked of abolishing the monarchy: the imperial institution had too firm a hold on the imagination of the nation for that. Many did, however, believe in a ministry responsible for all its acts to a national assembly elected on the basis of a liberal franchise. The second group was made up of some of those of the governing class who had broken with the men in power, and who desired to make political capital out of the agitation. They apparently hoped that by championing the constitutional movement they would either oust the ministry or force it to make terms with them.

Early in 1874 a group of officials who had differed from the government on its Korean policy and had resigned, presented a memorial protesting against the arbitrary acts of the heads of the bureaucracy and advocating an elective assembly. Of these protestants Itagaki should be remembered for his part in the later struggle for a constitution. The government was inclined to make concessions to these former officials, apparently in the hope that it could win their support and forestall more demands

later. Accordingly a compromise was arranged ¹ by which the two factions were reconciled and important constitutional changes were agreed upon which were a step, although a very short one, toward representative government. A senate ² was established as a legislative chamber. It was to have deliberative powers but not those of initiating measures, and it was to be made up exclusively of appointed members of the noble and official classes. There was to be a reorganization of the departments, including the establishment of a high court of justice, to obtain a separation between the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of the government. This was obviously done under the influence of the theory of the division of functions that so greatly influenced the constitutions of the West. In addition, an assembly of the prefectoral governors was to be convened to bring the Tokyo authorities in touch with the needs of the people. None of these changes provided for popular election or for representation of any but the official classes, but they were meant to qualify the absolute power of the group that surrounded the emperor. The nation was probably not ready safely to take advantage of further concessions.

The changes promised in 1874 could not, however, be expected permanently to satisfy the liberals. Neither the senate nor the assembly of governors proved very effective, and of course, since they were representative only of officialdom, both were easily controlled by the ministry. By 1877 the agitation for a constitution was again in evidence. It was more insistent than before and was no longer confined to liberal or dissatisfied members of the ruling

¹ At the so-called Osaka conference, 1874.

² Genro-in, not to be confused with the Genro or Elder Statesman, a later institution.

class. Radical ideas were spreading under continued contact with the democracy of the West, and political bodies sprang up which advocated representative institutions and sent out lecturers and agitators to instruct and arouse the people. The movement grew in intensity, and in 1878, moved by the assassination of one of the prominent ministers (Okubo), the government partially gave way and announced the organization of local assemblies. These were elective bodies, chosen by a limited franchise. There was to be one in each prefecture and they were to be merely advisory to the governors. They were to meet for one month each year and were to have a voice principally in the levying and spending of local taxes and in the supervision of accounts. They could also petition the central government. On the whole these assemblies worked well. Later (1880) similar ones were organized in the cities, towns, and villages. Occasionally they came into collision with the representatives of the central government, but they served to give the people a voice in local finances and were training schools for the national parliament.

The grant of these local assemblies did not, however, silence the liberals. Their demands were only intensified, as no national assembly was yet provided for, and revolutionary ideas from the Occident were spreading with each month that intercourse with Westerners continued. Memorials asking for a national assembly were presented to the government by various bodies. A convention of the liberal clubs met, and by a demonstration emphasized their desires. Many of the newly founded newspapers championed the movement. Finally, in October, 1881, the government yielded and in the name of the emperor promised that a national assembly would be convened in 1890 and that a constitution would be granted. The next year

Ito was sent abroad to study the form of constitutions in use in the West, and became on his return the head of the commission that was to frame a similar document for Japan.

Of Ito it ought to be added that he was the most prominent statesman of Japan in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. He had begun life as a samurai of Choshu and was originally, like his master, anti-foreign. He early became convinced of the necessity of reform after Western models, however, and together with Inouye and three others, in 1863, braving the edicts which still made it a capital offense to go abroad, secretly went to Shanghai. From there he and his companions sailed to London, Ito and Inouye working their passage before the mast. In London the latter two spent a year, studying. When Choshu became embroiled with the powers, Ito hurried back to Japan in an attempt to prevent his fief from persisting in its truculent attitude towards foreigners. He did not succeed, and for a time was in imminent peril of his life. After the restoration, however, and the frank recognition by the country of the new age, he quickly rose in office, and was for years to be the dominant figure at Tokyo.

FORMATION OF PARTIES, PARTY AGITATION

Following the promise of 1881, three parties arose to prepare the way for government under a constitution, and to mold by their action the terms of that document. The first of these, called the Liberal Party,¹ had as its leader Itagaki, who had earlier been a member of the group that had helped guide the nation through the Restoration. He was a zealous advocate of giving the people a voice in the government and his party represented the extreme wing

¹ Jiyuto.

of the radicals. He has sometimes been called the Rousseau of Japan, and while the parallel is not an accurate one, he and his party stood for what they deemed the rights of man. Occasionally the more rabid members of his party employed violent measures to further their cause, and they often used virulent language.

The next party was the Liberal Conservatives.¹ Its leader was Okuma, another ex-samurai. He had early acquired a knowledge of English and Dutch and with them a conviction of the need of reforming Japan. He had been a member of the government and had remained in it longer than had Itagaki. Having chafed under the strong control exercised over the administration by the ex-samurai of Satsuma and Choshu, he finally broke away and organized a party, apparently in the hope of weakening the Sat-Cho (Satsuma-Choshu) combination by bringing into the government the element of popular representation. The Liberal Conservatives were the more moderate wing of the advocates of representative government. They favored a gradual extension of the franchise, the development of local self-government, and a policy of internal reorganization as opposed to imperialism. They stood also for a sound currency. The party would naturally attract to itself many elements in the nation which, while opposed to the Sat-Cho oligarchy, were not willing to go to the lengths proposed by Itagaki and his followers.

A third party was the Constitutional Imperialists.² It was made up of the conservatives, and while in favor of a constitution, was opposed to any action that would weaken the sovereignty of the emperor. It favored a restricted electorate, an absolute imperial veto over all legislation, and a bicameral legislature as opposed to the more demo-

¹ Kaishinto.

² Rikken Teiseito.

cratic one-chamber plan. It was, however, in favor of an independent judiciary, of keeping military and naval officers out of politics, and of a rather wide freedom of speech and assembly. The party itself was transient and numerically small, but men in the government and their supporters held similar opinions, and the principles it advocated proved more influential than did those of its opponents. Many of the ideas championed by it were to be found in the finished constitution.

Following the formation of these parties there came some months of popular agitation. Each went to the nation with its views. Public mass meetings were held, and many of the radical newspapers became violent in their advocacy of their pet theories. So disturbing were the discussions that the government felt called upon to adopt repressive measures, and by muzzling the press and public meetings it produced for a time a semblance of calm. The Japanese were as yet too unaccustomed to the institutions of the West to exercise the self-restraint in public speech that is necessary to a well-conducted popular government. They were obviously still unprepared for the party system involved in such a constitution as that of England.

CHANGES PREPARATORY TO THE CONSTITUTION

Ito returned from his tour of the West in 1883 and almost at once changes were begun preparatory to the reorganization of the government involved in the adoption of a constitution. Of all the forms of limited monarchies he had seen, Ito was most impressed with that of Germany. He had been greatly influenced by Bismarck and by the rejuvenation of the Fatherland that was taking place under the empire. He felt that the spirit of the German govern-

ment, with its traditions of autocratic monarchy and its bureaucracy, was more nearly that of the new Japan than was that of any other important Occidental power. His modifications of Japanese institutions clearly show how deeply he had been stirred by these convictions. He began (1884) by rehabilitating the nobility. That of past ages had officially disappeared with the Restoration. It now seemed to Ito wise to create a new one as the preliminary to an upper house of a national legislature, and as a means of strengthening the government with the support of the more powerful, conservative classes. The orders of the new nobility, five in number, were modeled on those of Europe and were conferred on former court nobles and feudatories of the old régime, and upon those who had been prominent in the restoration movement.

The next step was the remodeling of the cabinet to a form corresponding somewhat to that of Germany. The prime minister, like the German chancellor, was now to have the guidance of all the other ministers, and was to be responsible for the entire conduct of the administration. The bureaucracy was modified by the introduction of examinations. Official appointments to the civil service were henceforth to be made on the basis of success in examinations which were open to all subjects of the emperor. This change was eventually to make the civil bureaucracy a truly national body and was to remove it from the monopoly of the ex-samurai.

THE FRAMING AND PROMULGATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1889

The framing of the constitution was meanwhile under way. That task was not intrusted to a popular representative assembly. The document was to be granted by the

emperor out of his own kindness, and in constructing it the nation was to have no direct voice. The work was placed in the hands of a group of men, chief of whom was Ito, who carried it on in secret, where each step in the process would not be subject to the criticism of a violently partisan press. Ample time was taken, and finally, in 1889, the completed constitution was sanctioned by the emperor and was officially promulgated by him amid great pomp and ceremony.

THE TERMS OF THE CONSTITUTION

The chief provisions of the document are as follows:

First, the institution of the emperor is emphasized. He is declared to be of a line that has been "unbroken from ages eternal." He is the source of all authority and combines in himself all sovereignty. He sanctions all laws and orders them to be promulgated and executed. He convokes and prorogues the diet and dissolves the lower house. While the diet is not sitting, he can issue ordinances which have the force of law. He is the head of the executive branch of the government, appoints and dismisses all officers, and determines their salaries. He is supreme commander of the army and navy and declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties. He confers titles of nobility and has the power of pardoning and of granting amnesty. He is, in other words, virtually supreme. While all these functions are in practice exercised by his ministers, the latter are responsible to him, not to the diet, and he may interfere at any time with their actions. Still the emperor does not openly interfere in or guide the administration as in Germany. In many respects he reigns but does not govern. He has never under the new régime openly exercised any direct power. His official acts of importance are as a rule taken only after

consultation with his privy council or his ministers. Neither is his position exactly parallel to that of the English sovereign, for constitutionally he could act directly if he wished, and his crown is not founded upon the will of the legislature. As in feudal days all government was through the shogun, so now it is through the cabinet and the privy council. The emperor is, however, consulted as he was not in the days of the Tokugawa, and has a much larger share in the government than then.

Many rights are conceded to the subjects of the emperor. All Japanese are to be liable for taxes and military service, but, subject to the restrictions placed by law, they have equal rights to appointment to office, they can change their abode, their houses are free from search, and they have freedom of speech, public assembly, writing, association, and religion. They can be arrested only according to law and must be tried by legally appointed judges. Their property is inviolate, and they have the right of petition. While the recognition of these rights marked a great advance over feudal days, it must be remembered that they are not as unlimited as would at first appear. The fact that most of them are "subject to the restrictions placed by law" makes it possible for the government to curtail them if necessary.

The Imperial Diet consists of two chambers, the House of Peers and the House of Representatives. The first as later modified is made up of members of the imperial family and of the two higher ranks of the nobility, of representatives elected by their peers from the three lower ranks of the nobility, of distinguished men nominated by the emperor, and of some of the highest taxpayers, elected by their fellows. It is, evidently, a conservative body, and can be counted upon to check any ultra-liberal tendencies in the

lower house. The House of Representatives is made up wholly of elected members. These represent districts which theoretically are as nearly equal in population as possible. The franchise is limited by property qualifications. The diet must meet yearly, and the duration of the session, although it may be altered by the emperor, is fixed at three months. Members have freedom of debate and are not subject to arrest. No law can be passed without the consent of the diet, and it may initiate legislation. The government may also initiate legislation. No new tax can be imposed without the consent of the diet, and the annual budget must be approved by it. The diet does not, however, have the complete power of the purse, for certain matters, the control of salaries and the expenditures of the imperial house, are outside its jurisdiction, and if it refuses to pass a budget, that of the preceding year will be kept in force as the standard. The emperor has an absolute veto over legislation. The diet has the important privilege of interpellation, or of putting questions to the different members of the cabinet. Both houses may address the crown, and by this means may present grievances and virtually impeach a minister. The diet does not have the power that is wielded by the English Parliament. It resembles rather the German diet. The cabinet is not responsible to it, and were it not for public opinion an obdurate emperor might almost dispense with it. Moreover, the upper house has in many matters an effective check over the lower one, and since the former is conservative, it can prevent any radical measures from being enacted by the latter.

A Privy Council is provided for, which, unlike that of England, is not an honored but now powerless relic of the past out of which the cabinet has emerged. It is a distinct body, appointed by the emperor, and exists for purposes of

personal consultation with him. It is made up of the distinguished statesmen of the land. Cabinet ministers are members ex-officio.

There is an institution, the Elder Statesmen, which is not provided for by the written constitution, but which is so prominent a feature of the unwritten constitution that it must be spoken of in connection with the former. The Elder Statesmen, or *Genro*, are an unofficial body made up of members of the group of samurai who led in the re-organization of the government. They have the ear of the emperor and by virtue of that and of their achievements occupy a commanding position in the nation. Their function is purely advisory, but in times of great national crisis they have often had more weight than privy council, cabinet, or diet. Very influential during the nineties and the first years of the twentieth century, the Elder Statesmen as an institution, unless recruited from younger men, must soon become extinct with the death of the original members. At the present (1918) only four of them remain active, and that in spite of the fact that two have been officially added from the older men not heretofore classed with the group.

The Cabinet has charge of the executive side of the government and is responsible to the emperor, not to the diet. At its head is the premier, who, like his German prototype, as has been said, is its dominant figure.

A judiciary is provided for, to be filled by appointment, and to hold office during good behavior. As in some European countries, however, a separate set of courts exists for administrative cases, or those involving government officers, and over these the ordinary courts are not given jurisdiction.

The constitution was the first to be granted by a monarch of East Asia. With all its conservatism it marked the en-

trance of the liberal democratic theories of the West into the autocratic Far East. Then too, although conservative, it is so elastic that its real working may change with the political education of the people, and still retain its form. Especially is this true as regards the responsibility of the cabinet. Ito was sagacious. It was a far cry from the feudalism of 1860 to the constitutional monarchy of 1890.

The constitution so adopted had now to be put into force. It has, on the whole, worked well. Its chief weakness, and a very real one, has been the conflicts that it renders almost inevitable between the two houses of the diet, and especially between the lower house and the executive. With the exception of war times, when factional differences have been forgotten in the face of the common enemy, few years since 1890 have passed without a struggle between the political parties and the cabinet. The former have been striving to make the latter responsible to the House of Representatives, as in England, Italy, or France. At times they have seemed to gain a measure of success, but more frequently they have failed. Too often the government has obtained peace and support by questionable concessions to individual members of the house.

STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THE MINISTRY

The struggle began with the preliminaries to the first diet. The parties of the early eighties had for a time been quiescent, but with the adoption of the constitution at least two were revived, the Liberals (Jiyuto) under the leadership of Itagaki, and the Liberal Conservatives (Kaishinto) directed by Okuma. Both Liberals and Liberal Conservatives demanded that the ministry be made responsible to the lower house, and formed a temporary union as an

opposition party. The elections went off quietly. There was a general interest in them; in most districts three or four candidates appeared for each seat and the large majority of the half million or so to which the franchise was confined appeared at the polls. The opposition parties won a decided majority of the seats of the lower house. This, by the way, was quite representative of the various groups of the nation; the ex-samurai, while numerous, were in the minority; the leading occupations of the country were represented in about their just proportion: the lower house was not, as is the American congress, largely a body of lawyers. The upper house was, as might be expected, a dignified and conservative body.

The diet had no sooner met than the opposition began to make trouble for the government. The budget, which by the constitution must be presented to the diet, seemed the most promising point of attack, and on it the struggle raged furiously. Both Liberals and Liberal Conservatives saw in the partial control of the diet over the purse their opportunity to force the ministry to its knees. The government was compelled to compromise and granted two-thirds of the demands of the opposition. The ministry, however, while compelled to recognize the power of the parties, did not concede the main point at issue, that of responsibility to the lower house. The struggle between the legislature and the cabinet therefore did not abate, and finally in disgust the government exercised its constitutional right and in the name of the emperor dissolved the diet.

In the elections to the second diet the government made a determined effort to obtain control of the lower house, an act that in itself was a partial concession to the contention of the party politicians. It used every possible legal and some illegal means to insure the return of a majority of its candi-

dates. Bribery, intimidation, and repressive laws were all employed, and the contest was marked by scenes of violence. In spite of these drastic measures, when the diet assembled the ministry found its supporters in the House of Representatives still in the minority. In addition the government had seriously damaged its prestige by its election methods. The struggle between legislature and executive was inevitably renewed, the chief points of attack still being financial. Upper and lower houses were at variance, for the upper house rather consistently sided with the government. So difficult did the ministry find its task that its reorganization became necessary, and Ito, the framer of the constitution, felt called upon to accept the premiership. This cabinet change, while caused by party opposition, was by no means made in consultation with the politicians of the lower house, and they were no more disposed to be conciliatory toward the new cabinet than they had been toward the old. Ito had finally to meet their demands for a curtailment of expenditures by resorting to a direct message from the emperor which announced a voluntary contribution of a tenth of the expenses of the imperial household to the defense fund of the nation, called upon all officials to make a similar sacrifice, and asked that the diet coöperate by striving for harmony with the government. Ito further instituted extensive retrenchments in government expenses, and even made arrangements with Itagaki and the Liberals to obtain their support in the lower house. The result of these strenuous efforts was simply to shift the attack of the opposition groups from the budget, from which respect for the sovereign's expressed wish restrained them, to other points in the policy of the government. They were bent on hindering and irritating the oligarchy in every possible way until the principles for which they contended should be

granted. Again the government was forced to confess failure, and the second diet, like the first, was dissolved.

The third House of Representatives, elected in 1894, was, like its predecessors, in the control of the enemies of the government. Ito's agreement with the Liberals won their support, but his former adherents were angered by his apparent concession to the principle of party government and went over to the camp of the opposition. Ito found that he had simply exchanged the aid of one group for that of another. The third House of Representatives, then, like its predecessors, had a nearly continuous record of disagreement with the ministry. After a bitter attack on the foreign policy of the government, and a decision to present in an address to the emperor its lack of confidence in the cabinet, the lower house, and with it the diet, were again dissolved.

TEMPORARY PARTY TRUCE DURING THE WAR WITH CHINA

Before the new elections war had broken out with China and in that spirit of patriotism which in Japan seems always stronger than factional interests, the diet united solidly in a cordial support of the government. Partisanship was abandoned in the enthusiasm of the attack on the common enemy, and was not again to be displayed until after peace had been declared. The first period of struggle for a responsible ministry had come to an end. It was evident, however, that the strife would be resumed when the external danger was past. The only hope of lasting peace under the existing constitution was the unconditional surrender either of the liberals or of the executive. The ministry must not be thought to have been moved entirely or even primarily by selfish motives. Its leaders seem

sincerely to have believed, and probably with justice, that the nation was not yet ready for a government by a cabinet responsible to a representative parliament. The further history of the struggle must, however, be deferred to a subsequent chapter.

For further reading see: Griffis, *The Mikado's Empire*; Brinkley, *Japan, Its History, Arts, and Literature*; Brinkley, *A History of the Japanese People*; McLaren, *A Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era*; Okuma, *Fifty Years of New Japan*.

CHAPTER IX

THE PERIOD OF INTERNAL TRANSFORMATION (1853-1894)

3. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC, EDUCATIONAL, AND RELIGIOUS CHANGES FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE WAR WITH CHINA (1868-1894)

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

For the past several pages we have been discussing the transformation wrought in the spirit and structure of the Japanese government by the coming of the Westerner. This was perhaps the predominating feature of the years between 1853 and 1894. Of almost equal interest, however, was the development of the foreign policy of the nation. Through all but their earliest years the policy of the Tokugawa toward other countries can be summed up in one word, isolation. The coming of Perry brought this hermit existence to a final and irrevocable end. It took some years to impress upon all the nation a recognition of that fact, but when once it was acknowledged, the necessary readjustments to the demands of the new age were resolutely made. The establishment of the legations of Western powers in Tokyo was allowed and the young emperor at the advice of his ministers received the foreign diplomats in person and exerted himself to maintain friendly relations between them and his administration. Japanese legations were established in the capitals of the various treaty powers, and the island empire sought to conform itself to the international usages of the Occident.

THE GROWING SPIRIT OF NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM

The spirit of nationalism and patriotism which had been growing, even if feebly, under the Tokugawa régime, and which had been roused into sudden, vigorous life by contact with the nations of the West, had expressed itself inwardly in a centralization and complete reorganization of the state. In foreign relations it showed itself in the main in three ways. The first, a passing phase, was the attempt of the conservatives to rid the nation of the defiling touch of the foreign barbarians and to renew the policy of exclusion. Except for the mistaken zeal of unorganized samurai this had practically disappeared before the seventies. The second was the rise of a spirit of imperialism, a desire to expand, which showed vigorous life almost from the day of its birth, and which was to have a large share in the wars and diplomacy of the eighteen nineties and the twentieth century. The third was a demand for equality with Western powers, arising from a spirit of national pride which could not brook invidous discrimination by any people. It showed itself principally in a demand for restored tariff and judicial autonomy through the revision of the treaties and the abolition of extritoriality, and was in the twentieth century to lead to bitter resentment of the treatment of Japanese on the Pacific coast of the United States.

The spirit of imperialism first showed itself after the Restoration in a demand that all territories inhabited by Japanese, or belonging naturally to the archipelago, be occupied by the emperor's government. The conviction was expressed that the Riu Kiu Islands, the Bonin Islands, the Kuriles, Sakhalin, and Yezo were all rightfully Japanese, and even that Korea, because of Hideyoshi's invasion

and the periodical "tribute-bearing" embassies from its court to Yedo, should be dealt with as a subject state. Yezo was indisputably Japanese, and under the Tokugawa it had been held by one of the northern daimyo and the shogun. Its population was made up largely of Ainu, however, and only a few Japanese were to be found there. A special bureau was now organized by the imperial government to oversee it, and a vigorous policy of colonization and development was adopted. So successfully was the work carried on that the island speedily became a convenient outlet for the surplus population of the empire, a kind of frontier province. With Sakhalin and the Kuriles the imperialistic policy was not so successful. Russia also laid claim to these territories and the controversy was settled in 1875 by an agreement whereby Japan's sovereignty over the Kuriles was to be acknowledged in return for the renunciation of all her claims to Sakhalin. Sakhalin, it may be added, was of strategic importance to Russia, for it commanded not only much of the littoral of Eastern Siberia, but the mouth of the Amur river, the main artery of that region. The Bonin Islands, a desolate no-man's-land in the Pacific whose only possible importance was as a naval and commercial station, were occupied without opposition in 1878.

The Riu Kiu Islands presented a somewhat more difficult situation. By blood and language their inhabitants were related to the Japanese. They had been subdued by Satsuma during feudal times and for two centuries or so had been considered part of its domains. They had sent tribute embassies to Peking and yet as an independent state had made treaties with several Western powers. In 1868 Japan definitely claimed the islands as her own, and when in 1871 certain of their inhabitants were killed by

the savages of Formosa she undertook to avenge them. Now, Formosa was a dependency of China, and Tokyo demanded redress at Peking on the ground that the men of Riu Kiu were Japanese subjects. Peking both denied Japan's authority and disowned jurisdiction over the savages of Formosa. Japan replied (1874) by sending a punitive expedition that seized and occupied southern Formosa. When China protested, Japan demanded an indemnity for her trouble. The two nations nearly came to blows, but Peking finally yielded, paid an indemnity, and the Japanese withdrew. In the meantime Japan had persuaded the king of the Riu Kiu islands to surrender his treaties with Western nations and accept her rule. She extended her provincial administration over the islands in 1876, thus making them an integral part of her empire. China still protested and declined to agree to a proposed division of the islands between herself and Japan, but the latter quietly persisted and succeeded in retaining possession of the entire group.

RELATIONS WITH KOREA

In Korea the situation was still more difficult. Like the Riu Kiu islands, Korea had in years past recognized the simultaneous suzerainty of both Japan and China. Tribute-bearing embassies were sent both to Peking and Yedo. China was nearer and more powerful, and the historic source of culture, so Korea had more respect for her. Nor had Korea forgotten the resentment roused by the cruelties of Hideyoshi's invasion. When Japan admitted the foreigner and began remodeling her government, Korea took the opportunity to break off rather insolently all relations with the traitor to Oriental seclusion. Such an attitude roused anew the Japanese desire to exert an in-

fluence in the peninsula. Moreover, some of Japan's statesmen began to fear Russian aggression, for that power had recently (1868) acquired the territory east of the Ussuri River and had established a port, Vladivostok, almost on the northern boundary of Korea. The Russian bear would evidently not be content to rest there in a harbor closed by ice during the winter months. Japan controlled what were virtually the only two exits from Vladivostok to the Pacific. The one, the narrow Tsugaru Strait between Yezo and the Main Island, was evidently Japanese. The other, the broad straits between Korea and Kiushiu, had planted in their midst the two Japanese-owned islands of Tsushima and Iki. Russia once in the eighteen eighties tried to seize Tsushima but was balked by Great Britain. She would evidently be glad to get possession of Korea, which, weak, backward, and ruled by a corrupt and inefficient government, could not, unless aided from without, hope to offer successful opposition to the great European power. The Russian might prove an unpleasantly aggressive neighbor to Japan were he established on the peninsula. One group among the Japanese leaders demanded a vigorous assertion of the interests of their country in the Hermit Kingdom. The majority of the reforming statesmen were unwilling, however, to commit the nation to a vigorous continental program until the work of internal reorganization should be more nearly complete. It was dissatisfaction with the policy of the majority, it will be recalled, that paved the way for Saigo's break with the government and the subsequent Satsuma revolt. The government did not forget Korea, however. When in 1875 a Japanese gunboat was fired on by a Korean fort the emperor's advisers decided that vigorous action was necessary. An armed expedition was sent the following year.

It adopted the plan used by Perry with the shogun's officials and by tactful intimidation obtained a treaty with Seoul. China, it may be added, offered no opposition when Korea negotiated the treaty as an independent power. Japan thus took the lead in opening Korea to the outside world and began to encourage within her the idea of reorganization along Western lines. Treaties with Occidental powers followed, commerce sprang up, and a reform party came into existence. China looked with no friendly eye upon the activity of the "island dwarfs," as she chose to call the Japanese. She was still the bulwark of Far Eastern conservatism, and naturally espoused the cause of the reactionary party at Seoul. She maintained a "resident" there who, as the representative of her suzerainty, had great influence. Japan as naturally championed the reform party. Conflicts arose between the factions, and in 1882 the conservatives attacked and burned the Japanese legation and forced its inmates to flee for their lives. In return the Japanese demanded and received an indemnity and the privilege of guarding their legation with their own troops. In 1884 occurred another collision between the conservatives and the radicals. The one called on China for assistance, the other on Japan. Both powers responded and in 1885 they agreed to withdraw their troops on the mutual written understanding that: "In case of any disturbance of grave nature occurring in Korea which might necessitate the respective countries or either sending troops, it is hereby understood that each shall give to the other previous notice in writing of its intention to do so and that after the matter is settled they shall withdraw their troops." Affairs in the peninsula temporarily quieted down, but the friction between reformers and reactionaries continued and was to lead in 1894 to war between Japan and China.

TARIFF AND LEGAL READJUSTMENTS

The agitation for the revision of the foreign treaties was an outgrowth of the sacrifice of Japan's judicial and financial autonomy embodied in them. When the treaties were negotiated the Japanese laws were still what they had been in feudal days, and the powers did not think it just to subject their citizens to them or to the local courts. Each Western nation stipulated that all cases in which its subjects or citizens were defendants should be tried by its consuls and under its own laws. The residence of foreigners was restricted to certain specified "treaty ports." This "extritoriality" was in force in China and Turkey and wherever Western nations were in treaty relations with a non-Christian state. Tariff duties, as in China, were also made a matter of formal agreement: otherwise they might be subject to frequent and arbitrary modifications. The Japanese felt that extritoriality and the sacrifice of tariff autonomy were a mark of inferiority. This the patriotic spirit of the nation could not willingly tolerate. Moreover, under extritoriality wrongs committed by foreigners to Japanese frequently went without redress and unpunished, and too many consular courts, especially of the smaller nations, were poorly administered. Under the conventional tariff, too, the rates had been so manipulated by the powers that the average five per cent *ad valorem* really yielded but half that much. Japan was in great need of revenue, and felt keenly the curtailment of her rights to raise it from this perfectly legitimate source. One of the first acts of the government of the Restoration was to plan for the removal of these restrictions, and in 1871 an embassy was sent to Europe and America to ask for it. Such

a concession had never been granted by Christendom to a non-Christian power and since Japanese laws and law courts were yet to be reorganized, the failure of the mission was certain before it started. The agitation, however, had only begun. In 1878 the United States agreed to a treaty on the terms desired by Tokyo, but the document was not to go into force unless the other powers made similar concessions. This Europe was unwilling to do. Then the Japanese foreign office tried conferences of the Tokyo representatives of the powers. Two of these gatherings were held, one in 1882 and another in 1886, but both failed. Japan seemed to Westerners still unprepared to be trusted with full control over the lives and property of strangers. In the meantime the Japanese thinking public had taken up the agitation, and from the early eighties tariff autonomy and the abolition of extritoriality were vigorously demanded both from the press and the public platform. Halfway measures were denounced. A compromise agreed to by the 1886 conference of the representatives of the powers and favored by the government, would have extended the jurisdiction of Japanese courts to foreigners, provided that all cases in which Westerners were involved should be submitted to courts to which foreign judges had been appointed. This concession the Japanese public would not tolerate.

Hand in hand with the demand for treaty revision went an earnest attempt so to conform national institutions to Occidental standards that all reasons for discrimination would cease to exist. European customs and dress were copied. The new education was promoted. The formation of laws on Western models was pushed. A new civil code was compiled on the general lines in use in the Occident. A code of commercial law was drawn up resembling closely

that of Germany, and French models were followed in framing the criminal law. Judges, appointed from those specially trained for the profession, were to serve during life or good behavior. In 1890 the codes were finally approved by the emperor.

The reasons for extritoriality were fast ceasing to exist and the powers could evidently not long, with any show of justice, continue to maintain it. In 1888, Mexico signed a treaty granting to Japan judicial autonomy, and the United States had long been known to be willing to take a similar step as soon as the leading European powers would agree to do so. The lower house of the diet kept urging the ministry to push the negotiations, and the government, nothing loath, took the question directly to the European capitals. Finally in 1894, Great Britain, whose trade was larger and whose subjects resident in Japan were more numerous and more opposed to a change than those of any other Western power, signed a treaty drawn in the revised form desired by Japan, and the United States followed. The other powers conformed in the course of the next three years. Japan had so effectively demonstrated her complete reorganization that further delay would have been palpably unjust. In 1899, extritoriality came to an end, consular courts and foreign "settlements" were abolished, and Westerners became subject to Japanese courts and laws. It must be said that on the whole the Japanese have proved highly worthy of the trust. Tariff autonomy was partially restored in 1899, although it did not completely go into effect until more than a decade later (1911). For the first time in history an Asiatic country was admitted to the circle of Occidental powers on the basis of full equality. The concession was a notable achievement for Japanese patriotism and ability.

The political reorganization and the assumption of a new international status were the most prominent features of the years between the coming of Perry and 1894. They were, as well, the most important, for the government has taken the lead in activities which in most countries are left to the initiative of individual citizens. The changes in the structure, policies, and position of the state, were, however, only part of the transformations in progress in all phases of the nation's life. Impact with the West was producing a revolution in commerce, finance, transportation, industry, dress, thought, education, and religion, in some of its phases more complete than that wrought by the coming of Buddhism and Chinese culture over a thousand years before. As in that earlier transition period, the government led, but also as then, the people followed, in time with enthusiasm.

ECONOMIC REORGANIZATION

Commerce, naturally, sprang up almost as soon as the Perry treaty had been signed. Naturally, too, it was many years before it attained large proportions. Not until after 1887 did it exceed fifty million dollars. The nation had so long been closed to the outer world that it took time to develop a demand for foreign goods and the ability to pay for those purchased. Until at least 1881, the balance of trade was against Japan, and she was drained of her specie. After 1887 commerce grew more rapidly, thanks partly to a more active supervision by the government and partly to the internal reorganization of the industry of the country. Its period of greatest increase was to be after the war with China. During its earlier years this revived commerce was largely under the control of the foreign middleman. It was he who came to Japan, purchased from the local merchants,

and exported to other lands. In too many instances he was not an ideal representative of the West. Adventurers who had followed the flags of foreign powers strove to exploit the new Japan to their own advantage. Their code of business ethics was often not of the best; they regarded the Japanese as inferior "Asiatics," and dishonesty and overweening selfishness marked far too many of their transactions. The Japanese had been unaccustomed to foreign commerce and time was required to produce an adequate machinery to handle it. The government tried to help, but in the early days many of the merchants who dealt with the foreigner aped his ethics along with his other business methods, and a report of Japanese commercial dishonesty became current. While conditions later improved, the story still spread, for unfortunately there was some basis for it. It lost nothing in the telling and gave the average Westerner an impression, greatly exaggerated, that Japanese business men were unreliable.

With the growth of commerce, banks naturally sprang up. At first the government experimented with various devices, and in 1873 established a national banking system patterned largely after that in use in the United States. The country was being drained of its specie, however, and the banks and the national treasury were on a precarious paper basis. In 1881 the government was led to organize in addition a great central institution, now the Bank of Japan, and, to assist in trade and foreign exchange, a secondary institution, now the Yokohama Specie Bank. Through the latter it took over for a time the foreign commerce of the country and by an ingenious device built up a metal reserve and made possible the resumption of specie payments. In the following years the older national banks were converted into ordinary joint-stock concerns and their note issues

were redeemed and retired. Postal savings banks were introduced. Before 1900 the system finally took the form whose main features it has ever since preserved, a great national Bank of Japan which alone issues notes, and centering in it a system of private, joint-stock concerns. There were to be added in the years after 1894 agricultural and industrial banks for the aid of farmers and manufacturers. As in most branches of the nation's life, laws and state supervision carefully regulate all private financial institutions.

With the growth of commerce came, too, an improvement in means of transportation. Steamships plied the coastal waters of the islands. At first most of them were built abroad and were the property of foreigners, but before long they began to be constructed and owned at home. Here again the government gave its encouragement, and heavily subsidized companies laid the basis for the phenomenal growth of the twentieth century in domestic and foreign shipping. The state was a pioneer in railway building. In spite of earnest opposition by the conservatives a line was begun between Tokyo and its port, Yokohama, and was officially opened by the emperor in 1872. The state continued to promote railways and most of the earlier ones were constructed either by it or by government-aided companies. Later the privately owned lines predominated, but, as we shall see, they have been nationalized within the last few years. Telegraph lines were built by the state and in 1886 were united with the postal service under a joint bureau. The telephone was introduced in 1877, also under official auspices.

In industry the state again had a prominent part, and owned directly plants for as divergent purposes as paper-making and cotton-spinning. By 1890 there were over two hundred steam factories in the country and the ancient handicrafts were beginning to be supplanted by the meth-

ods of the industrial revolution. The great industrial development of the nation, however, was not to take place until after the war with China.

The government led, too, in bettering agriculture. After the Restoration the peasant was made the owner of the soil that he had cultivated for the feudal lords under the old régime, and payments of taxes in money was substituted for forced labor and for payment in the products of the soil. Western agricultural experts were brought in to suggest improvements in the time-honored methods of the farmer, and new breeds of cattle and horses were introduced.

In the reorganization of banking, commerce, transportation, industry, and agriculture, then, the state, directed by the reformers, had a major part. For this there were two reasons. First, the state was the only institution which had the organization, the mobile capital, and the credit to undertake operations on the large scale necessary for successful competition with the industrialized West. At the coming of Perry there were few if any large commercial fortunes in the country, capital was in land, and industry and trade were rudimentary and without an organization fitted to cope with that of the Occident. In the second place, an emphasis upon the state had been encouraged by the Tokugawa shoguns, for they sought to exercise a paternalistic supervision over all the life of the nation. It was but natural that the ministers of the Restoration should follow the precedent of past ages.

EDUCATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS TRANSFORMATION

The government led the way in remaking the educational system of the land. Before the downfall of the shogunate, Japanese students had begun to find their way to the West,

partly on their own initiative, and partly as state pensioners. With the Restoration scores of students went to Europe and America to drink of the new learning at its sources. They returned bursting with ideas and became ardent supporters and leaders of the reform movement. The embassy that in 1871 went abroad to ask for a revision of the treaties came back with the determination to inaugurate, among other things, a modern school system, and in 1872 a law was passed which was the basis of universal compulsory primary education. A complete program of public instruction was gradually carried out, beginning with the elementary school and leading through the "middle" and "high" schools, to a culmination in the national universities. Enthusiastic private effort supplemented that of the state, and Christian missionary institutions added their contribution. Foreign teachers were engaged by the score, among them some who later not only interpreted the West to Japan, but Japan to the Occident. Translations of Western books were made. England was the great commercial power of the Far East; Japan had been opened by America and many of her youth were there in school. It was but natural then, that English should be studied extensively and should be the language through which the Japanese chose to acquire Western learning. Fresh combinations of the convenient Chinese characters were formed to express the new ideas that were constantly pouring in. Newspapers sprang into existence, some of them encouraged by the state, but many of them edited by men who had been too recently introduced to Western thought and institutions to have their radicalism balanced with the sound judgment born of experience. So numerous and influential did such sheets become that by the eighties the government found it necessary to curb

them with press laws. A simpler form of literary style appeared and a beginning was made toward conforming the language of the printed page more nearly to the vernacular: education and the new ideas were being brought to the man on the street.

Even in religion, that most conservative side of a people's life, innovations were being made. By their experiences of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Japanese had been taught to view Christianity with mingled fear, contempt, and hate. The stringent prohibitions against it remained on the public edict-boards until 1872 and complete religious toleration was not granted until after the promulgation of the constitution. As late as the sixties a few remnants of the church of the seventeenth century that had preserved their faith through more than two centuries of the severest prohibitions were discovered and persecuted. Under the shelter of the treaty ports, however, missionary activity was begun by foreign representatives of Protestant, Greek, and Roman Catholic communions, and the foundations of the church were laid anew. A number of notably able men were among the missionary pioneers, and had a share in remolding not only the religious thought but other phases of national life. In the eighties, when all things foreign shared in the popularity that attended the national enthusiasm for transformation, the Christian church grew rapidly. The centuries of prejudice could not be entirely forgotten, however. A reaction took place during the nineties and Christianity for a while gained ground but slowly.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD

To the traveller or foreign resident in Japan the years of marked transition were at times amusing, at times be-

wildering, and always interesting. With the momentous alterations in political institutions, in commerce, transportation, industry, education, thought, and religion, there were other changes, some of them much more superficial, but all of them significant. A mixture of costumes was to be found, often ludicrous. To Japanese houses were added foreign rooms fitted out with European furniture. Business blocks and public buildings were erected either in an avowedly foreign architectural style, or in a curious mixture that was neither Occidental nor Oriental and that tried to be both. The nation was attempting to find itself, to adjust itself to the new world into which it had been forced.

By 1894 the crisis of the transition period had passed. The government had been completely reorganized and a constitution had been given several years of trial. An army and navy had been built up after approved Western models. A modern school system was in successful operation. Tariff and judicial autonomy were on the point of being granted. Industry and commerce were giving promise of vigorous life. The reorganization was not complete and its fruits were only beginning to be seen, but in the main the shock caused by internal adaptation to the modern world was over. From 1894 on, the reorganized Japan was to expand and take her place as an equal and an increasingly important member in the family of nations.

For further reading see: Griffis, *The Mikado's Empire*; Brinkley, *Japan, Its History, Arts, and Literature*; Brinkley, *A History of the Japanese People*; McLaren, *A Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era*; Okuma, *Fifty Years of New Japan*; Cary, *A History of Christianity in Japan*.

CHAPTER X

1894 TO 1917: JAPAN TAKES HER PLACE AMONG THE POWERS OF THE WORLD

I. THE WAR WITH CHINA, THE BOXER UPRISING, AND THE WAR WITH RUSSIA (1894-1905)

JAPAN'S INTEREST IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 1894

By 1894, as we have seen, the work of the internal reorganization of Japan had been brought to a point where it no longer needed the entire attention of the nation, and where it was not only safe but necessary to take a more active part in international affairs. The new Japan was certain to enter a period of expansion in population, industry, and commerce. This expansion, together with her intense patriotism and the existing conditions in the Orient, was certain to bring on serious clashes with other countries. The first trouble was in Korea, and out of it was to come a long train of events which has not yet ended, and which has been momentous for the entire world.

It was but natural that there should be friction in Korea. Here, it will be recalled, China and Japan had temporarily adjusted their differences by the agreement of 1885, but both had continued their intrigues. In the background was the Russian, who, as Japan's statesmen well knew, was more to be feared than China. Unless heroic measures were taken, the feeble and reactionary Korea would fall

an easy prey to the ever-expanding empire of the north. Were the Land of the Morning Calm¹ to become Russian, Japan believed that she would have a relentlessly aggressive power at her very doors, that her commerce with the neighboring continent would be stifled by unfavorable restrictions, and that the natural outlet of her growing population would be threatened. It must be remembered that the Czar's frontiers in Asia had for centuries been steadily advancing. Long before the time of Peter the Great, cossacks and hardy pioneers had crossed the Urals. They had made their way to the Pacific before the eighteenth century, claiming the land for their imperial master as they went. Russia had clashed with the Chinese, and had taken away from them first the northern shores of the Amur, and then the territory east of the Ussuri. She was expanding in the Trans-Caspian region and was threatening India from the northwest and China from the west. We have already seen that she desired a foothold in southern Korea to make sure of a safe passage from Vladivostok to the open Pacific. She would undoubtedly welcome the acquisition of ice-free ports in Korea or North China as outlets to Siberian railways and trade routes, and as open doors to the commercial and naval control of the Far East. She was already intriguing in Korea and was so strong in Peking that she might succeed in using China as a cat's-paw. No wonder that Japan, as yet not certain of herself, should fear the Russian menace, and should seek to strengthen the hands of the reform party in Seoul in its attempts to reorganize the inefficient and corrupt government and make it capable of holding its own against foreign aggressors.

¹ More accurately, "Morning Freshness," but the term given above is the usual translation of the Chinese characters.

WAR WITH CHINA OVER KOREA, 1894-1895

Between the reactionaries, supported by China, and the reformers, encouraged by Japan, there were frequent clashes, and the Korean government became, if possible, more hopelessly impotent than ever.¹ The agreement of 1885 could not be a permanent settlement of the difficulty, for the joint interests it recognized could only be a source of friction. China treated Korea as a tributary, scorning the Japanese contention that she was independent. Friction increased in Seoul,¹ and finally, when a rebellion broke out in the unhappy land, China sent troops to suppress it and announced her action to Japan. She did not, be it added, strictly obey the letter of the convention of 1885, for the notice was sent after and not before the troops were dispatched. When the Chinese action became known, Japan promptly prepared to send a force to Korea, as was her right under the convention of 1885, and notified China to that effect. Although the rebellion that had been the occasion for sending the troops quickly died down, Japan and China both kept their forces in Korea. Japan proposed that Peking unite with her in permanently reorganizing the peninsula's government and in putting down disorder. China declined, refusing to admit that Korea was independent, and claimed the right to fix limits both to the number of Japanese troops that could be sent, and to their use. China evidently suspected the Japanese of a desire to control the peninsula and intended to assert unmistakably her own exclusive suzerainty over the land. Japan was at that time in the midst of a bitter struggle between the lower house of the diet and the ministry, and China

¹ The Chinese resident in the years before the war was Yuan Shih K'ai, later to be president of China.

evidently thought her too torn by internal strife to become a formidable antagonist. She had, moreover, a profound contempt for these "island dwarfs" who had once copied her civilization and had now partly abandoned it for that of the West. China began sending more troops to Korea, although she had been warned by Tokyo that such action would mean war. While one group of reënforcements was on its way, an armed clash occurred with the naval forces of the Japanese. War followed (July, 1894). The details of the conflict need not here be narrated. To China's surprise the Japanese ceased their internal dissensions, and with the splendid loyalty for which they are noted, united solidly and enthusiastically in support of the emperor's forces. The ministry was possibly not at all unwilling to turn the current of popular thought from the struggle for a responsible cabinet to imperialism. Indeed, some have claimed to see in the war a clever ruse of the government to withdraw the attention of the nation from the constitutional struggle by a policy of foreign expansion. The Chinese were beaten on land and sea. Their navy, made up of modern ships, was decisively defeated and its remnants were sunk or captured. Port Arthur and Talien, naval stations on the Liaotung Peninsula, and commanding South Manchuria, were captured. Both places had been fortified under the direction of European engineers, and Port Arthur, with its splendid natural harbor, was considered especially strong. Mukden, the capital of Manchuria, was threatened; Wei-hai-wei, the great harbor-fortress of Shantung, was taken. Japan thus dominated the naval approaches to North China and Peking. A successful expedition was sent to Formosa and the neighboring Pescadores Islands. China was compelled to sue for peace. By the treaty that ended the war, the complete independence of Korea was formally acknowl-

edged by both powers;¹ the Liaotung Peninsula in Southern Manchuria was ceded to Japan; Formosa and the Pescadores were given her; a large indemnity (200,000,000 taels, about \$150,000,000) was to be paid her; and China agreed to open up the Yangtze River and certain additional treaty ports to the trade of the world. The dwarf had worsted the giant, and had demonstrated that it was a factor to be reckoned with in the Far East.

Europe had watched the war with interest and surprise, and some of the powers viewed the outcome with alarm. Russia saw her plans for southern expansion blocked and her influence in North China threatened. The German emperor saw in Japan's victory the beginning of the military rehabilitation of Eastern Asia and feared, or pretended to fear, that a yellow wave of conquest would eventually shake to its foundations European world-supremacy. Even before the treaty of peace had been negotiated it seems that Russia had given assurance to Peking that Japan would not be allowed to retain the Liaotung Peninsula. Soon after the treaty was signed, Russia, instigated by Germany and seconded by her ally, France, lodged protests in Tokyo. These were courteous, but firm, for they said that the terms of the treaty threatened the peace of the Far East. At the same time Germany presented a note with a similar purport, but curt and offensive in its language and in the method chosen for transmission. The only course open to Japan was compliance. She had no ally and could not hope to resist successfully the armed forces of the three powers. With as good face as was possible under the circumstances she "accepted the advice," and gave back to China the

¹ The treaty of Shimonoseki (April, 1895). The Chinese negotiator was the famous Li Hung Ch'ang, the greatest Chinese statesman of the time.

Liaotung Peninsula in return for an additional indemnity.

The Japanese public was bitterly disappointed with the outcome of the war. To many the original treaty had seemed too mild. Then came the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula, a blow to the national pride as severe as it was unexpected. A conflict between Japan and Russia became almost inevitable. The ministry at once began a policy of naval and military expansion. Taxes were increased and sums far larger than the indemnity received from China were spent in preparation for the coming struggle. Japan's leaders saw that if she was to win from European powers the recognition of her right to a voice in Far Eastern affairs, she must have an effective armament.

With the growth of the army and navy, the position of the Satsuma and Choshu groups was strengthened. The ex-samurai of these former fiefs of the South had succeeded in controlling the fighting arms of the nation, and now with the great program of preparedness, exerted a much stronger influence than formerly over all the policies of the government. They stood, very naturally, for territorial expansion and for a vigorous policy on the continent. They did not want for opposition, as we shall see a little later, but the force of events aided them in committing Japan to a policy of imperialism, a policy that has since led her into three wars and has made of her an important factor in world-politics.

The war with China spectacularly impressed on the world the importance and the thoroughness of the transformation that had been wrought in Japan in the preceding forty years. With one or two exceptions, and then only when great provocation had been given, the Japanese had throughout the struggle scrupulously observed the regulations of the international law of the Occident. They had

demonstrated their ability to use the weapons and organization of the West.

Japan was not, however, to attain easily to a full recognition of her claim to a voice in the affairs of China, to a predominant interest in Korea, and to an open door into Manchuria. As a reward for her interference in 1895, Russia was given by Peking the privilege of building the trans-Siberian railway that was to bind together her Siberian and European possessions, directly across Northern Manchuria to Vladivostok. It need not, as was originally planned, follow the more tortuous all-Russian route along the Amur and the Ussuri. This would, of course, give the Czar a decided hold on Northern Manchuria, which was admittedly Chinese territory. Russia guaranteed a loan raised in Paris by China to pay off the indemnity due Japan, an act which might be the precedent for a financial protectorate over the great Middle Kingdom and which at least seemed to impose on Peking a debt of gratitude to St. Petersburg. Russian intrigues continued in Korea and served greatly to embarrass the Japanese. The latter, in fact, played directly into the hands of Russia by a bungling management of their interests in Seoul. The Japanese agent there¹ was implicated in an attack on the royal palace that resulted in the murder of the queen and the escape of the king to the Russian legation, where he lived for two years. Many Japanese merchants and settlers in the peninsula needlessly antagonized the Koreans by an overbearing attitude, dishonest business dealings, and even violence. Tokyo had good reason to fear that the agents of St. Petersburg would obtain more than a passing hold on Korea, and from that vantage point embarrass Japan's commerce with the continent and threaten her coasts.

¹ Miura.

Then in 1897 began a scramble of European powers for leased territories and spheres of influence in China. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century Western nations were entering on a new period of colonial expansion. Africa had recently been divided, unclaimed islands of the sea were being occupied, and the territorial integrity of all weak nations was threatened. China's impotence had been made unmistakably apparent in her war with Japan, and European powers were not slow to take advantage of it. In 1897, Germany availed herself of the murder of some of her subjects—missionaries—by a Chinese mob, and demanded a ninety-nine year lease on the strategic harbor of Kiao Chau in the province of Shantung, where the outrage had taken place. Here she began building a model city, Tsingtao, and connected it with the interior by railway lines for which she had been granted concessions. She was given the privilege, too, of working the valuable coal mines of the province. A little later Russia, as compensation, demanded and obtained a lease on Port Arthur and Dalny on that Liaotung Peninsula of which she had deprived Japan scarcely three years before. She connected them with the Siberian railway by a branch line which China ostensibly had the right of purchasing at the expiration of a certain number of years. A Russo-Chinese bank was established, professedly a joint enterprise of the two nations, as the name indicates, but with the first-named partner predominant. Russia had thus obtained what was for most of the year an ice-free terminus for her Siberian railway and was in a position to dominate all Manchuria and North China. She could effectively block Japanese commercial and industrial expansion by virtually closing the ports of Manchuria to all non-Russian trade. And this she tried to do. Great Britain, it may be added, at the

same time obtained a lease on Wei-hai-wei, the fortified harbor that commanded the approach to Peking from the Shantung side, and marked out for herself a "sphere of influence" in the Yangtze Valley within which she was to have the preference in commerce and in providing capital for railways, industry, and mines. France was given a lease and a sphere of influence in South China. Neither Great Britain or France were as yet to be serious rivals of Japan, however.

JAPAN'S PART IN REPRESSING BOXER OUTBREAK

Following this "leasing" of her territory and the partitioning of the empire into spheres of influence there was a reform movement in China. Led by the young emperor, the progressives made a serious effort to reorganize their nation, as Japan had done, by adopting Occidental methods. A reaction followed which culminated in the uprising of 1900, an armed attempt, led by the Boxers and sanctioned by the imperial court, to rid the land of the Westerner. The foreign residents in Peking were besieged in the legation quarter and Christian missionaries and their converts were killed in exposed stations throughout North China. Japan was looked to by the powers to help restore order, and joined in a relief expedition that rescued the beleaguered foreigners in Peking. By the discipline and efficiency of her contingent she won the respect of the world and demonstrated her right to a voice in all international councils over Chinese affairs.

EVENTS PRECEDING RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Russia had taken advantage of the Boxer disturbances to rush troops into Manchuria, ostensibly to protect her

citizens and her property. After the uprising was over she still maintained her forces in that region and seemed determined on a permanent occupation. Japan protested, and the United States, newly aroused to an interest in the Far East by her entrance into the Philippines, attempted to insure in Manchuria, as elsewhere in China, the principle of territorial integrity and the "open door," or equal economic and political privileges for the citizens of all nations. Russia at times seemed to comply and promised to remove her troops. In reality she had no serious intention of yielding and sought an agreement with China which would virtually have turned Manchuria into a Russian province and which failed only because of the strong protests of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. She did, however, obtain special privileges in the coveted region and in 1903 appointed a "viceroy" to administer her interests on the Amur and in Manchuria, treating the latter region almost as though it were already her own.

It became increasingly evident to Japan that she must fight. Russia seemingly had no intention of withdrawing from Manchuria and declined seriously to recognize the Japanese claim to a voice in the affairs of that district. Should she stay she would probably succeed in keeping the door closed and in crippling the growth of Japanese commerce. She would certainly threaten Japanese interests in Korea. Japan sought by every honorable means to avoid an appeal to arms. She tried negotiations, but the Russians would not concede that she had any right to be heard in Manchurian questions, and although they acknowledged that she had special interests in Korea, they insisted on placing restrictions on her control of that kingdom. Japan would probably have welcomed an alliance with Russia had the latter been willing to make what

seemed to Tokyo a fair division of influence in the Far East. This alliance, indeed, was a favorite aim of Ito.

Foreseeing the approaching conflict, Japan continued to strengthen her army and navy and entered into a pact with Great Britain. This Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded early in 1902, was limited in its scope to China and Korea, and recognized the special interests of Great Britain in China and of Japan in China and Korea. It provided that in case either ally went to war with another power to defend these interests the other would remain neutral and would use its influence to keep other powers from attacking its ally. In case one or more additional powers were to join in the hostilities against one ally, the other agreed to come to its assistance. The two were to make war and peace together. The agreement was to be in force for five years. England was beginning to see threatened the dominant commercial position she had held in China in the earlier years of the nineteenth century and especially feared Russian aggression. She was quite willing to see Japan attack her rival. The agreement was, however, chiefly of benefit to Japan, for it gave her the prestige of alliance with the leading financial, naval, and commercial power of the world, and virtually insured the isolation of Russia in the coming struggle: other European powers would probably not care to join the Czar at the expense of a war with England. It gave to Japan, too, the much needed support of the London bankers.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-1905

Even with the British alliance the outcome of a war with Russia was by no means a certain victory for Japan, and the latter sought by long negotiations to preserve

peace. St. Petersburg persistently refused to grant Japan's demands and seemingly held her in contempt. The Japanese offered to recognize Manchuria as outside their sphere of influence providing Russia would similarly state that Korea was outside her own sphere. This St. Petersburg refused to do. Not only that, but Russian activities at Seoul and on the southern coast and northern frontiers of Korea convinced Tokyo that the imperialists in charge of the Czar's government were engaged in a deliberately aggressive policy in the peninsula itself. From Japan's standpoint the only alternative was war. Both powers had been actively preparing but Japan obtained the initial advantage by a prompt attack following the severance of diplomatic relations (February, 1904). For over a year hostilities continued. Russia fought under a handicap; the field of battle was thousands of miles from her European possessions, the source of most of her men and supplies, and the only connecting link was a single-track railway; her administration, particularly of her navy, was handicapped by corruption and incompetency. The Japanese were near home and were splendidly organized and led. Their courage, ability, and efficiency were the surprise and admiration of the neutral world. The Russian armies resisted stubbornly but were steadily driven back. The Czar's fleets which might have imperiled Japan's communication with her armies on the continent, were destroyed or penned up in Port Arthur. Port Arthur itself was captured after a desperate resistance, and a few weeks later Mukden, the capital of Manchuria, fell before the Japanese attack. The Baltic fleet, after a famous cruise around the Cape of Good Hope, was destroyed in the Straits of Tsushima between Japan and Korea in the "Battle of the Sea of Japan." The island empire's com-

mand of the eastern seas could no longer be endangered. In spite of her reverses Russia was by no means crushed: but for internal disturbances she might still have persisted and won. The war was, however, unpopular at home, and when a revolution broke out St. Petersburg was quite ready to begin peace negotiations. The Japanese statesmen were equally willing to negotiate. Success on the field of battle had so far been with them, but their finances, already overloaded by the years of preparation, were threatening to give way under the strain of prolonged war. The island empire was not a wealthy land and could not continue to borrow indefinitely. Consequently when President Roosevelt offered his mediation both powers welcomed it.

The resulting negotiations were held at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and were concluded (September, 1905) by the treaty bearing the name of that city. By this treaty (1) Japan's "paramount political, military, and economic interests" in Korea were recognized; (2) the simultaneous evacuation of Korea by both was agreed upon; (3) Russia transferred to the Japanese the lease of the portions of the Liaotung peninsula held by her, and her railways and mining privileges in Southern Manchuria;¹ (4) the southern half of Sakhalin was given to Japan by Russia; (5) certain fishing privileges were conceded to Japanese in the seas to the North and West of their islands; and (6) each power was to reimburse the other for the expense of the maintenance of prisoners of war, the balance being in favor of the Japanese by about twenty million dollars. In addition (7) each was allowed to keep armed railway guards in Manchuria up to a certain specified maximum per mile of track, (8) neither was to fortify Sakhalin or use the Man-

¹ South of Kwan-Cheng-Tze and Chang-Chun.

churian railways for strategic purposes, and (9) both were to restore and respect Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria except in the leased territory, and were to maintain there the open door of equal commercial and industrial opportunity to all nations.

The treaty was intensely unpopular in Japan. The mass of the nation had expected a large indemnity and the victory had seemed so decisive that the terms of peace appeared not to have given the victor all she had justly earned by her success and her sacrifice of blood and treasure. The Japanese envoys at Portsmouth had at the beginning of the negotiations demanded a large indemnity, probably not in the expectation of obtaining it, but as a diplomatic move to induce the Russians to make larger concessions of territory than they would have made had they thought their opponents would accept peace without a money payment. The demand for the indemnity was dropped at the proper moment, but the Japanese public did not understand the game that had been played and was bitterly and angrily disappointed. Even the United States shared temporarily in the abuse heaped by the populace on the treaty, for its president had acted as mediator and had intervened to prevent the rupture of the peace conference, and it was on American soil that the negotiations had been carried on.

SEQUELS TO THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

And yet Japan's imperialists had every reason to be satisfied with her gains. She had blocked the Russian advance and had established herself firmly in Korea and Southern Manchuria. She had risen to the position of a world power; she was the one non-European nation since

the wave of Turkish invasion had begun to subside that had faced successfully on the field of battle a first-class Occidental power. Her victory was heralded all through the East and gave heart to the nationalist and reform movements in Persia, India, and China. Far Eastern peoples, however little they might like her, looked to her as a model and as a prophecy of independence from the yoke of the European. Japan had demonstrated that the Westerner was not invincible. He could be defeated with his own weapons.

Japan's prestige was greatly increased in the Occident. In August, 1905, while the Portsmouth negotiations were still in progress, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed. The maintenance of the peace of the Far East, the integrity of China, and the open door into that land were provided for, as in the last agreement. The scope of the alliance was extended to India and the Far East in general, an advantage to England, and Japan's special interests in Korea were again recognized. In case the rights of either power within the prescribed areas were assailed even by one outside power the other was to come to the aid of its ally. England was still fearful of Russia, and desired support in case of a possible attack on India. The alliance, it might be well to add, was again renewed in 1911, this time also, as in 1905, for ten years. The triple entente had by this time been formed by England, France and Russia, and British fear of the latter's aggression on India and China had been removed, at least for the time; but Germany was now looming on the horizon as a very possible danger and it seemed wise to have an agreement with Japan in the event of attack from that quarter. The only changes of importance in the last renewal were the omission of reference to Korea, which, as we shall see later, was annexed by Japan in 1910, and

the provision that neither power should by the alliance be drawn into war with a nation with which it had a treaty of general arbitration. This last change, in the eyes of many, was designed to release England from any obligation to help Japan in the event of war between the latter and the United States, for Great Britain had lately negotiated with America a treaty—which had not yet been ratified—of the kind specified. But it is well to note that Japan had in 1908 also concluded a treaty of arbitration with the United States. In that same year the latter two nations had also, by the Root-Takahira agreement, expressly declared to each other that their policy was to maintain the *status quo* and to respect each other's territorial possessions in the Pacific, to preserve the independence and integrity of China and the open door, and to communicate with each other as to the proper action to be taken in case those principles were threatened. France and Russia in 1907 both entered into agreements with Japan for the joint support of the peace of the Far East, recognizing the independence and integrity of China. This was a natural accompaniment of the formation in the same year of the triple entente. By these agreements and others to be mentioned later, Japan made certain the recognition of her voice in Far Eastern affairs. She could no longer, as before 1894 or even before 1904, be ignored or treated lightly.

For further reading see: Brinkley, *Japan, Its History, Arts and Literature*; Brinkley, *A History of the Japanese People*; Asakawa, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict; The Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi*; Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East*.

CHAPTER XI

1894 TO 1918: JAPAN TAKES HER PLACE AMONG THE POWERS OF THE WORLD

2. FROM THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH (1905) TO 1918

REORGANIZATION OF POSSESSIONS AND DEPENDENCIES

After the treaty of Portsmouth the Tokyo statesmen set themselves to the task of organizing their territorial accessions in a way that would repay the nation for the great sacrifices entailed by the two wars. Formosa, of course, had been theirs since 1895. It had been one thing, however, to exact it of China, and another to occupy it and make of it a profitable colony. Its west coast was inhabited by Chinese who resented the transfer to new masters and offered them armed resistance. When this was put down the Japanese faced the more serious enemy of disease, for the land had been notoriously unhealthful and the Chinese population had been maintained only by continued immigration from the mainland. Japanese doctors have succeeded in reducing the death rate by modern sanitation and medicine. The eastern section of the island was mountainous and was inhabited by savage tribes of head-hunters. Some of these the Japanese have induced to settle down and become peaceful agriculturalists. The recalcitrants have been restricted to increasingly narrow localities by drastic police measures and constant vigilance. Japanese administration in its initial stages was honeycombed with corruption; it took time to evolve an honest, efficient government. For years

Formosa was a drain on the imperial treasury. Eventually, as order was restored, new industries were introduced and old ones improved, railways were built, administrative efficiency was increased, and the island ceased to be a dead weight on the nation and became more nearly a contributor to its wealth. Irrigation has been fostered; the valuable forests have been conserved and improved. The administration has encouraged the three great staple crops, tea (in the northern part of the island), rice (in the center), and sugar (in the south). The production of sugar has been especially aided, for the larger part of Japan's supply is imported. Education has been encouraged. The colonial officials have made an eager and careful study of European colonial administrations and are trying to raise the islanders as rapidly as possible to an equality with Japan in civilization and prosperity.

In 1905 Korea theoretically still had her independence. That had been recognized by Japan on several occasions, and it was ostensibly to insure it that the war with China had been waged. Had the court at Seoul been able to take steps vigorously and promptly to reorganize the administration and to insure the independence of the country against European and Chinese aggression, it is quite possible that Japan would have withdrawn its hand. Tokyo felt, however, that Seoul could not be trusted to manage its own affairs. There were, it is true, a few earnest and patriotic Korean reformers who might in time, if they had been certain of being unhampered by foreign intrigues, have worked out the salvation of their land; but Japan, after her experiences of the past several decades, was not disposed to grant them a free hand. She had not tried to combat Russian and Chinese intrigues in Seoul and in two wars fought to maintain her interests in the neighboring peninsula, to

risk them to the unhampered control of a feeble monarch, a corrupt court, and a few untried and possibly erratic reformers. Moreover, her imperialistic ambitions had been aroused. Late in 1905, or almost immediately after the treaty of Portsmouth, she obtained the unwilling assent of Seoul to a treaty which turned over to her the control of the foreign affairs of the peninsular kingdom and provided for a Japanese resident-general to supervise the administration. This agreement, it is true, partly nullified the independence that had been repeatedly recognized by Japan, and endangered the treaty rights of other powers. But Europe and America consented to the change, and Korean patriots, however bitter they might feel, could not hope to resist successfully. Ito undertook to fill the post of resident-general. He attempted still to preserve the native court and administrative machinery, and at the same time to parallel it with a system of Japanese advisers and to reform completely the finance, police, laws, administration of justice, education, sanitation, industry, and commerce of the land. He naturally had in mind the development of the peninsula for the benefit of his nation, but he professed, and there is no valid reason for doubting his sincerity, that he was actuated as well by a desire to promote the interests of the Koreans themselves. His, however, was an almost impossible position. The dual system of government was at best a clumsy one. Korean officialdom could not be purged of inefficiency and corruption in a day, and co-operated sullenly or not at all. The Japanese were heartily disliked by the Koreans as a whole. The inevitable friction between the two peoples was increased by the high-handed action of many Japanese officials and immigrants, who looked upon the peninsula as conquered territory and a legitimate field for exploitation. There was in Tokyo,

moreover, a strong party of imperialists who desired the complete annexation of the country. In 1909, after a term of less than four years, Ito withdrew, virtually confessing his failure, and shortly afterward was assassinated by a Korean fanatic. The form of dual government was maintained a few months longer, but in August, 1910, Korea formally signed a treaty that annexed her to Japan. Under the old name of Chosen Korea was made an integral part of the empire. When one considers the weakness of the country, its important strategic position, the selfishness and ambitions of European powers, and Japan's sacrifices in war, one does not wonder at the annexation, as much as he may regret some features of it. It had been demonstrated that Korea could not maintain her independence: it was simply a question of which power should control her. All things considered, it was probably better for the world and for Korea that that power should be Japan.

The Tokyo statesmen have tried earnestly and vigorously to increase the wealth of the land and to insure the Japanization, if one may use that term, of the Chosenese. Brigandage has been reduced, railway and highway construction promoted, agricultural and sericultural experiment stations have been multiplied, much-needed afforestation has been undertaken, and industry has been encouraged. By the treaty of annexation, the retired royal house was pensioned and honored and Koreans were promised official positions if they were loyal and competent. Japan evidently has wished the Chosenese to become loyal subjects of the emperor. It has been hoped, too, that as rapidly as possible they would become amalgamated with the Japanese. It is pointed out that the two peoples are closely related and that the task is quite feasible. To promote its accomplishment the Japanese laws and law courts have

been extended to the peninsula, schools have been founded, and the modern educational institutions of the land, heretofore largely owned and operated by Christian missionaries from the West, have been made as far as possible to conform to the Japanese system and to submit themselves to official control. The use of the Japanese language has been encouraged and where feasible required.

The Chosenese have not faced the prospect of assimilation with unalloyed pleasure. There has been at times a deep undercurrent of discontent. Christian missions, begun long before annexation, have prospered as they had in no other Far Eastern land in the nineteenth century, and the Japanese, fearing lest sedition should cloak itself with religion and seek refuge in the church, have naturally been suspicious of the influence of the foreign pastor over his flock. At times friction has occurred, notably over the state supervision of missionary schools and the attempt to secularize them, and over the trial of a number of native Christians, most of them, possibly all of them, innocent, on the charge of plotting against the government. The Japanese have shown no signs of weakening in their purpose of completing the assimilation of the peninsula, however, and the Chosenese cannot hope to present more than a passive resistance: they are, indeed, increasingly contented. The land has been a drain on the imperial treasury, but the subsidies have been decreased year by year and it is expected that they will soon be no longer needed.

Sakhalin, or Karafuto as it is called by the Japanese, has not yet proved a very profitable acquisition. In the southern half, the section ceded by Russia in the treaty of Portsmouth, there are several hundred square miles of arable lands, and a few thousand Japanese have come in

and settled on them. The fisheries are to-day the most important income-producing feature of the island. Their annual value has approached the four million dollar mark. The island has several undeveloped sources of income; its forests are the most extensive of any section of the empire, and there are valuable deposits of coal. The Tokyo treasury has had to make a yearly contribution to the local budget, however, for the island has been so sparsely settled that it is not yet paying its own way.

JAPAN'S GROWING INTEREST AND POWER IN MANCHURIA

In Manchuria Japan's position was not as predominant as in Korea nor her policy as clearly indicated for her by local conditions. She had gone to war with Russia ostensibly to defend the open door and the integrity of China. By the fortunes of war, she found herself on the conclusion of peace in the possession of the very Russian holdings in South Manchuria against the prejudicial tendency of which she had protested. Consistency and loyalty to pledges repeatedly made in treaties and conventions with various powers demanded that she scrupulously respect Chinese sovereignty and the principle of equal economic opportunity for all. Many Japanese felt, however, that the war had so altered conditions that a strict adherence to promises made earlier should not be insisted upon. Japanese lives by the thousand had been poured out on Manchurian soil to defend it against Russia, while China, the nominal sovereign, stood idly and helplessly by. Japan had loaded taxes on her people almost to the breaking point and had accumulated an immense war debt which would be a burden on generations yet unborn, while China had spent scarcely a dollar. The Japanese would not have been human

had they not desired to use for their own advantage the territory taken at so much cost. Moreover, the successes of the war had strengthened the imperialistic ambitions of the nation. Manchuria was a most tempting field of expansion. It bordered on Korea; it was possessed of immense and almost virgin resources of field, mine, and forest; it was still a frontier country; it had been a part of China for less than three centuries and only recently had the Chinese entered it in large numbers; it was now being rapidly settled by these and they were demonstrating by the results of their farming the immense fertility of the land. Japan, moreover, needed room for expansion. Her population was steadily increasing. In 1891 it had been 40,718,677, in 1899, 44,260,652, in 1903, 46,732,876, and by 1908 it was to be 49,588,804. The arable land of the islands was not all occupied, but the limit was in sight. The pressure of population must be relieved either by emigration or by promoting industry and the exchange of its products abroad for food. In either case Manchuria was greatly to be desired. It was a comparatively virgin land to which Japanese might go and still for military purposes not be lost to the home land.¹ Its rapidly increasing population offered a promising market, and its mines, forests, and fields were sources of abundant raw materials.

Considering all the temptations that Manchuria presented and the cost at which a foothold in it had been acquired, it would have been strange, although highly commendable, had Japan stayed strictly by her plighted word. She did, however, pay attention to China's claims to sovereignty. Even after the treaty of Portsmouth she sought

¹ It has later been claimed that the Japanese do not care to go much to Manchuria as laborers or farmers, for they are brought into competition with the Chinese and their lower standards of living.

and obtained from Peking the confirmation of the provisions of that document in so far as they affected Chinese rights. In a set of secret protocols Japan's control in Manchuria was confirmed by provisions that were believed by many to threaten the open door: other powers were apparently not to be allowed railway concessions save with the consent of Japan, and the Chinese were not to build lines that would compete with those owned by the Japanese.

AMERICANS AND THE MANCHURIAN RAILWAYS

There were efforts to loosen Japan's hold on Manchuria. The ink was hardly dry on the treaty of Portsmouth before Harriman had agreed with the Tokyo authorities to buy the roads that had been taken from Russia. The great American railway genius planned to obtain control of the trans-Siberian road, to span the Atlantic and Pacific with steamship lines, and thus to belt the world with a transportation system controlled by himself. This arrangement, however, stood in the way of Japanese expansion, and while favored by Ito was abrogated on the advice of the Japanese chief commissioner to Portsmouth. Both British and American financiers sought from China railway concessions in both the Japanese and Russian spheres of influence.¹ Harriman negotiated for the lines in Manchuria still held by Russia. The United States through Secretary Knox proposed a scheme for the neutralization of the railways of Manchuria. The powers were jointly to lend China money to purchase the existing Russian and Japanese lines and to construct such additional roads as might be needed. The administration of the roads was to

¹ Principally the railroad from Chinchor in South Manchuria to Aigun on the Amur.

be for a time in the hands of an international commission. The plan was significant, for had it been carried out, it would have meant a precedent for the substitution of a benevolent international protectorate over China for "spheres of influence," "leased territories," "special interests," and other forms under which each nation was trying to obtain for its exclusive enjoyment some part of the country. If successful, Knox's plan would have lessened intrigues and reduced causes of friction and war. To the American proposal Japanese and Russian expansionists could hardly be expected to agree, and since they were in control at their respective capitals, alarm at the threatened action led the two countries not only to disapprove publicly of the plan, but to enter into an agreement (1910) to act jointly to conserve and coördinate their interests in Manchuria. The former enemies had been driven together by the American suggestion and their common interests. The temptation was great to obtain special privileges for Japanese merchants as well as for Japanese railroads. The accusation was repeatedly made that by manipulation of the customs, railroad rebates, preferential rates of interest in the Manchurian branches of the Yokohama Specie Bank, and the evasion of taxes, the Japanese were obtaining favors for their own goods and merchants at the expense of those of other powers. In some instances the complaints may have been well-founded, but if there was a violation of the open door it was more by indirect than by direct methods. It was seldom if ever as apparent as had been that practiced by Russia.

JAPAN'S INTEREST IN CHINA TO 1914

Japan's interest in China was not confined to Manchuria and events were soon to take place which would give her

a larger voice in the affairs of her huge neighbor. If Manchuria was a rich field for commercial, mining, and industrial exploitation, China proper was even more so. There was a huge industrious and thrifty population variously estimated at from two hundred and fifty millions to four hundred millions, potentially the greatest market in the world. There were great supplies of raw material and of coal and iron, of the last of which Japan, without much iron ore of her own, stood particularly in need. There was the natural field for the commercial expansion that Japan must have if she were to find occupation and food for her increasing population and to insure her continued progress as a nation. Why should she not direct the transformation and organization of this unwieldy, newly awakened land, and the development of its resources? Why should she not make secure Chinese independence of Europe and furnish advisers for the schools, the diplomacy, and the civil and military administration of the great empire? Why should the two lands not form a close alliance under the leadership of Tokyo that would insure to Orientals the possession of the Far East, and exercise a decisive influence in world affairs? Moreover by her possession of Chosen and her special interests in Manchuria, Japan was under the necessity of watching, and if possible controlling diplomacy in Peking.

By every device known to industry and commerce Japan's trade with the Eighteen Provinces¹ was encouraged. Heavily subsidized steamers plied the waters of the Yangtze and its tributaries; Japanese post-offices and consulates were opened in the main treaty ports; Japanese merchants came in by the hundreds; and Japanese teachers were to be found in Chinese government schools. Since 1901

¹ A name given to China proper.

Chinese students had flocked to Japan by the thousands, finding in Tokyo a nearer and less expensive source of Western learning than the university centers of the Occident. Returning, they had given a decidedly Japanese flavor to the reform movement in their home land.

The Chinese revolution of 1911 that overthrew the Manchu dynasty and established in its place a republic gave Japan fresh opportunities for interference in the internal affairs of her neighbor. It is true that the revolution was accompanied by a patriotic movement that resented foreign influence, and that Yuan Shih K'ai, the president of the united republic, had been of old, as his country's representative in Seoul before the Chino-Japanese war, an enemy of Japan. But with the revolution came disorder and temporary decentralization. The one led to offenses against a few individual Japanese, which gave Tokyo an opportunity to overawe the Chinese by vigorous demands for satisfaction. The other weakened Peking. Some of those who sought to oppose Yuan naturally looked to Japan for aid. It has not been proved that the Tokyo government ever gave Chinese rebels direct aid, but individual, over-enthusiastic Japanese, some of them officials, were guilty of helping them. The revolution, too, brought a need for more money. Yuan was put to it to find funds to pay his troops and to maintain and reorganize the government. A group of foreign bankers, made up originally of representatives of France, Germany, England, and the United States, offered to make a huge loan to be secured by receipts from taxes, notably the salt monopoly, and on the condition that in the future China should borrow exclusively from that group. Japan and Russia demanded and obtained entrance into the charmed circle, and the "sextuple syndicate" seemed about to institute a joint

protectorate over China's finances. The American members of the syndicate withdrew soon after President Wilson came into office, for he had declined his support on the ground that by the terms of the loan China's autonomy would be jeopardized. The representatives of the remaining five powers made the loan, although this did not carry with it quite the drastic monopoly on the finances of China that had at first been contemplated. Japan, with the other four powers, was by it given a firmer hold on China.

RELATIONS WITH CHINA, 1914-1916

Then in August, 1914, came the Great War. By the terms of her alliance with Great Britain Japan was under obligation to come to the former's assistance in case she were attacked in the Far East, and to consider in common with her the measures that should be taken to safeguard any interests in the same region that were threatened by the Germans. Japan was quite ready to assume to the full her obligations under the alliance, for it gave her an unprecedented opportunity to establish herself in China and the Pacific. With the European powers busy elsewhere and with the known reluctance of the United States to use force to preserve the open door, she could do on the neighboring continent almost as she pleased. On August 15th Japan presented a note to the German government "advising" it to withdraw from Far Eastern waters all its men-of-war and armed vessels, to disarm those that could not be withdrawn, and to give up to her the leased territory of Kiao Chau "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." The note made one strangely reminiscent of the German communication to Japan in 1895. Germany sent no reply and Japan entered the war. She aided

England in clearing Asiatic waters of German cruisers and raiders and captured some of the German Pacific islands which, by the way, are not without strategic importance. With some slight assistance from her ally she sent a force to China and after a siege captured Tsingtao and occupied the German railways and mines in Shantung. Count Okuma, then the premier, publicly and in writing disavowed any territorial ambitions. Japan said she had "no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other peoples of anything which they now possess." The temptation offered by the unusual opportunity, however, proved very great, too great, in fact, to be entirely resisted. In the attack on Tsingtao China's neutrality was accorded scant respect and repeated complaints were made by the Chinese of usurpations of authority by Japanese troops and officials in and near the railway zone. Tsingtao was treated as conquered territory, even to the exclusion of British interests.

But Japan was preparing for a more far-reaching move. Early in 1915 she made certain demands on Peking, demands which if granted in full would place the huge continental republic completely under the tutelage of its island neighbor. These were in five groups.

First: in regard to Shantung, China was to promise to give her assent to anything upon which the Japanese and German governments might agree in regard to the rights which the latter possessed in the province. She was to engage not to cede or to lease to any third power any territory within or along the coast of Shantung. She was to give to Japan an additional railway concession and to open new ports to trade.

Second: in regard to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the leases on the railways and ports held

by Japan were to be extended to ninety-nine years instead of the twenty-five years for which they were first made. Japanese officials and civilians were to have the right not only in the railway zones and treaty ports, but everywhere in the two regions, to travel, to reside, to lease or buy land for trading, manufacturing or agricultural purposes, to engage in any business they wished, and to open such mines as China and Japan might agree upon. Such extensive privileges of residence and ownership of land had not been granted elsewhere in China to foreigners other than missionaries: extraterritorial rights had had as a corollary the restriction of most foreign residence and business to treaty ports, where the necessary consular courts could be operated without too much prejudice to Chinese jurisdiction. China was to promise, too, that the Japanese government would be consulted before any foreign advisers were employed for South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia, and that before Peking granted a railway concession or made a loan on the security of the taxes of those districts, Tokyo's consent would first be obtained. Lease was to be given Japan on a short railway¹ hitherto outside its control. The effect of this second group of concessions, if they were granted, would be to strengthen Japan's control over some of the richest sections of China, the exclusion of all possible interference from the outside, while still preserving the semblance of the open door and Chinese sovereignty.

Third: the Han-yeh-ping Company, a home-owned enterprise which operated the greatest iron works in China,² and which controlled extensive bodies of iron ore and coal,

¹ From Kirin to Chang-Chun.

² At Hanyang, across the Han River from Hankow, the great river of Central China.

was, when the opportune moment arrived, to be made the joint undertaking of Japan and China. Without the consent of the former the latter was not to dispose of her rights in the company, and without the company's permission she was not to permit mines in the neighborhood of those owned by it to be worked, or any enterprise affecting its interests to be undertaken. The properties of the Han-yeh-ping Company were in the heart of China, within the region that less than twenty years before had been marked out by the British as a sphere of influence. The company was in financial straits and had already borrowed from Japanese. Its control by the Japanese and the strengthening of their political influence in that region would be made certain were the demand granted. Japan, sadly deficient in iron ore of her own, would be assured a supply that would probably be adequate for years to come.

Fourth: China was not to cede or to lease to any other power than Japan any harbor, bay, or island along her coast.

The fifth group comprised a series of demands which more completely than the other four would, if granted, place China under the tutelage of her neighbor. The Chinese government was to employ Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and military affairs; the police departments of important places in China were to be under the joint administration of the two nations; China was either to purchase of her neighbor fifty per cent or more of her munitions of war, or a joint arsenal was to be established employing Japanese experts and using Japanese material. Japanese hospitals, schools, and churches might own land in the heart of China, and the right to propagate religious doctrines¹ was to be acknowledged. Certain railway conces-

¹ The doctrines were presumably Buddhist. The reason for this demand is somewhat obscure, but it was apparently to encourage

sions in the Yangtze Valley were to be granted, and no foreign capital for the development of Fukien, the province opposite Formosa, was to be employed without first consulting Japan.

These demands aroused a storm of protest in China, vigorous criticism in many foreign quarters, and much opposition even in Japan. To accede to them seemed to the Chinese to mean the virtual surrender of independence. But Peking was not in a position to offer armed resistance. The nation was disorganized and in sad financial straits, and its army could not hope to oppose successfully the fighting machine of its doughty neighbor. Europe was too busy with its own affairs to protest, and the United States, even if it objected, could be counted on not to back up its complaints by force. Long negotiations followed, and early in May Tokyo presented Peking with what was virtually an ultimatum, demanding the immediate acceptance of the provisions of the first four groups. The discussion of the fifth group was to be postponed for the time. To this ultimatum China was constrained to yield and by treaties and the exchange of notes granted all that Japan had asked, with the exception of the fifth group, the discussion on which was postponed. It may be noted that while the fifth group was not formally conceded, certain features of it have been partially carried out in practice, for Japanese advisers to the government are increasing in numbers and influence.

Disorders in Eastern Inner Mongolia in 1916 gave Japan the excuse for a demand for still further control over the policing of the region involved. Again China could only protest, but this time Tokyo was in a more conciliatory mood and compromised.

Japanese Buddhist missionaries to come to China to offset the strong Occidental influence exercised by Christian missionaries.

Japan was now unquestionably the leading power in China. Her predominance was spectacularly made apparent when in December, 1915, the Japanese *chargé d'affaires* acted as spokesman for a group made up of himself and the French and British ministers, the latter the dean of the diplomatic corps in Peking, in a formal protest to Yuan Shih K'ai against the substitution of a monarchy for a republic. Japan, as a member of the group that was attempting to crush Germany, was evidently not to be put under constraint by her companions in arms. Her position was still further strengthened by an agreement with Russia published in July, 1916. The two powers had been drawing together ever since the treaty of Portsmouth, and Japan had been aiding Russia in her struggle with Germany by shipments of supplies across Siberia. Each government now agreed not to enter into any alliance or arrangement with a third power directed against the other, and both promised that in case the Far Eastern territorial rights or special privilege of either were menaced they would "consult with each other regarding the measures to be taken for the purpose of protecting and guarding the said rights and privileges." Although not a formal alliance, it was an agreement for joint action. This agreement and the Anglo-Japanese alliance insured as much as solemn international promises are capable of doing the friendship and support of the two European powers most influential in the Far East.

CHINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN 1917

In the summer of 1917 more light was thrown on Japan's special position in China by incidents arising from internal troubles in the republic. Yuan Shih K'ai had died in 1916 after a vain attempt to make himself emperor. The republican government that he had restored in the last few

weeks of his life was left in the control of two discordant factions, a conservative group, chiefly military, with its stronghold in the north, and a radical group, chiefly from the south. Early in 1917, the first was in control of the cabinet, and the second of parliament. Over both the president, Li Yuan Hung, was trying to preside and insure harmony. In the spring of 1917 the government received a copy of the note sent by the United States asking that all neutral powers join her in her break with Germany. This, followed by the outbreak of war between America and Germany, precipitated a heated discussion as to whether China should join the entente powers. So bitter did the discussion become that the president was constrained to dismiss the premier, and then the parliament, and civil war seemed about to follow. The United States now dispatched a note to Peking, advising China that it was more important for the welfare of the world that she preserve internal peace than that she join in the war. Great Britain, France, and Japan were apparently asked to second the note. Although the texts of the documents were not made public, Japan apparently protested to the United States that because of the former's special interests in China, Tokyo should have been communicated with before the note was sent to Peking. This was tantamount to asserting Japan's supervision of China's foreign affairs, and Great Britain and France by declining to second the American note, seemed tacitly to agree to Japan's position. The incident at first seemed trivial, but it was highly significant. The spectacular transient revival of the Manchu empire by Chang Hsun, followed by the restoration of the republic by the military party and the declaration of war on Germany, seemed to many in Japan to promise further disorder and to show the need for interference.

Japan failed to obtain the hearty coöperation of the Chinese in her program. She professed, it is true, to have no desire to annex any of their territory, but rather to aid them in reorganizing, and reaching a position where they could defend their independence. She professed to favor a close alliance between the two nations to the mutual advantage of both; Japan to protect China during her years of weakness against the aggressions of Western powers and to aid in her political and military reconstruction and her economic development, and China to provide Japan with a market and a source of raw materials. The Japanese pointed out that the two nations were closely related in blood and in culture and that it would be to the advantage of both if they acted together. For the time, they said, Japan would need to lead, even in China's internal affairs, but she could not hope to annex her huge neighbor and eventually the latter would be able to stand on her own feet. Unfortunately for the realization of this hope, neither people could heartily or harmoniously coöperate with the other. The Chinese had, until a little over half a century before, regarded Japan as an inferior state, one which had borrowed from them all the culture that separated her from barbarism. They could not quickly forget the earlier relationship and chafed with helpless rage under Japan's assumptions and aggressions. While the great growth of Japanese commerce on the continent was possible only because the Chinese traded with them, the latter despised and feared their island neighbors even while they bought from them, and contrasted scornfully the cheap and consequently flimsy articles sold them by Japan with the corresponding more expensive and substantial European products. The Japanese, moreover, were not in a frame of mind that would enable them easily to placate Chinese resent-

ment. Their successes during the past few decades and their traditional national pride had not promoted a humble or conciliatory spirit. In spite of the many things that the two peoples had in common, and their many points of contact, it is doubtful whether they really understood each other. Their histories and ideals, had, after all, been very different. Even the best of the Japanese felt a certain contempt for their neighbors. It was true that the Chinese were successful merchants and that in ages past their culture had been dominant in the Far East; but had they not been unable quickly to adjust themselves to the new age, and were they not proving themselves incompetent to organize a government that could maintain its independence? As the Japanese had annexed Korea to prevent its absorption by Russia, so, they thought, they might need to supervise China to prevent Western powers from doing so and slamming to the door of economic opportunity. Many Japanese felt that Manchuria more properly belonged to them than to China. It had never, they claimed, been an integral part of China proper but had been held merely as a dependency until fear of foreign aggression led to its incorporation into the provincial system. The Chinese had not shed their blood nor spent their treasure for it as had the Japanese. In the light of these sentiments, friction between the two peoples was inevitable. Under a new ministry¹ Japan in the latter part of 1916 began to adopt a more conciliatory attitude in an attempt to allay Chinese suspicions and promote harmonious coöperation, but, while she met with some success, her motives were still suspected by the mass of the Chinese nation. Whether or not the two peoples could get along peaceably together, it was evident that China would for years to come be the dominant factor in Japan's foreign policy.

¹ Under Terauchi.

The collapse of Russia in 1917 and 1918 brought with it developments the outcome of which cannot, in the spring of 1918, be accurately predicted. Japan's intervention in Vladivostok has the consent of her European allies, at least outwardly, and that in spite of the reluctance of the United States to see any action taken by the entente powers which may seem to smack of territorial aggression or serve to alienate the Russian people. Japan professes to entertain no purpose of permanent occupation, but the future of Russia is so fraught with uncertainty, and some of the territories concerned are so rich in minerals, particularly in coal and iron, that sceptical observers may well be pardoned if at times they doubt whether, if Japan once really occupies the region, she will find withdrawal convenient or possible.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1894-1917

During the years since 1894 Japan's relations with the United States had been undergoing a change. From the time of the Perry expedition the two countries had had for many years the most cordial attitude toward each other. The United States had never been suspected of territorial ambitions in the Far East. She had repeatedly by acts of generosity demonstrated the cordiality of her friendship for her trans-Pacific neighbor. She looked with a kind of elder-brotherly pride upon the rapid development of a nation that she had come to regard as a protégé, and saw in it no menace to her own safety. The two nations coöperated in seeking to maintain the open door in Manchuria after the Boxer uprising. In the war with Russia American sympathies were all with the Japanese and New York bankers loaned a

large proportion of the funds needed for the struggle. In return Japan looked upon America as the one great Western power from whom she had nothing to fear and was moved by gratitude for the evidences of disinterested friendship that had been shown her. Many Japanese students found their way to American universities and took back with them a hearty admiration for the country where they had spent their college days. The United States, moreover, had provided Japan a market for tea and raw silk, especially the latter, and was her best customer, better even than China. In return Japan bought from the United States large quantities of raw cotton, manufactures, machinery, iron, and steel.

By the close of 1905, however, friction between the two countries began to develop. A small and uninfluential portion of the Japanese public was temporarily inclined to regard the United States as partly responsible for the terms of the intensely unpopular treaty of Portsmouth. This slight resentment would quickly have died out had there not soon been added other causes for trouble. The first of these was the immigration question. The Pacific Coast states of America were poorly supplied with the cheap labor needed for their development. Chinese coolies had been excluded by law and the newer European immigration did not quickly find its way across the continent. Unskilled Japanese workmen, then, found an open field for their services, at wages far in excess of what they could hope for at home. Numbers came to the Pacific Coast and especially to California and were accompanied or followed by a few merchants and professional men. Immigration was swelled by the annexation of Hawaii. Tens of thousands of Japanese had come to the islands during the years of independence to work on the plantations, and still form the largest

single racial element of the very heterogeneous population of that territory. After 1898 they began to go to the continent. This influx of cheap Asiatic labor alarmed the people of the coast states, especially the labor unions. The Japanese, it was felt, could not be assimilated easily if at all. Their home country was known to be crowded by a rapidly growing population, and it was feared that unless their immigration were stopped, they would soon form a large un-American group on the thinly settled Pacific Coast. White laborers would be unable or unwilling to compete with a race whose standards of living were traditionally so much lower than their own and would either become poverty-stricken or withdraw; the coast states would be filled with an ever increasing Oriental population and might in time become a Japanese rather than an American community. These fears were to some extent justified, but they were largely unfounded, for the Japanese proved to be more assimilable than the Chinese, more eager to learn the language and to adopt the ways and standards of living of their adopted country, and in efficiency and enterprise they were on the whole the equals if not the superiors of the immigrants from South Europe. Some of the student class who have remained in America have risen to the highest ranks in medicine and teaching, and there have been those among their merchants who have become honored, prosperous members of American communities. But for prejudice there would have been little more difficulty in absorbing a reasonable number of them than a somewhat similar number of Greeks or Italians. Unfortunately, native Americans felt a strong race prejudice. False or exaggerated reports were circulated which gave the American communities the quite erroneous impression that the Japanese were grossly immoral and dis-

honest and were spies for their government. With such a prejudice, friction was inevitable, intermarriage was frowned upon, and assimilation made difficult. As early as 1900 there had been some trouble, and the Tokyo government, to avoid friction, had passed restrictions on emigration to the United States. In 1903 a labor convention in Chicago appointed a commission to study the question and the report was opposed to Japanese immigration. In 1905 a league to exclude Japanese and Koreans was organized in San Francisco, and in 1906 the question came to a head when the San Francisco school officials attempted to segregate the Japanese from the American pupils. Through President Roosevelt's intervention the local authorities agreed to drop the matter, but only on the condition that the federal government would undertake to put a stop to further immigration of Japanese from Hawaii, Mexico, and Canada. Congress in 1907 passed an act authorizing the president to prevent a further influx of the unpopular race. The president then by proclamation prohibited the movement from Hawaii, Mexico, and Canada, an act which, in light of existing treaties, was of doubtful constitutionality. He also entered into negotiations with Tokyo which led to the so-called "gentlemen's agreement" by which Japan agreed to prevent any of her laboring class from coming to America.

In 1913 friction again arose over legislation in California, when, in spite of President Wilson's representations through Secretary of State Bryan, a bill was passed which in effect and purpose, although not by name, forbade Japanese to hold agricultural land in the state except on a short term lease. Similar legislation was talked of in Oregon and Idaho in 1917 and was withdrawn only on requests from Washington. Naturalization has not been

allowed, and only American-born Japanese have or can acquire the rights of citizenship. The question of anti-Japanese clauses in the national immigration laws has been seriously debated in Congress. The Japanese people have been deeply offended by this American legislation, partly because of the scant respect for their feelings that has been shown in discussing and enacting it, and partly because it seems to them unwarranted discrimination. It is certainly unnecessary; the number of Japanese that can come to the United States and hold land there is, relatively speaking, unimportant so long as Tokyo adheres, as it has so far scrupulously done, to the "gentlemen's agreement": in 1905 there were probably less than 100,000 in the United States proper. It is discriminatory, for it seems to violate treaty obligations which guarantee Japan all the rights granted to other powers and it appears to rank the Japanese with the inferior peoples of the earth. This is doubly offensive to a nation as keenly sensitive and intensely patriotic as the Japanese. The American legislation has seemed, too, to be a phase of a general policy of the white race to exclude all other peoples from the best of the unoccupied sections of the earth, while refusing these others the privilege of shutting out the white man from their own lands. British Columbia and Australia, for example, have shown nearly as great irritation over Japanese immigration as has California, and that in spite of the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. There has seemed to be no immediate possibility of a war arising over the question, for Japan is too greatly interested in China to risk losing her advantage there by engaging in hostilities elsewhere. A majority of the American thinking public, moreover, has deplored the anti-Japanese agitation and has objected to having the peace of the nation jeopardized by the hysterical

fears of three or four states. The admission of Japanese to the United States and their status when admitted, are, however, questions which will evidently arise again and if America continues to prove discourteous they may combine with other causes to bring war.

Another source of friction between Japan and the United States has been the policy of the two powers in the Far East. In 1898 America took the Philippines and in the same year annexed Hawaii. This, from the American standpoint, was the unavoidable result of the force of circumstances. From the Japanese standpoint it was ominous of designs on China. Shortly afterward, as if to confirm Japan's worst suspicions, the United States began to champion the principle of the open door in China, a principle which after 1905 threatened the special interests acquired by Japan in Manchuria through the treaty of Portsmouth. After the Russo-Japanese war, it will be remembered, Harriman offered to buy the South Manchurian railways from Tokyo, and when this was refused, tried to get hold of the Russian lines in North Manchuria. American capitalists attempted to get from China concessions for a railway which would have competed with the Japanese roads in Manchuria, and were prevented only by the opposition of Tokyo. Still later came the Knox proposal to purchase and operate these same Japanese Manchurian roads by an international syndicate. This from the standpoint of Americans was designed merely to preserve the open door and Chinese independence, but to Japan it might well have seemed to be actuated by purely selfish motives and to threaten the fruits of her dearly won victories. Still later Americans began to invest capital in China. American bankers joined in the six-power loan to China until discouraged by President Wilson. The

Standard Oil Company obtained a partial monopoly on the oil fields of China, although that was later surrendered, and an American company entered into negotiations to build great docks in Fuhkien province, opposite the Japanese-owned Formosa. In 1916 other American capitalists proposed a loan for railway construction that competed with Japanese interests in Shantung. It was due largely to pressure from the United States that China in 1917 broke with Germany. All of this seemed very reasonable and just to the average citizen of the United States, if he stopped to think about it at all. He was innocent of any imperialistic intentions in Asia and wanted only an open door of equal opportunity. To some Japanese minds, however, there was a sinister aspect to this American westward expansion. In the course of a hundred years or so the United States had jumped the Mississippi River, crossed the Rockies, occupied the Pacific slope, and since Japan's war with China had spanned the Pacific, occupying Hawaii and the Philippines, and was seeking investments in Chinese mines and railways. What might she not do next? What wonder that many Japanese, misunderstanding the spirit of the American people, should be irritated by their open door policy and regard it as a hypocritical cloak for selfish designs? What wonder that they should think of America as a menace and even if they could be persuaded that for the present she had no selfish motives, should believe that commercial expansion and the investment of capital in China might lead her later to challenge Japan's special interests in that land? Many of them might feel, too, that the open door, splendid in theory, could not be left safely to the protection of Occidental powers. All of Japan's experience had been to the contrary. In the absence of an effective league of nations, the Japanese might

well feel that until China should be able to take care of herself, her integrity could be made certain only by the assistance of some one strong power. Japan planned, without doubt, to maintain in China her "special interests," her semi-protectorate over that nation, and there seemed to be no question but that if the United States were to undertake an aggressive policy there that would seriously jeopardize the position of Japan, the latter would fight, unless prevented by the alignment of European powers.

Many Americans were suspicious of Japan's designs in the Far East and the Pacific. They feared that she was only waiting her opportunity to seize the Philippines and Hawaii and even portions of the American Continent. They pointed to the large Japanese elements in the Hawaiian Islands as a source of danger, and gave credence to baseless rumors of Japanese political designs on Mexico, and Central and South America. They viewed with alarm the growth of Japanese shipping on the Pacific: it was rapidly increasing while American shipping on the same waters was declining. They lost no opportunity to magnify the Japanese influence and designs in China. As a matter of fact, a few chauvinists in Japan probably hoped that the opportunity would sometime come to obtain possession of the Philippines and Hawaii, and in case of war between the two countries both of these exposed and valuable possessions of the United States would certainly be attacked, but the nation as a whole and its responsible statesmen seem to have been entirely innocent of any thought of seizing wantonly the American Pacific islands or any section of the American coast. They were too much concerned with China to dissipate their energies elsewhere. They were frankly out for as large a share of the Pacific trade as possible, but they had

no serious intention of attempting to get it by any other than the approved means of peaceful competition.

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT, NOVEMBER, 1917

Friction between the United States and Japan over China was allayed, at least for the time, by an exchange of notes which grew out of the visit to America in the summer and autumn of 1917 of a Japanese commission headed by Viscount Ishii. The United States frankly recognized "that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries . . . [and] that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous." She expressed her faith that Japan would observe the open door and the territorial integrity and independence of China. To this Japan readily agreed, and declared with the United States, that she was "opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China." The agreement merely recognized existing conditions and renewed Japan's previous pledges of good faith. It was greeted with no great enthusiasm by the press in either America or Japan, for to many of the public in both countries it seemed that each foreign office had conceded too much. The Chinese were bitter in their denunciation; the agreement seemed to them to be the desertion of their last remaining protector against the aggressions of Japan, and Peking registered a formal refusal to be bound by any conventions to which she was not a willing party. As the weeks passed, however, the agreement seemed to have re-

lieved the tension between Japan and America. Suspicions were further allayed by several Japanese commissions sent to the United States to insure the full coöperation of the two countries in the war against the Central Powers.

PROBABLE FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND UNITED STATES

There seemed then, with all the talk of war, to be no imminent danger of Japan and America coming to an armed clash. America's entrance into the war on the side of the Allies promoted, for a time at least, coöperation and a better understanding. The Japanese, unless wantonly or thoughtlessly insulted by discriminatory legislation, would fight only to preserve their position on the continent, and the American public was too indifferent to Chinese affairs and too reluctant to back up her capitalists and merchants by force of arms to go to war to protect China against Japan. It was evident, however, that the two peoples must become better acquainted with each other if friction was to end and relations of mutual confidence and understanding to be restored. If the irritation and suspicion were to continue they might eventually lead to an armed clash, and war would probably be indecisive and disastrous for both peoples.

For further reading see: Abbott, *Japanese Expansion and American Policies*; Gulick, *The American Japanese Problem*; Millis, *The Japanese Problem in the United States*; McCormick, *The Menace of Japan*; Millard, *Our Eastern Question*; Kawakami, *Asia at the Door; The Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi*; Brinkley, *A History of the Japanese People*; Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East*.

CHAPTER XII

THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN FROM THE WAR WITH CHINA TO THE PRESENT (1894-1917)

The past several pages have been given to recounting Japan's foreign relations from the close of the Chino-Japanese War. These from the standpoint of the foreigner are probably the most interesting feature of the years following 1895. No study of the development of Japan would, however, be complete without a description of her domestic history during the period.

STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THE MINISTRY, 1894-1917

In political life the outstanding series of events was the continuation of that struggle between the lower house of the diet and the ministry that had been begun almost with the promulgation of the constitution. The House of Representatives was in the hands of parties which insisted that the ministry be responsible to the diet. This the group of men who controlled the bureaucracy and had the ear of the emperor would not seriously consider. They were for the most part representatives of the leading southern fiefs of feudal days and were unwilling to grant to the people a larger voice in the government, chiefly because of a genuine distrust of the masses, but partly possibly for selfish reasons. The Chinese war had strengthened the hands of the two groups, Satsuma and Choshu, who controlled the army and

navy, and made them less than ever disposed to yield. All internal differences had been dropped in enthusiastic support of the government during the war, but no sooner had the treaty of peace been signed than they reappeared. Ito, whose ministry had carried on the war, formed an alliance with the Liberal Party,¹ and preserved the existing one with the conservatives to insure the support of the legislature for his *post bellum* measures. This combination failed long to maintain an adequate majority in the lower house, and by the close of 1896 Ito had resigned.

It would merely add confusion to a work of this scope to recount in detail all the political history of the next two decades. Only the main events can be given. Even these are confusing, but they help to illustrate the main lines of political and constitutional development.

If there was not to be a deadlock in the administration it was necessary for the cabinet to have the support of a party, if possible the majority party, in the lower house. The cabinet did not, however, need to seek the ratification of all of its measures by the diet, and it might insist on holding office when backed only by a minority. To obtain support ministries too frequently resorted to the practice made notorious in England by Robert Walpole, and unfortunately not unknown in the Occident since his time, of corrupting individual members of the diet by the award of office or by out and out bribery. This practice was made the more pernicious by the inability of the diet to enforce its initiative in great constructive pieces of legislation or to do more than block measures proposed by the cabinet. On one side, then, was the cabinet, usually controlled by the ex-samurai who had brought about the reorganization of Japan and of whom the strongest group was the Sat-Cho

¹ The Jiyuto.

combination. On the other was the diet, its lower house made up largely of party men who were at odds with the government and who found their slogan in the principle of the responsibility of the cabinet to the legislature.

After the fall of the Ito government a new one was formed which obtained the support of the powerful Progressive (Shimpoto) Party—the name assumed in 1896 by the reorganized Liberal Conservatives—by giving its leader, Okuma, the foreign office. Okuma found himself blocked by his colleagues on the cabinet in any attempt to exercise a decisive influence on general administration measures and resigned (November, 1897). Shortly afterward the cabinet was dissolved, Ito again became premier, and got together a ministry. His resignation was soon caused by the union of the two strongest parties of the nation, the Progressives (Shimpoto), led by Okuma, and the Liberals (Jiyuto), led by Itagaki, in a new party, the Constitutionalists (Ken-seito). To the amazement of the nation the emperor, acting on the recommendation of Ito, asked Okuma and Itagaki to form a cabinet. It looked as though the principle of ministerial responsibility to the diet had at last been conceded. But alas for such hopes! The divergent elements in the new party could not be perfectly welded, internal friction developed, the cabinet resigned, and the Constitutionalists split into their former elements. The Itagaki group retained the fusion name, and the Okuma group for a time assumed a modified name but eventually readopted its former title of Progressive (Shimpoto). A Sat-Cho ministry¹ in spite of an alliance with the powerful Constitutional rump failed to last long. Ito surprised the nation by accepting the leadership of the Constitutionist party (1900). He reorganized it, renamed it,² and on the downfall

¹ Under Yamagata.

² The Rikken Seiyukai or Seiyukai.

of the Sat-Cho cabinet came into office again as premier. It looked as though the man chiefly responsible for the constitution and the independence of the administration of the legislature had conceded the principle of party government. Had he not placed himself at the head of what had once been the Liberal Party, the champion of ministerial responsibility? However, the party, not Ito, had changed its convictions. The latter still held to the complete dependence of the cabinet officers upon the will of the sovereign, and by his maneuver hoped to prevent a deadlock between the executive and the legislature by winning party support. His attempt to insure harmony failed and his cabinet lasted less than a year. Ito, although an ex-samurai of Choshu, had been at odds with the military Sat-Cho group, and national politics were now become chiefly a three-cornered struggle between the former, backed by his party (the Seiyukai), the militaristic section of the government, and Okuma's party. On the resignation of the Ito ministry (1901) the military group came back into power under the premiership of Katsura, and carried the nation through the Russian war. Then, as during the struggle with China, internal dissensions were abandoned in the face of external danger. In 1905 the Katsura cabinet resigned and in 1906 the Ito group, now led by Saionji, a scion of the older court nobility but a believer in party government, formed a ministry. There now followed (1906-1913) four ministries in which Saionji and Katsura alternated as premier. Finally, when Katsura broke with the dominant group in the Sat-Cho combination and formed a party of his own,¹ the military group put in a ministry under new leadership.² Following the downfall of this cabinet (1914), Okuma, now 77 years of age, whose party, the former

¹ Rikken Doshikai (Unionist).

² Yamamoto.

Progressives, had been renamed the Nationalists (Kokumin-to), came into power. The formation of this ministry was seemingly a victory for the principle of cabinet responsibility for which Okuma had so long stood, but his victory was more apparent than real. In 1916, he was forced to give way to the Terauchi cabinet, representing the militaristic group. These cabinet changes, so confusing to the foreigner unfamiliar with local conditions, largely represent stages in the struggle between different factions, some of them in the bureaucracy, some of them in the lower house of the diet.

RESULTS OF THE PARTY STRUGGLE

The principle of ministerial responsibility to the diet has not been conceded, but as has been said, a compromise has been reached and maintained, too often by corrupt means, and in a kind of rough way the cabinet has come to represent, more nearly than some foreigners suspect, the sentiment of the nation. Back of all the kaleidoscopic changes, moreover, has been a bureaucracy which remains fairly constant while ministries come and go, and it is partly due to it that national policies have shown so steady an evolution as the years have passed. Unchanged by shifting currents of popular opinion has been, too, that remarkable group of men known as the *genro*, or "elder statesmen." They are the survivors of those remarkable Choshu and Satsuma ex-samurai who directed the transformation of the nation. Sadly depleted by death, they still have the ear of the emperor and in times of crisis are called upon by him for advice. Popular opinion is increasingly making itself felt in governmental policies. The franchise has been made more liberal; the electorate was

nearly doubled between 1890 and 1902. There is nothing in the constitution that would make impossible the granting of ministerial responsibility to the diet if in time that seemed wise to the emperor and his ministers.

THE DEATH OF THE EMPEROR MEIJI AND THE ACCESSION OF YOSHIHITO, 1912

One must pause long enough to record the death in 1912 of the emperor Mutsuhito, or Meiji as he is posthumously and more correctly known, and the accession of Yoshihito.¹ The event greatly stirred the nation, for added to the intense loyalty accorded the monarch was the special sentiment attached to the man who had held the throne in the years of the nation's transformation. He had been industrious, public-spirited, broad-minded, and of good judgment, willing to take the advice of his ministers. He did much to strengthen and nothing to weaken the intense loyalty of the nation for the throne. His successor seems likely to follow in his steps. What the effect upon the state would be if a self-assertive, injudicious monarch were to come to the throne, it is hard to say: the foundations of the constitution might be shaken. For the present, however, there seems to be no danger of this.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PROBLEMS, 1894-1917

The years that followed the war with China and the war with Russia saw a remarkable development in the economic life of the nation. In 1907 all but a few hundred miles of the private railways were purchased by the government and extended. Manufactures greatly increased, and Osaka,

¹ With his accession a new era, Taisho (Great Righteousness) began.

Tokyo, and other cities became large factory centers, reminding the traveller of the industrialized West. In manufactures the leading place was held by textile plants which produced cloth and yarn for home and foreign consumption, but there was also a great increase in the output of machinery and chemicals. The European conflict brought unprecedented demands for war supplies, principally from Russia, lessened the competition in China, and opened up new markets in India. Under the stimulus the manufacturers of the nation have become rich; the number of listed millionaires has passed the five hundred mark. Banks, both public and private, have grown in accumulated capital and deposits. Fire and life insurance companies have appeared and prospered. Originally, many industries were undertaken under governmental initiative, but as the years have passed and the nation has become adjusted to the new methods, official participation has been confined chiefly to a few state monopolies, a protective tariff, research laboratories, and government-aided industrial banks. Scientific forestry has been encouraged, to develop and conserve the great timbered areas of the islands, more than half of which are in the possession of the state and the crown. Fisheries, one of the great sources of the nation's food, have been subsidized. Agricultural schools and experiment stations aid the farmer in his struggle to provide the growing population with food-stuffs. Partly as a result, the yield of grain per acre has increased from a tenth to a half. Agricultural banks fostered by the government provide the farmer with money on long-term loans at a low interest rate. The reclamation of waste lands and the clearing of new lands, especially in Yezo, are encouraged. In spite of its growing population the nation still produces nearly all of its own food. The majority of the farms are cultivated by

their owners and the nation has a sturdy, independent, peasant class. Mining has developed. The copper ores for which Japan was famous in feudal days have continued to yield large and increasing quantities of the metal for export. Zinc and sulphur have been produced in amounts more than sufficient for home consumption. Iron does not exist in any quantity, Japan's supply of that metal coming principally from the continent and America, but coal is found in fairly extensive deposits and is mined both for home consumption and for export. The growth in the mercantile marine has been spectacular. The gross tonnage leaped from 15,000 in 1893 to 1,522,000 at the end of 1905: by March, 1914, it had passed the two million mark, and since the war began with its stimulus to ship-building, the figures have still further increased. Generous government bounties and subsidies have stimulated the construction of ships and have encouraged the extension of lines to China and on the waters of the Yangtze and its tributaries, and to North and South America, Australia, and Europe. Splendidly organized financial and commercial houses have established branches in the leading business centers of the world. It is of interest to notice that the largest of these houses, such as Mitsui and Company, are undertaking a wide variety of enterprises. They manufacture, engage in shipping and in commerce, and show much the same tendency toward centralization in finance and industry as does the government in politics. The nation has ceased to be exclusively agricultural and is making giant strides toward the leadership that it aspires to hold in the commercial and manufacturing life of the Far East and the North Pacific basin. Cities have grown by leaps and bounds, Tokyo and Osaka ranking in population among the leading ones of the world. They have as a

rule been well and honestly governed, much more so than many American cities. Modern water-works and sewage systems, electric lights and tramcars, and parks and playgrounds add to their health and convenience.

And yet the industrialization of the nation is not complete. Japanese laborers are not yet, man for man, the equal in efficiency and skill of those of the West. Too many factory hands are women and children, labor that from its very nature is more or less irregular. A large amount of human energy is still employed to do tasks that in the West are performed by machinery. The iron and steel industry is still in its infancy. The nation does not now, even after the vast additions brought by war prosperity, possess sufficient stocks of commercial capital of its own to enable it to carry out the plans of development at home and in China to which its ambition calls it. In China the first place in foreign trade is still held by Great Britain. Japan is still staggering under a heavy load of debt acquired in the process of development and through the wars and armaments necessitated by its determination to win and make safe for itself a "place in the sun"; and although taxes are not as heavy as during Tokugawa times, they are still extremely high. The leaders of the nation believe, however, that the country is just at the beginning of a long age of development that will free it from debt and make it the dominant economic, as it is now the dominant political power, in the Far East. The prosperity brought by the war has seemed to hasten the time when that dream will be realized.

EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PROBLEMS, 1894-1917

The growth of schools and the spread of the new learning have been steady. The system of public education had

been sketched out and inaugurated long before the war with China. The outlines have been filled in since then, however, and new features have been added. The elementary school course, attendance at which is compulsory, has been lengthened from four years to six, and the percentage of children who are not receiving the prescribed instruction has declined to less than two. The number of institutions of learning of practically all classes has increased and the universities are producing scholars who are beginning to make valuable contributions to the world's stock of knowledge. Especially noteworthy has been the popularity of technical education. Secondary and higher education for women, while not yet provided for as fully as in many progressive countries of the West, has displayed a rapid growth. Uniform textbooks for the empire have been adopted, teachers are carefully trained, and an earnest effort has been made to raise and keep the standards of efficiency and scholarship up to the highest of the age. Japan, especially Tokyo, is the educational center of the Far East. Chinese students have come by the thousands and representatives are to be found from most of the other principal countries of Eastern Asia.

The educational system is not without its problems and defects. The teachers are too frequently underpaid; funds needed for schools have sometimes been diverted for armaments and war expenses. The facilities in the higher institutions are far from sufficient to accommodate all those who apply for admission, and there results a competition which proves a fearful and sometimes unbearable strain on many of the nation's best young men; physical breakdowns and suicides among the student class are alarmingly common. The curricula are in places overloaded and the courses of study are too long. The Japanese boy is under a

handicap in having to learn the difficult Chinese characters and a literary language whose style is quite different from the colloquial. If he acquires an Occidental language, as he is compelled to do in the higher schools, he finds it a more difficult task than does a European, for it is not at all cognate to his own. In spite of problems and obstacles, however, the educational system is noteworthy and has helped remarkably to equip the nation for the new age.

LITERATURE, 1894-1917

Newspapers have grown in circulation and influence, especially since the war with China. They are read by everyone and vary from the staid, semi-official sheets with a carefully correct style to the yellow press which nourishes jingoism and talks blatantly of Japan's rights and ambitions and of a Pan-Asia led by Japan. A censorship is still maintained and together with a revised press law, attempts to restrain the worst excesses of unbalanced journalism. Translations of foreign works have continued to multiply and native books dealing with modern topics in an easy literary style appear in ever larger numbers. The theater flourishes, both in a native, a modified native, and a foreign style. Art continues, although often sadly commercialized. A few artists and craftsmen still cling to the strictly classical models of the past, a few affect a purely Western style, but the great majority seek to combine the old and the new, and are typical of the eclecticism of the new Japan.

MORAL, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS

The moral and social conditions of the country have distressed many observers, both native and foreign. In these phases of its life the nation has many characteristics of

an age of rapid transition. Cities have grown amazingly and in spite of their honest and efficient administration there have come with them the social and moral problems of their counterparts in the West. Labor unions have appeared, although their organization has been officially discouraged, and during the depression that followed the Russian war strikes occurred. Socialism has found a few adherents, even though it is unpopular with the mass of the nation, and some of its manifestations have been proscribed by the government. Women and girls are employed in the factories. Too frequently they are exploited by pitiless or careless mill-owners and are compelled to work on excessively long shifts for hopelessly inadequate wages and to live in surroundings that are a disgrace to the nation. The social evil has long been present and as in the West it has been alarmingly aggravated under the shifting standards of modern life. Commercial morality, while it has risen and was probably never at as low an ebb as is currently believed by the West, is by no means ideal. There is political corruption, although it is not nearly as aggravated or widespread as it has been at times in America. There is, too, a spirit of jingoism and chauvinism abroad in the land which is perhaps the natural outcome of Japan's rapid rise to the position of a first-class power, combined with her intense patriotism, but which is no less dangerous and unpleasant for her neighbors. Some enthusiasts believe their nation's culture to be the best in the world and speak glibly of the duty of spreading it. They are not, one is glad to say, representative of the best in the nation. With the coming of modern science and Occidental philosophy the traditional religious convictions and with them the moral standards of many have been shattered. Shinto has never been strong on its ethical side. Buddhism has shown signs of renewed

activity and adaptability under the stimulus of danger. It has some highly educated men among its leaders and has organized Young Men's Buddhist Associations and schools for religious instruction on the models of the approved methods of the Christian church. In spite of these efforts, however, it has lost its hold on numbers, both of the thoughtful and the unthoughtful. The formal instruction in ethics in the public schools, even when reënforced by patriotism, does not adequately supply that emotional element which is so inseparable from robust morals. While Christianity has partially recovered from its unpopularity of the nineties, and has an influence out of proportion to its numerical strength, it has never been able completely to dispel the impression that it is unpatriotic, an impression which is perhaps partly the fruit of the propagandism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, partly of the international spirit of Christianity, a contrast to the intense and rather narrow patriotism of Japan, and partly of its Occidental dress.

There is, however, cause for encouragement. In some factories the owners are undertaking to improve the living and working conditions of the employees, and the diet passed a national factory act in 1911. Abuses have been prevalent in Japan, as in every country in the initial stages of the industrial revolution, but thoughtful men are attacking them. In morals, as in most phases of their life, the Japanese are their own severest critics and many of their leading statesmen are keenly alive to the disintegration threatened by the new age and are striving to counteract it. Conferences of representatives of the leading religions of the land have met at the call of the government to consider means of meeting it, although one is sorry to say that these gatherings have been too formal and perfunctory to accomplish much. Numerous charitable institutions have

been founded, most of them under Christian auspices, to help alleviate human suffering. There are able and zealous leaders both in the Christian and Buddhist churches who are striving to raise the spiritual and ethical tone of the nation. The leading school authorities have earnestly grappled with the problem of moral education; in each classroom, for example, is posted a copy of the imperial rescript of 1890 setting forth and commanding the observance of fundamental moral principles, and the effort is made through the curriculum to elaborate on these. The people are essentially sound and there is much ground for hope that the vices so often associated with periods of marked transition will not be fastened so firmly on the country as to prove its undoing.

SUMMARY

The past few pages picture but hastily and inadequately the changes in the internal life of the nation during the past twenty-five years. Enough has perhaps been said, however, to indicate that transition did not end with the promulgation of the constitution or the war with China. It has been going on rapidly ever since and is still in progress. Even in her cities, Japan has not fully adjusted herself to Occidental ways. The industrial revolution has only fairly begun and with it the nation's commercial development. Literature, art, education, and religion are still in a state of flux. In these lines especially the nation is only beginning to emerge from the stage of adaptation and assimilation to that of constructive achievement. What the Japanese genius is to produce and what the nation is to be and do when it completely finishes the process of adjustment, no one can yet accurately predict. Japan will hardly be content to be an imitator and there is much in her past history that leads one

to hope for new and valuable contributions to world culture. It is certain, however, that Japan's future is inseparably bound up with that of China. It is certain, too, that the rapid rise to prominence of the Far East during the past half century is to be no transient phenomenon. Japan and China are for better or for worse to bulk increasingly large in world affairs and will need more than ever before to be taken into consideration by Europe and America.

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